PKI Consortium blog
Posts by tag Revocation
Who Sets the Rules Governing Certification Authorities?
August 19, 2014 by Kirk Hall (Entrust) CA/Browser Forum Code Signing DV Encryption ETSI EV Google Hash Function Identity IETF Microsoft Mozilla OCSP Policy Revocation Root Program SSL/TLS WebTrust
Every time something positive is published about SSL and encryption,such as Google’s recent decision making use of https encryption a favorable rating factor for a website, or negative, such as the Heartbleed issue – bloggers and others always post questions about public Certification Authorities (CAs), including general questions on who sets the rules that govern CAs. Some bloggers seem to assume there are no rules or standards, and that CAs can operate without any requirements or limitations at all — that’s incorrect.
In the Wake of Unauthorized Certificate Issuance by the Indian CA NIC, can Government CAs Still be Considered “Trusted Third Parties”?
July 24, 2014 by Ben Wilson CA/Browser Forum CAA CASC Chrome ETSI Firefox Google Microsoft Mis-issued Mozilla OCSP PKI Policy Revocation SSL/TLS Trust List WebTrust
Short answer: Government CAs can still be considered “trusted third parties,” provided that they follow the rules applicable to commercial CAs. Introduction On July 8 Google announced that it had discovered several unauthorized Google certificates issued by the National Informatics Centre of India. It noted that the Indian government CA’s certificates were in the Microsoft Root Store and used by programs on the Windows platform. The Firefox browser on Windows uses its own root store and didn’t have these CA certificates.
June 18, 2014 by Bruce Morton (Entrust), Rick Andrews Announcement Revocation SSL/TLS
With the announcement of the Heartbleed bug and the resulting need to revoke large numbers of SSL certificates, the topic of certificate revocation has, once again, come to the fore. There have been many issues with how revocation information is provided to the browsers. First let’s review how SSL certificate status may currently be obtained: How | How | Definition | Pros | Cons | | signed list of the serial numbers of all revoked certificates that were signed by the CA’s certificate.
CASC Heartbleed Response
May 8, 2014 by CA Security Council CASC Chrome CRL Google Malware OCSP Revocation SSL/TLS
The recent Heartbleed issue has reawakened interest in SSL certificate revocation (see Adam Langley’s blog, Larry Seltzer’s articles here and here, and Steve Gibson’s web pages) Several years ago, the CA Browser Forum convened a special Revocation Working Group to explore issues and solutions. Leading CAs were actively involved in that group, and many of them invested in moving their OCSP responders to high-performance, high-availability Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) to respond to browser vendors’ requests for increased performance and reliability.
Revocation – A Cure For the Common Heartbleed
April 28, 2014 by Jeremy Rowley Attack CASC Chrome CRL Google Identity OCSP Revocation SSL/TLS
The Heartbleed bug spurred server administrators worldwide to work closely with Certification Authorities (CAs) in rekeying and reissuing potentially vulnerable SSL certificates. Part of this effort included revoking existing certificates used on vulnerable servers to ensure obtained private keys are not later used in a man-in-the-middle attack against the website. Unfortunately, in recent days, certain news reports and blogs addressing certificate revocation and checking for revoked certificates online have failed to discuss the benefits of revocation, instead focusing on the minority of circumstances where widely deployed revocation is not perfect.
CA Security Council Members Presentation at RSA 2014 Conference: New Ideas on CAA, CT, and Public Key Pinning for a Safer Internet
March 17, 2014 by Kirk Hall (Entrust) Attack CAA CASC Chrome EV Google IETF Microsoft Mis-issued OCSP Revocation RSA SSL/TLS Vulnerability
CA Security Council (CASC) members Trend Micro, Go Daddy, and Symantec participated in a discussion panel at the 2014 RSA Conference in San Francisco on February 24 entitled “New Ideas on CAA, CT, and Public Key Pinning for a Safer Internet.” Panel members included Kirk Hall of Trend Micro (Moderator), Wayne Thayer of GoDaddy (Panelist), and Rick Andrews of Symantec (Panelist). Introduction to the Topic Hall began by introducing the topic – all three alternative technologies (Certificate Transparency or CT, Certificate Authority Authorization or CAA, and Certificate Pinning) are intended to make the internet safer by dealing with mis-issued digital certificates, including so-called “rogue” certs like those obtained by a hacker from the now-defunct Diginotar Certification Authority (CA).
ICANN’s Accelerated gTLD Delegation Process and How This Impacts Your Organization
December 18, 2013 by Jeremy Rowley Announcement CA/Browser Forum CASC ICANN MITM Mozilla PKI Policy Qualified Revocation SSL/TLS Vulnerability
After the CASC’s previous letter addressing ICANN’s proposal to delegate nearly 2000 new gTLDs for use on the public Internet, ICANN identified and initiated an extensive study on two significant security issues. Now, based on the conclusions of the studies, ICANN is moving forward quickly with the delegation process, delegating more than 30 in the last two months alone. With ICANN ramping up the delegation process, nearly all 2000 will be delegated under the new rules, with only .
IETF 88 – Pervasive Surveillance
November 26, 2013 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) Attack CRL Encryption Forward Secrecy HSTS IETF PKI Revocation SSL/TLS Vulnerability Web PKI
Internet Surveillance The big news at IETF 88 in Vancouver was the technical plenary on Hardening the Internet which discussed the issue of pervasive surveillance. Pervasive surveillance is a mass surveillance of an entire or a substantial fraction of a population. The surveillance is usually carried out by government, is not targeted and its occurrence may not be overt. It was noted that pervasive surveillance, of the kind revealed in the Snowden-sourced documents, constitutes a misguided and damaging attack on civic society in general and the Internet in particular.
Certificate Chains, Key Management and the Number of CAs Counted by Web Crawlers – Oh My
November 4, 2013 by Ryan Hurst CRL Microsoft OCSP PKI Policy Revocation SSL/TLS
Have you ever wondered why your web server certificate has a “chain” of other certificates associated with it? The main reason is so that browsers can tell if your certificate was issued by an organization that has been verified to meet the security, policy and operational practices that all Publicly Trusted Certificate Authorities are mandated to meet. That certificate at the top of the chain is commonly called the “root.” It’s signature on a certificate below it indicates that the organization operating the root believes that practices of the CA below it meets that same high bar.
The (Soon to Be) Not-So Common Name
October 8, 2013 by Ryan Hurst CA/Browser Forum CRL Encryption Identity IETF Revocation SSL/TLS Vulnerability
If you are reading this post you are probably already familiar with the use of digital certificates and SSL even if you may not be familiar with the history. Before exploring the history of SSL, let’s review at its core what a digital certificate actually is. Fundamentally, a digital certificate is the binding of entitlements and constraints to a key, in other words a digital certificate would dictate the following, “The holder of the private key associated with this certificate can rightfully use the name John Smith when signing emails.