PKI Consortium blog

Posts by tag TLS 1.1

The CA Security Council Looks Ahead to 2020 and Beyond
January 9, 2020 by Patrick Nohe (GlobalSign), Doug Beattie (GlobalSign) Apple CA/Browser Forum Chrome Edge Encryption EV Firefox Forward Secrecy GDPR Google Identity Microsoft Mozilla PKI Policy Qualified SSL 3.0 SSL/TLS TLS 1.0 TLS 1.1 TLS 1.2 TLS 1.3 Web PKI
A whirlwind of activity will cause dramatic shifts across the PKI world in the year ahead Suffice it to say that 2019 was filled with challenges and contentiousness as Certificate Authorities and Browsers began to watch their shared visions diverge. The debate around Extended Validation continued as CAs pushed for a range of reforms and browsers pushed to strip its visual indicators. And a ballot to shorten maximum certificate validity periods exposed fault-lines at the CAB Forum.

A Follow-up on POODLE and SSL 3.0
November 21, 2014 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) Attack Encryption Google IETF Mozilla OpenSSL SSL 3.0 SSL/TLS TLS 1.0 TLS 1.1 TLS 1.3 Vulnerability
In October 2014, Google announced POODLE, an SSL 3.0 protocol attack. To bring you up to speed, the SSL/TLS protocol is the most important and popular security protocol on the Internet. The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol was developed by Netscape. They quickly moved from SSL 1.0 to 2.0 and finalized with SSL 3.0 in 1996. This protocol was then picked up by the IETF, who released it under the name of Transport Layer Security (TLS).

Heartbleed Bug Vulnerability: Discovery, Impact and Solution
April 9, 2014 by Jeremy Rowley Attack BEAST CASC CSR DTLS Encryption Google OpenSSL SSL/TLS TLS 1.0 TLS 1.1 Vulnerability
On April 7, 2014, a vulnerability in the OpenSSL cryptographic library was announced to the Internet community. Aptly labeled as the Heartbleed bug, this vulnerability affects OpenSSL versions 1.0.1 through 1.0.1f (inclusive). The Heartbleed bug is not a flaw in the SSL or TLS protocols; rather, it is a flaw in the OpenSSL implementation of the TLS/DTLS heartbeat functionality. The flaw is not related or introduced by publicly trusted certificates and is instead a problem with server software.

Reducing the Impact of Government Spying
April 4, 2014 by Jeremy Rowley CASC Encryption Forward Secrecy Malware PKI RC4 RSA SHA2 SSL/TLS TLS 1.1 Vulnerability
Last year, Edward Snowden, an American computer-specialist working as a contractor for the National Security Agency (“NSA”), shocked web-users around the world by publicizing documents showing that the NSA was gathering intelligence on Internet users. The realization that the US government was gathering sensitive information has led to a worldwide demand for better protection of online communication and data and a general worry about the effectiveness of existing infrastructures. Specifically, some entities have asked whether PKI is still a robust way to protect online information.

It’s Time for TLS 1.2
September 19, 2013 by Wayne Thayer Attack BEAST Chrome Firefox OCSP RC4 SHA2 SSL 3.0 SSL/TLS TLS 1.0 TLS 1.1 TLS 1.2 Vulnerability
In a previous post titled Getting the Most Out of SSL Part 2, we touched on the recommendation that Web servers be configured to prefer Transport Layer Security (TLS) version 1.2. With the planned release of Firefox 24 and recent release of Chrome 29 adding support for TLS 1.2, now is a great time for website administrators to make the switch. Transport Layer Security was formerly called Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and is the protocol that enables secure “https://” connections to websites.

Encryption Still Works – It’s About How You Implement It
September 13, 2013 by Ben Wilson ECC Encryption Malware RSA SHA1 SHA2 SSL/TLS TLS 1.1 Vulnerability
The September 5th joint article by the New York Times and Guardian newspapers on NSA’s and GCHQ’s efforts to circumvent encryption implementation have left many people speculating on the security of the data they are transmitting over the Internet. Hopefully, this blog post will provide some guidance and help understand SSL in light of these recent articles. Importantly, the articles point out that the primary means of attacking SSL/TLS do not exploit a vulnerability in the protocol itself but instead aim to exploit poor implementations of the protocol, insecure servers, and weak cryptography.

RSA Recap – Securing Your Site
March 8, 2013 by Ben Wilson BEAST CASC Encryption Firefox Hash Function HSTS OpenSSL Policy RSA SSL/TLS TLS 1.1 TLS 1.2 Vulnerability
At RSA last week a few of us participated in panel discussions that focused on SSL/TLS. During the panel that I moderated on Friday, one theme we addressed was secure server configuration. One of CASC’s goals is to help harden existing SSL/TLS implementations against vulnerabilities—because most SSL/TLS exploits arise from suboptimal website configurations. These vulnerabilities and attacks can be mitigated or even eliminated with proper server configuration and good website design.

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