PKI Consortium blog

Posts by tag IETF

Preparing for Quantum Computing
April 21, 2020 by Diana Gruhn (Entrust) ECC IETF NIST Quantum RSA
Quantum computing is advancing, and while experts are not sure when there will be a quantum computer powerful enough to break the RSA and ECC cryptographic algorithms that are currently in use, many are operating under the assumption that this can happen within a 10-15 year timeframe.

CA Security Council (CASC) 2019 Predictions: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
December 6, 2018 by Bruce Morton (Entrust), Chris Bailey (Entrust), Jay Schiavo (Entrust) Apple Attack CASC Chrome DV Encryption EV Firefox Google Identity IETF Malware Microsoft Phishing SSL/TLS TLS 1.0 TLS 1.2 TLS 1.3
As the legendary coach of the NY Yankees Yogi Berra allegedly said, “It’s difficult to make predictions, especially about the future.” But we’re going to try. Here are the CA Security Council (CASC) 2019 Predictions: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly. The Good Prediction: By the end of 2019, over 90% of the world’s http traffic will be secured over SSL/TLS Encryption boosts user security and privacy, and the combined efforts of browsers and Certification Authorities (CAs) over the past few years have moved us rapidly to a world approaching 100% encryption.

TLS 1.3 Includes Improvements to Security and Performance
April 10, 2018 by Tim Shirley Forward Secrecy IETF SSL/TLS TLS 1.2 TLS 1.3 Vulnerability
Last month saw the final adoption, after 4 years of work, of TLS version 1.3 by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). This latest iteration of the protocol for secure communications on the internet boasts several noteworthy improvements to both security and performance: Security All cipher suites that do not provide forward secrecy have been eliminated from TLS 1.3. This is a very important security property, because without forward secrecy, if a server’s private key is compromised today, any previously-recorded conversations with that server dating back as long as the key was in use could be decrypted.

Certificate Transparency Deadline Moved to April 2018
May 3, 2017 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) Chrome Google IETF Policy SSL/TLS
Google just announced they will not be enforcing certificate transparency (CT) logging for all new TLS certificates until April 2018. In a previous blog post, we advised that Google provided a new policy, which required new TLS certificates to be published to the CT logs in order for the domain to be trusted by Chrome. The reason for the delay was not clear, but Google needs to consider the following:

Google Certificate Transparency (CT) to Expand to All Certificates Types
November 8, 2016 by Jeremy Rowley Announcement CA/Browser Forum Chrome DV EV Google IETF OV Policy SSL/TLS
The policy change goes into effect October 2017 A recent Google announcement stated that all publicly trusted SSL/TLS certificates issued in October 2017 or later will be expected to comply with Chrome’s Certificate Transparency (CT) policy or be untrusted by the browser. Since January 2015, Chrome has required Extended Validation (EV) certificates to comply with CT. With this policy change, the Chrome CT policy will also apply to Domain Validated (DV) and Organization Validated (OV) certificates.

SSL 2.0 and DROWN
April 4, 2016 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) Attack IETF OpenSSL SSL 3.0 SSL/TLS Vulnerability
A team of researchers has announced a vulnerability with SSL 2.0 called Decrypting RSA with Obsolete and Weakened eNcryption; otherwise known as DROWN. SSL 2.0 is a version of the SSL/TLS security protocols. It was released in February 1995, but due to security flaws was superseded by SSL 3.0 in 1996. DROWN is a cross-protocol attack where the bugs in SSL 2.0 can be used to attack the security of connections that use TLS.

2016 – Looking Back, Moving Forward
December 14, 2015 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) Attack CA/Browser Forum CAA Chrome Code Signing DH Encryption Firefox Google Hash Function IETF Microsoft MITM OpenSSL Policy RC4 Revocation RSA SSL/TLS TLS 1.2 TLS 1.3 Vulnerability
Looking Back at 2015 A number of new tactics proved 2015 was no exception to an active year defending against ever increasing security issues. Vendors found new and creative ways to provide vulnerabilities including the now popular man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks. MitM as well as a host of other new vulnerabilities caused browsers to rethink their security requirements. This article gives a flashback of the exploits and industry changes from 2015 and looks ahead at the latest security requirements and how it impacts IT security teams.

New Directions for Elliptic Curve Cryptography in Internet Protocols
June 24, 2015 by Rick Andrews ECC ECDSA IETF NIST RSA SSL/TLS
Last week I attended and presented at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Workshop on Elliptic Curve Cryptography Standards. In NIST’s words, “The workshop is to provide a venue to engage the crypto community, including academia, industry, and government users to discuss possible approaches to promote the adoption of secure, interoperable and efficient elliptic curve mechanisms.” We began by discussing the reasons for holding this workshop. Speakers acknowledged that although there are no known issues with the current set of NIST curves, in some circles they are widely distrusted.

HTTP/2 Is Speedy and Secure
April 20, 2015 by Wayne Thayer Announcement Chrome Firefox Forward Secrecy Google HSTS IETF Microsoft Mozilla SSL/TLS Vulnerability
Since we last wrote about SSL/TLS performance, there has been a lot of activity in the IETF HTTP Working Group, resulting in the February announcement that the next version of HTTP has been approved. This is big news because it means that major SSL/TLS performance improvements are on the way. Background When your browser connects to a website today, it most likely uses the HTTP/1.1 protocol that was defined in 1999 in RFC 2616.

My Website’s SSL Certificate is Fine; Why Do Browsers Downgrade the Security Indicators For My Site?
April 1, 2015 by Rick Andrews Attack Chrome Encryption EV IETF RC4 SSL/TLS
All the major browsers provide “security user interface”, meaning visual elements to inform the user of the security of their connection to the web page they’re visiting. Up until now, those interface elements were tied to the use of SSL/TLS certificates served by the web site. For example, if you went to http://www.example.com, no special elements would be displayed, but if you visited https://www.example.com, you would see a lock icon indicating the presence of a trusted SSL/TLS certificate.

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