PKI Consortium blog
Posts by tag Phishing
How to do HTTPS … The Right Way
June 2, 2020 by
Corey Bonnell
(DigiCert)
CAA
Identity
Phishing
Site Seal
SSL/TLS
With secure HTTP — aka HTTPS (the “S” is short for “secure”) — swiftly becoming universal on the Internet, it is important to know how to configure HTTPS for your website the right way. The payoff for properly securing your website has many benefits.
Don’t ‘Compromise’ Your Code Amid Malware Mayhem
May 12, 2020 by
Abul Salek
(Sectigo)
CA/Browser Forum
Code Signing
EV
FIPS
HSM
Malware
Microsoft
Phishing
SSL/TLS
Code Signing Certificates demand a price premium in the underground online marketplace. This is no surprise considering that criminals sometimes use them to dupe their potential victims into installing malware in their machine.
Digital Trust Is Elusive – Are Qualified Trust Services A Solution?
May 1, 2020 by
Sebastian Schulz
Attack
eIDAS
ENISA
ETSI
Phishing
Policy
QTSP
Qualified
SSL/TLS
Trust List
TSP
A popular saying goes: “Trust takes years to build, seconds to break, and forever to repair.”
While I wouldn’t completely agree, the idea isn’t wrong. In real life trust between two parties is established over some period of time, depending on a variety of factors. Have you ever wondered why you initially trust some people more and others less, even if you’ve never met them before? There are a complicated multitude of factors that influence our thoughts: the person’s appearance, tone of voice, title or rank, etc. Trust is established over time but can be lost within a few moments.
Online Identity Is Important: Let’s Upgrade Extended Validation
October 21, 2019 by
Patrick Nohe
(GlobalSign)
Apple
CA/Browser Forum
Chrome
Code Signing
Encryption
EV
Google
Identity
Mozilla
Phishing
SSL/TLS
It’s time for the CA/Browser Forum to focus on the other half of its mandate
Let’s have a candid discussion about Extended Validation SSL. What’s working. What’s NOT. And what can be done to fix it so that all parties involved are satisfied.
The Insecure Elephant in the Room
October 10, 2019 by
Paul Walsh
2FA
Android
Attack
Chrome
DV
Encryption
EV
Firefox
Google
Identity
Malware
Microsoft
Mozilla
Phishing
Policy
Revocation
SSL/TLS
Vulnerability
W3C
The purpose of this article
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate why I believe browser-based UI for website identity can make the web safer for everyone. I explain in great detail, the reasons why the UI and UX didn’t work in the past. And what’s left is only making the problem worse instead of better.
Why Are You Removing Website Identity, Google and Mozilla?
August 27, 2019 by
Kirk Hall
(Entrust),
Tim Callan
(Sectigo)
CA/Browser Forum
Chrome
DV
Encryption
EV
Firefox
GDPR
Google
Identity
Malware
Mozilla
Phishing
SSL/TLS
You can’t have consumer privacy without having strong website identity
Today there’s a huge wave toward protecting consumer privacy – in Congress, with the GDPR, etc. – but how can we protect user privacy on the web without establishing the identity of the websites that are asking for consumer passwords and credit card numbers? Extended Validation (EV) certificates provide this information and can be very useful for consumers.
2019 – Looking Back, Moving Forward
January 3, 2019 by
Bruce Morton
(Entrust)
Attack
CA/Browser Forum
Certificate Expiry
Chrome
Code Signing
DV
ECC
EV
Forward Secrecy
Identity
Mis-issued
Phishing
PKI
Policy
Qualified
Revocation
RSA
SSL/TLS
TLS 1.0
TLS 1.3
Vulnerability
Looking Back at 2018
2018 was an active year for SSL/TLS. We saw the SSL/TLS certificate validity period drop to 825-days and the mass deployment of Certificate Transparency (CT). TLS 1.3 protocol was finally completed and published; and Chrome status bar security indicators changing to remove “secure” and to concentrate on “not secure.” The CA/Browser Forum has been reformed, the London Protocol was announced and the nearly full distrust of Symantec SSL completed. Here are some details on some of the 2018 happenings in the SSL/TLS ecosystem.
CA Security Council (CASC) 2019 Predictions: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
December 6, 2018 by
Bruce Morton
(Entrust),
Chris Bailey
(Entrust),
Jay Schiavo
(Entrust)
Apple
Attack
CASC
Chrome
DV
Encryption
EV
Firefox
Google
Identity
IETF
Malware
Microsoft
Phishing
SSL/TLS
TLS 1.0
TLS 1.2
TLS 1.3
As the legendary coach of the NY Yankees Yogi Berra allegedly said, “It’s difficult to make predictions, especially about the future.” But we’re going to try.
Here are the CA Security Council (CASC) 2019 Predictions: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.
The Good
Prediction: By the end of 2019, over 90% of the world’s http traffic will be secured over SSL/TLS
CASC Announces Launch of London Protocol to Improve Identity Assurance and Minimize Phishing on Identity Websites
June 27, 2018 by CA Security Council Attack CA/Browser Forum CASC DV EV Identity OV Phishing SSL/TLSLONDON – (June 27, 2018) – The Certificate Authority Security Council (CASC), an advocacy group committed to the advancement of the security of websites and online transactions, announced at the CA/Browser Forum event in London the launch of the London Protocol – an initiative to improve identity assurance and minimize the possibility of phishing activity on websites encrypted with organization validated (OV) and extended validation (EV) certificates, which contain organization identity information (Identity Certificates).
The London Protocol
June 27, 2018 by CA Security Council DV EV Identity OV PhishingThe objective of The London Protocol is to improve identity assurance and minimize the possibility of phishing activity on websites encrypted by OV (organization validated) and EV (extended validation) certificates (together referred to as “Identity Websites”). The London Protocol reinforces the distinction between Identity Websites making them even more secure for users than websites encrypted by DV (domain validated) certificates. That security feature can then be utilized by others for their own security purposes, including informing users as to the type of website they are visiting and use by antiphishing engines and browser filters in their security algorithms.
