PKI Consortium blog
Posts by tag Policy
One Year Certs
July 9, 2020 by
Patrick Nohe
(GlobalSign)
Apple
CA/Browser Forum
DV
Google
Identity
Microsoft
PKI
Policy
Root Program
SHA1
SHA2
SSL/TLS
Starting on September 1st, SSL/TLS certificates cannot be issued for longer than 13 months (397 days). This change was first announced by Apple at the CA/Browser Forum Spring Face-to-Face event in Bratislava back in March.
Digital Trust Is Elusive – Are Qualified Trust Services A Solution?
May 1, 2020 by
Sebastian Schulz
Attack
eIDAS
ENISA
ETSI
Phishing
Policy
QTSP
Qualified
SSL/TLS
Trust List
TSP
A popular saying goes: “Trust takes years to build, seconds to break, and forever to repair.”
While I wouldn’t completely agree, the idea isn’t wrong. In real life trust between two parties is established over some period of time, depending on a variety of factors. Have you ever wondered why you initially trust some people more and others less, even if you’ve never met them before? There are a complicated multitude of factors that influence our thoughts: the person’s appearance, tone of voice, title or rank, etc.
The CA Security Council Looks Ahead to 2020 and Beyond
January 9, 2020 by
Patrick Nohe
(GlobalSign),
Doug Beattie
(GlobalSign)
Apple
CA/Browser Forum
Chrome
Edge
Encryption
EV
Firefox
Forward Secrecy
GDPR
Google
Identity
Microsoft
Mozilla
PKI
Policy
Qualified
SSL 3.0
SSL/TLS
TLS 1.0
TLS 1.1
TLS 1.2
TLS 1.3
Web PKI
A whirlwind of activity will cause dramatic shifts across the PKI world in the year ahead Suffice it to say that 2019 was filled with challenges and contentiousness as Certificate Authorities and Browsers began to watch their shared visions diverge. The debate around Extended Validation continued as CAs pushed for a range of reforms and browsers pushed to strip its visual indicators. And a ballot to shorten maximum certificate validity periods exposed fault-lines at the CAB Forum.
Chrome Kills Mixed Content for HTTPS
December 6, 2019 by
Bruce Morton
(Entrust)
Attack
Chrome
Firefox
Mixed Content
Policy
SSL/TLS
In a phased approach, Chrome plans to block mixed content on secure websites to improve user security. Most browsers already block some mixed content such as scripts and iframes by default. Chrome is amping it up by gradually taking steps to also block images, audio recordings and videos, according to a recent Google Security blog. Preventing mixed content to load will eventually result in HTTPS websites losing their security indicator downgrading the site to HTTP, which alerts visitors that the site is not secure.
The Insecure Elephant in the Room
October 10, 2019 by
Paul Walsh
2FA
Android
Attack
Chrome
DV
Encryption
EV
Firefox
Google
Identity
Malware
Microsoft
Mozilla
Phishing
Policy
Revocation
SSL/TLS
Vulnerability
W3C
The purpose of this article The purpose of this article is to demonstrate why I believe browser-based UI for website identity can make the web safer for everyone. I explain in great detail, the reasons why the UI and UX didn’t work in the past. And what’s left is only making the problem worse instead of better.
Some people seem to find it difficult to consume my thoughts about the enforcement of “HTTPS EVERYWHERE”, free DV certs and the browser padlock.
What Are Subordinate CAs and Why Would You Want Your Own?
June 26, 2019 by
Doug Beattie
(GlobalSign)
CA/Browser Forum
Chrome
Code Signing
CRL
ECC
eIDAS
Encryption
EV
HSM
Identity
Microsoft
OCSP
PKI
Policy
Revocation
RSA
S/MIME
SSL/TLS
Digital certificate and PKI adoption has changed quite a bit in recent years. Gone are the days where certificates were only synonymous with SSL/TLS; compliance drivers like stronger authentication requirements and digital signature regulations (e.g. eIDAS) have greatly expanded the role of PKI within the enterprise.
As PKI usage has expanded, conversation has moved beyond just the number and type of certificates needed and onto deeper dialogue about custom PKI deployments.
2019 – Looking Back, Moving Forward
January 3, 2019 by
Bruce Morton
(Entrust)
Attack
CA/Browser Forum
Certificate Expiry
Chrome
Code Signing
DV
ECC
EV
Forward Secrecy
Identity
Mis-issued
Phishing
PKI
Policy
Qualified
Revocation
RSA
SSL/TLS
TLS 1.0
TLS 1.3
Vulnerability
Looking Back at 2018 2018 was an active year for SSL/TLS. We saw the SSL/TLS certificate validity period drop to 825-days and the mass deployment of Certificate Transparency (CT). TLS 1.3 protocol was finally completed and published; and Chrome status bar security indicators changing to remove “secure” and to concentrate on “not secure.” The CA/Browser Forum has been reformed, the London Protocol was announced and the nearly full distrust of Symantec SSL completed.
CA/Browser Forum Governance Reform
May 18, 2018 by
Dean Coclin
Apple
CA/Browser Forum
Code Signing
Policy
S/MIME
SSL/TLS
In March 2016, the CA/Browser Forum formed a working group to review potential ways to restructure the forum. The primary goal was to examine ideas so the Forum could work on other types of standards besides TLS. Ben Wilson and I chaired this group with excellent participation from a cross functional team of browser and certificate authority representatives as well as interested parties. After 2 years of efforts, the working group produced Ballot 206 which passed in April 2017.
Certificate Transparency Deadline Moved to April 2018
May 3, 2017 by
Bruce Morton
(Entrust)
Chrome
Google
IETF
Policy
SSL/TLS
Google just announced they will not be enforcing certificate transparency (CT) logging for all new TLS certificates until April 2018. In a previous blog post, we advised that Google provided a new policy, which required new TLS certificates to be published to the CT logs in order for the domain to be trusted by Chrome.
The reason for the delay was not clear, but Google needs to consider the following:
The Latest on Certification Authority Authorization
March 21, 2017 by
Jeremy Rowley
Attack
CA/Browser Forum
CAA
Encryption
Identity
OV
PKI
Policy
Qualified
Things are certainly heating up at the CA/Browser with exciting proposals surrounding inclusion of the Wi-Fi Alliance (WFA) as a subjectAltName otherName, new validation methods, and debates over how the CAB Forum will continue operating. One of these newly passed ballots requires all CAs to check and process a domain name’s DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) resource record prior to issuing a digital certificate.
Background RFC 6844 created CAA records as a method for domain owners to specify a policy on which certificate authorities are authorized to issue certificates for the associated domain.