PKI Consortium blog
Posts by tag WebTrust
9 Common Myths About CAs
August 1, 2019 by Tim Callan (Sectigo) CA/Browser Forum CASC Code Signing Encryption ETSI Identity Malware PKI Qualified Revocation SSL/TLS Vulnerability WebTrust
Over the years misconceptions about CAs and the SSL infrastructure have arisen. Below is a list of common myths related to SSL and CAs. Myth #1: CAs are not regulated Fact: CAs are subject to various checks and balances, including third-party qualified audits through WebTrust or ETSI and strict criteria set forth by leading browsers, before they are accepted in browser root stores. Similarly, the CA/Browser Forum’s Baseline Requirements and Network Security Guidelines establish global standards for certificate issuance and CA controls that will soon be included in third-party auditing standards.
CA/B Forum Istanbul 2015
November 10, 2015 by Dean Coclin Chrome eIDAS Qualified Root Program WebTrust
While some face to face meetings can be rather mundane and boring, that can’t be said about October’s CA/B Forum meeting in Istanbul, Turkey. Guest speaker Andrea Servida from the European Commission gave an overview of the new eIDAS regulation on electronic identification and trust services. While not everyone in the room agreed with his points, all were made aware that this has now become the law in the EU and certificate authorities which plan to issue the new EU Qualified website certificates must comply with it.
Fighting the Good Fight for Online Trust
April 2, 2015 by CA Security Council Apple CAA CASC Google HSM Mis-issued MITM Mozilla Policy Root Program SSL/TLS WebTrust
Once again Browsers and Certificate Authorities are in the news over the reported mis-issuance of an SSL server certificate to a google.com domain. Discovered by Google most likely via technology known as key pinning and discussed by Google’s Adam Langley in this blog, a Chinese certificate authority, CNNIC (Chinese Internet Network Information Center), apparently issued an intermediate certificate to an Egyptian company called MCS Holdings. Because the CNNIC root certificate is included in the root store of most major browsers, users would not see any warnings on sites that have certificates issued by CNNIC or MCS Holdings.
SSL Certificate Validity Periods Limited to 39 Months Starting in April
February 19, 2015 by Jeremy Rowley CA/Browser Forum ETSI Policy SSL/TLS Vulnerability WebTrust
In accordance with the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements, effective April 1, 2015, Certificate Authorities (CAs) will no longer be able to issue SSL Certificates with a validity period longer than 39 months. Shortening the validity period to 39 months is the result of much consideration within the CA/Browser Forum to arrive at a duration that allows optimal usability while maintaining the tightest network security. A shortened validity period will significantly improve Internet security by requiring administrators to renew and verify their certificates more often.
Who Sets the Rules Governing Certification Authorities?
August 19, 2014 by Kirk Hall CA/Browser Forum Code Signing DV Encryption ETSI EV Google Hash Function Identity IETF Microsoft Mozilla OCSP Policy Revocation Root Program SSL/TLS WebTrust
Every time something positive is published about SSL and encryption,such as Google’s recent decision making use of https encryption a favorable rating factor for a website, or negative, such as the Heartbleed issue – bloggers and others always post questions about public Certification Authorities (CAs), including general questions on who sets the rules that govern CAs. Some bloggers seem to assume there are no rules or standards, and that CAs can operate without any requirements or limitations at all — that’s incorrect.
In the Wake of Unauthorized Certificate Issuance by the Indian CA NIC, can Government CAs Still be Considered “Trusted Third Parties”?
July 24, 2014 by Ben Wilson CA/Browser Forum CAA CASC Chrome ETSI Firefox Google Microsoft Mis-issued Mozilla OCSP PKI Policy Revocation SSL/TLS Trust List WebTrust
Short answer: Government CAs can still be considered “trusted third parties,” provided that they follow the rules applicable to commercial CAs. Introduction On July 8 Google announced that it had discovered several unauthorized Google certificates issued by the National Informatics Centre of India. It noted that the Indian government CA’s certificates were in the Microsoft Root Store and used by programs on the Windows platform. The Firefox browser on Windows uses its own root store and didn’t have these CA certificates.
Certificate Authority Audits and Browser Root Program Requirements
October 15, 2013 by Kirk Hall AICPA CA/Browser Forum CASC ETSI EV ISO ITU Microsoft Policy Qualified Root Program SSL/TLS WebTrust
Recent news stories have highlighted the need for strong security in online communications, and use of SSL certificates issued by a publicly trusted Certification Authority (CA) is perhaps the best way to achieve that. But why should the public trust SSL certificates issued from commercial CA roots, which are embedded as trust anchors in web browsers? One answer is because of the multiple layers of standards and tough requirements that all commercial CAs must meet – and for which they are audited every year.
CAs Support Standards and Regulations
May 10, 2013 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) CA/Browser Forum CASC CICA ETSI EV SSL/TLS WebTrust
There is an industry myth that certification authorities (CAs) are not regulated. In fact publicly-trusted SSL CAs support the development of industry regulations and have been audited annually to ensure compliance to the many requirements. To provide some history, SSL CAs have always self-policed themselves by having external audits performed. In the ‘90s, the CAs wrote certificate policies and certification practice statements requiring annual compliance audits. Since there were no CA audit criteria, the CAs contracted for SAS 70 audits.