PKI Consortium blog

Posts by tag Identity

    One Year Certs
    July 9, 2020 by Patrick Nohe (GlobalSign) Apple CA/Browser Forum DV Google Identity Microsoft PKI Policy Root Program SHA1 SHA2 SSL/TLS
    Starting on September 1st, SSL/TLS certificates cannot be issued for longer than 13 months (397 days). This change was first announced by Apple at the CA/Browser Forum Spring Face-to-Face event in Bratislava back in March.

    How to do HTTPS … The Right Way
    June 2, 2020 by Corey Bonnell (DigiCert) CAA Identity Phishing Site Seal SSL/TLS
    With secure HTTP — aka HTTPS (the “S” is short for “secure”) — swiftly becoming universal on the Internet, it is important to know how to configure HTTPS for your website the right way. The payoff for properly securing your website has many benefits.

    5 Ways to Keep Up with Authentication Certificates
    February 24, 2020 by Arvid Vermote Code Signing Encryption Identity ISO Malware Microsoft PKI SSL/TLS
    When it comes to protecting an organization’s data and users, CISOs have no shortage of hurdles. Identity attacks have become sophisticated and convincing, thanks to ransomware, phishing and deep fakes. CISOs have long known the importance of strong identification and authentication controls, but with threats constantly changing and intensifying, having these controls in place is just one piece of the puzzle; they must be managed correctly in order to do their job.

    The CA Security Council Looks Ahead to 2020 and Beyond
    January 9, 2020 by Patrick Nohe (GlobalSign), Doug Beattie (GlobalSign) Apple CA/Browser Forum Chrome Edge Encryption EV Firefox Forward Secrecy GDPR Google Identity Microsoft Mozilla PKI Policy Qualified SSL 3.0 SSL/TLS TLS 1.0 TLS 1.1 TLS 1.2 TLS 1.3 Web PKI
    A whirlwind of activity will cause dramatic shifts across the PKI world in the year ahead Suffice it to say that 2019 was filled with challenges and contentiousness as Certificate Authorities and Browsers began to watch their shared visions diverge. The debate around Extended Validation continued as CAs pushed for a range of reforms and browsers pushed to strip its visual indicators. And a ballot to shorten maximum certificate validity periods exposed fault-lines at the CAB Forum.

    Online Identity Is Important: Let’s Upgrade Extended Validation
    October 21, 2019 by Patrick Nohe (GlobalSign) Apple CA/Browser Forum Chrome Code Signing Encryption EV Google Identity Mozilla Phishing SSL/TLS
    It’s time for the CA/Browser Forum to focus on the other half of its mandate Let’s have a candid discussion about Extended Validation SSL. What’s working. What’s NOT. And what can be done to fix it so that all parties involved are satisfied. But first, let’s zoom out and talk big picture. The vast majority of website owners almost never think of SSL. They worry about it once every year or so when it needs to be replaced, but it’s not really a major point of consideration.

    The Insecure Elephant in the Room
    October 10, 2019 by Paul Walsh 2FA Android Attack Chrome DV Encryption EV Firefox Google Identity Malware Microsoft Mozilla Phishing Policy Revocation SSL/TLS Vulnerability W3C
    The purpose of this article The purpose of this article is to demonstrate why I believe browser-based UI for website identity can make the web safer for everyone. I explain in great detail, the reasons why the UI and UX didn’t work in the past. And what’s left is only making the problem worse instead of better. Some people seem to find it difficult to consume my thoughts about the enforcement of “HTTPS EVERYWHERE”, free DV certs and the browser padlock.

    Why Are You Removing Website Identity, Google and Mozilla?
    August 27, 2019 by Tim Callan (Sectigo), Kirk Hall CA/Browser Forum Chrome DV Encryption EV Firefox GDPR Google Identity Malware Mozilla Phishing SSL/TLS
    You can’t have consumer privacy without having strong website identity Today there’s a huge wave toward protecting consumer privacy – in Congress, with the GDPR, etc. – but how can we protect user privacy on the web without establishing the identity of the websites that are asking for consumer passwords and credit card numbers? Extended Validation (EV) certificates provide this information and can be very useful for consumers. Recently, Google and Mozilla have announced plan to eliminate the distinctive indicators in the Chrome and Firefox browsers that let consumers know that they are looking at a site authenticated with an EV certificate.

    9 Common Myths About CAs
    August 1, 2019 by Tim Callan (Sectigo) CA/Browser Forum CASC Code Signing Encryption ETSI Identity Malware PKI Qualified Revocation SSL/TLS Vulnerability WebTrust
    Over the years misconceptions about CAs and the SSL infrastructure have arisen. Below is a list of common myths related to SSL and CAs. Myth #1: CAs are not regulated Fact: CAs are subject to various checks and balances, including third-party qualified audits through WebTrust or ETSI and strict criteria set forth by leading browsers, before they are accepted in browser root stores. Similarly, the CA/Browser Forum’s Baseline Requirements and Network Security Guidelines establish global standards for certificate issuance and CA controls that will soon be included in third-party auditing standards.

    What Are Subordinate CAs and Why Would You Want Your Own?
    June 26, 2019 by Doug Beattie (GlobalSign) CA/Browser Forum Chrome Code Signing CRL ECC eIDAS Encryption EV HSM Identity Microsoft OCSP PKI Policy Revocation RSA S/MIME SSL/TLS
    Digital certificate and PKI adoption has changed quite a bit in recent years. Gone are the days where certificates were only synonymous with SSL/TLS; compliance drivers like stronger authentication requirements and digital signature regulations (e.g. eIDAS) have greatly expanded the role of PKI within the enterprise. As PKI usage has expanded, conversation has moved beyond just the number and type of certificates needed and onto deeper dialogue about custom PKI deployments.

    2019 – Looking Back, Moving Forward
    January 3, 2019 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) Attack CA/Browser Forum Certificate Expiry Chrome Code Signing DV ECC EV Forward Secrecy Identity Mis-issued Phishing PKI Policy Qualified Revocation RSA SSL/TLS TLS 1.0 TLS 1.3 Vulnerability
    Looking Back at 2018 2018 was an active year for SSL/TLS. We saw the SSL/TLS certificate validity period drop to 825-days and the mass deployment of Certificate Transparency (CT). TLS 1.3 protocol was finally completed and published; and Chrome status bar security indicators changing to remove “secure” and to concentrate on “not secure.” The CA/Browser Forum has been reformed, the London Protocol was announced and the nearly full distrust of Symantec SSL completed.

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