PKI Consortium blog

Posts by tag Microsoft

    2014 – Looking Back, Moving Forward
    January 6, 2014 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) Attack BEAST CA/Browser Forum CAA Code Signing ECC Encryption Forward Secrecy HSTS ICANN IETF Microsoft MITM Mozilla PKI Policy RC4 RSA SHA1 SSL/TLS TLS 1.2
    Looking Back at 2013 Protocol Attacks The year started with a couple of SSL/TLS protocol attacks: Lucky Thirteen and RC4 attack. Lucky Thirteen allows the decryption of sensitive information, such as passwords and cookies, when using the CBC-mode cipher suite. Lucky Thirteen can be mitigated by implementing software patches or preferring the cipher suite RC4. That being said, RC4 was also attacked, where through 16 million sessions a small amount of plaintext can be recovered.

    SHA-1 Deprecation, On to SHA-2
    December 16, 2013 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) Code Signing Microsoft PKI Policy SHA1 SSL/TLS
    We have previously reviewed implementation of SHA-2, but with Bruce Schneier stating the need to migrate away from SHA-1 and the SHA-1 deprecation policy from Microsoft, the industry must make more progress in 2014. Web server administrators will have to make plans to move from SSL and code signing certificates signed with the SHA-1 hashing algorithm to certificates signed with SHA-2. This is the result of the new Microsoft Root Certificate Policy where Microsoft deprecates SHA-1 and imposes the following requirements:

    Certificate Chains, Key Management and the Number of CAs Counted by Web Crawlers – Oh My
    November 4, 2013 by Ryan Hurst CRL Microsoft OCSP PKI Policy Revocation SSL/TLS
    Have you ever wondered why your web server certificate has a “chain” of other certificates associated with it? The main reason is so that browsers can tell if your certificate was issued by an organization that has been verified to meet the security, policy and operational practices that all Publicly Trusted Certificate Authorities are mandated to meet. That certificate at the top of the chain is commonly called the “root.” It’s signature on a certificate below it indicates that the organization operating the root believes that practices of the CA below it meets that same high bar.

    Certificate Authority Audits and Browser Root Program Requirements
    October 15, 2013 by Kirk Hall AICPA CA/Browser Forum CASC ETSI EV ISO ITU Microsoft Policy Qualified Root Program SSL/TLS WebTrust
    Recent news stories have highlighted the need for strong security in online communications, and use of SSL certificates issued by a publicly trusted Certification Authority (CA) is perhaps the best way to achieve that. But why should the public trust SSL certificates issued from commercial CA roots, which are embedded as trust anchors in web browsers? One answer is because of the multiple layers of standards and tough requirements that all commercial CAs must meet – and for which they are audited every year.

    Some Comments on Web Security
    June 5, 2013 by CA Security Council Attack CA/Browser Forum CASC Google IETF Microsoft Mis-issued Policy SSL/TLS
    Steve Johnson of the Mercury News posted an article on Web security and highlighted some of the issues. The posted issues help to explain why we created the Certificate Authority Security Council. We want to determine the issues, have them addressed and provide awareness and education on the solutions. The CAs also work with the browsers and other experts in the industry to develop standards for all CAs to be audited against through the CA/Browser Forum.

    Getting the Most Out of SSL Part 1: Choose the Right Certificate
    May 25, 2013 by Wayne Thayer CSR ECC Microsoft RSA SHA2 SSL/TLS
    SSL and HTTPS are two of the most common security technologies on the internet today, but at the same time their use can be complex and challenging to get right. Over the next few weeks, we’ll be publishing a series of articles aimed at identifying some of the decisions that need to be made when buying, installing, and using SSL certificates. In this first installment, I’ll discuss some of the issues to consider when buying and requesting a certificate.

    Participate in our community discussions and/or join the consortium