PKI Consortium blog

Posts by tag Root Program

    One Year Certs
    July 9, 2020 by Patrick Nohe (GlobalSign) Apple CA/Browser Forum DV Google Identity Microsoft PKI Policy Root Program SHA1 SHA2 SSL/TLS
    Starting on September 1st, SSL/TLS certificates cannot be issued for longer than 13 months (397 days). This change was first announced by Apple at the CA/Browser Forum Spring Face-to-Face event in Bratislava back in March.

    CA/B Forum Istanbul 2015
    November 10, 2015 by Dean Coclin Chrome eIDAS Qualified Root Program WebTrust
    While some face to face meetings can be rather mundane and boring, that can’t be said about October’s CA/B Forum meeting in Istanbul, Turkey. Guest speaker Andrea Servida from the European Commission gave an overview of the new eIDAS regulation on electronic identification and trust services. While not everyone in the room agreed with his points, all were made aware that this has now become the law in the EU and certificate authorities which plan to issue the new EU Qualified website certificates must comply with it.

    Fighting the Good Fight for Online Trust
    April 2, 2015 by CA Security Council Apple CAA CASC Google HSM Mis-issued MITM Mozilla Policy Root Program SSL/TLS WebTrust
    Once again Browsers and Certificate Authorities are in the news over the reported mis-issuance of an SSL server certificate to a google.com domain. Discovered by Google most likely via technology known as key pinning and discussed by Google’s Adam Langley in this blog, a Chinese certificate authority, CNNIC (Chinese Internet Network Information Center), apparently issued an intermediate certificate to an Egyptian company called MCS Holdings. Because the CNNIC root certificate is included in the root store of most major browsers, users would not see any warnings on sites that have certificates issued by CNNIC or MCS Holdings.

    Who Sets the Rules Governing Certification Authorities?
    August 19, 2014 by Kirk Hall CA/Browser Forum Code Signing DV Encryption ETSI EV Google Hash Function Identity IETF Microsoft Mozilla OCSP Policy Revocation Root Program SSL/TLS WebTrust
    Every time something positive is published about SSL and encryption,such as Google’s recent decision making use of https encryption a favorable rating factor for a website, or negative, such as the Heartbleed issue – bloggers and others always post questions about public Certification Authorities (CAs), including general questions on who sets the rules that govern CAs. Some bloggers seem to assume there are no rules or standards, and that CAs can operate without any requirements or limitations at all — that’s incorrect.

    CA Day in Berlin
    January 24, 2014 by Dean Coclin eIDAS ETSI EV Microsoft PKI Qualified Root Program RSA SSL/TLS TSP
    “CA Day” (also known as CA Conformity Assessment) was hosted by the German company TuVIT in Berlin on January 16, 2014. In attendance were approximately 100 people from mostly European CAs. Under the European regulatory framework, CAs are included in a group referred to as “Trust Service Providers” or “TSPs.” CASC members in attendance at CA Day were Symantec, Digicert and Comodo. The dominant theme for this CA Day was the draft Regulation on Electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market (eIDAS) and upcoming changes in EU regulations for Qualified Certificates, which was briefed by Gerard Galler from the European Commission and discussed in greater detail by several European TSPs.

    Intermediate CA Certificates and Their Potential For Misuse For Man-In-The-Middle Attacks
    January 9, 2014 by Robin Alden (Sectigo) Attack Firefox Google MITM Policy Root Program SSL/TLS Vulnerability
    We have seen recently that Google detected that publicly trusted TLS/(SSL) certificates had been created for Google domains without having been requested by Google themselves. The existence of such certificates might usually be taken as an indication of misissuance by the issuing CA (i.e. a failure or mistake by the CA which allowed the issuance of an end-entity certificate otherwise than in accordance with their policy) or as an indication of compromise of the issuing CA.

    Certificate Authority Audits and Browser Root Program Requirements
    October 15, 2013 by Kirk Hall AICPA CA/Browser Forum CASC ETSI EV ISO ITU Microsoft Policy Qualified Root Program SSL/TLS WebTrust
    Recent news stories have highlighted the need for strong security in online communications, and use of SSL certificates issued by a publicly trusted Certification Authority (CA) is perhaps the best way to achieve that. But why should the public trust SSL certificates issued from commercial CA roots, which are embedded as trust anchors in web browsers? One answer is because of the multiple layers of standards and tough requirements that all commercial CAs must meet – and for which they are audited every year.

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