PKI Consortium blog
Posts by tag Google
Heartbleed Bug Vulnerability: Discovery, Impact and Solution
April 9, 2014 by Jeremy Rowley Attack BEAST CASC CSR DTLS Encryption Google OpenSSL SSL/TLS TLS 1.0 TLS 1.1 Vulnerability
On April 7, 2014, a vulnerability in the OpenSSL cryptographic library was announced to the Internet community. Aptly labeled as the Heartbleed bug, this vulnerability affects OpenSSL versions 1.0.1 through 1.0.1f (inclusive). The Heartbleed bug is not a flaw in the SSL or TLS protocols; rather, it is a flaw in the OpenSSL implementation of the TLS/DTLS heartbeat functionality. The flaw is not related or introduced by publicly trusted certificates and is instead a problem with server software.
CA Security Council Members Presentation at RSA 2014 Conference: New Ideas on CAA, CT, and Public Key Pinning for a Safer Internet
March 17, 2014 by Kirk Hall Attack CAA CASC Chrome EV Google IETF Microsoft Mis-issued OCSP Revocation RSA SSL/TLS Vulnerability
CA Security Council (CASC) members Trend Micro, Go Daddy, and Symantec participated in a discussion panel at the 2014 RSA Conference in San Francisco on February 24 entitled “New Ideas on CAA, CT, and Public Key Pinning for a Safer Internet.” Panel members included Kirk Hall of Trend Micro (Moderator), Wayne Thayer of GoDaddy (Panelist), and Rick Andrews of Symantec (Panelist). Introduction to the Topic Hall began by introducing the topic – all three alternative technologies (Certificate Transparency or CT, Certificate Authority Authorization or CAA, and Certificate Pinning) are intended to make the internet safer by dealing with mis-issued digital certificates, including so-called “rogue” certs like those obtained by a hacker from the now-defunct Diginotar Certification Authority (CA).
Bogus SSL Certificates
February 20, 2014 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) Attack Google MITM SSL/TLS
Netcraft has published an article stating they have found many bogus SSL certificates. In this case, a bogus certificate is self-signed (i.e., not issued from a legitimate certification authority) and replicates an SSL certificate of a large, popular website. This type of bogus SSL certificate could be used for a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. In this scenario, the attacker needs to gain a position that will allow them to intercept traffic and make you to go to their site instead of the real site.
Ten Steps to Take If Your Website Is Compromised
February 12, 2014 by Wayne Thayer CSR Encryption Google Malware SSH SSL/TLS Vulnerability
After the news broke that 40 million credit card numbers were stolen from Target in a data breach of epic proportions, many of their customers went to work checking their accounts for fraudulent purchases and replacing cards we’d used recently at Target. These have become standard responses to news of this sort. In much the same way, there are some common actions that you should be aware of if your website becomes compromised.
Always-On SSL, Part I
January 16, 2014 by Rick Andrews Encryption Google Identity Microsoft Mixed Content OpenSSL SSL/TLS
There is no doubt that content owners and publishers have a duty to encourage trust and the confidence during internet usage by adopting security best practices. If a customer believes that their data and identity are safe and protected, they are more inclined to continue their online transactions. Industry best practices for website protection should be vendor-neutral, easy to implement, and globally accessible. Websites should take all the reasonable steps possible to adopt best practices in secure design and implementation, and this includes using Always-On SSL across the entire website.
Intermediate CA Certificates and Their Potential For Misuse For Man-In-The-Middle Attacks
January 9, 2014 by Robin Alden (Sectigo) Attack Firefox Google MITM Policy Root Program SSL/TLS Vulnerability
We have seen recently that Google detected that publicly trusted TLS/(SSL) certificates had been created for Google domains without having been requested by Google themselves. The existence of such certificates might usually be taken as an indication of misissuance by the issuing CA (i.e. a failure or mistake by the CA which allowed the issuance of an end-entity certificate otherwise than in accordance with their policy) or as an indication of compromise of the issuing CA.
Public Key Pinning
August 28, 2013 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) Android Chrome Google IETF Mis-issued SHA1 SSL/TLS
The current browser-certification authority (CA) trust model allows a website owner to obtain its SSL certificate from any one of a number of CAs. That flexibility also means that a certificate mis-issued by a CA other than the authorized CA chosen by the website owner, would also be accepted as trustworthy by browsers. This problem was displayed most dramatically by the DigiNotar attack in 2011 and in a mistaken CA certificate issued by TURKTRUST in 2012.
Firefox 23 Blocks Mixed Content
August 13, 2013 by Wayne Thayer Chrome Encryption EV Firefox Google Malware Mixed Content Mozilla SSL/TLS
The latest version of the Firefox Web browser from Mozilla was released on August 6th with a great new security feature called a “mixed content blocker”. In a nutshell, this feature ensures that all of the parts of a secure Website are indeed encrypted via SSL certificates. All of the data on the website is prevented from being intercepted, and it becomes more difficult to add malware into the site’s content.
Some Comments on Web Security
June 5, 2013 by CA Security Council Attack CA/Browser Forum CASC Google IETF Microsoft Mis-issued Policy SSL/TLS
Steve Johnson of the Mercury News posted an article on Web security and highlighted some of the issues. The posted issues help to explain why we created the Certificate Authority Security Council. We want to determine the issues, have them addressed and provide awareness and education on the solutions. The CAs also work with the browsers and other experts in the industry to develop standards for all CAs to be audited against through the CA/Browser Forum.
IETF 86 – Web PKI Working Group
March 21, 2013 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) CRL Google IETF OCSP PKI Policy Revocation SSL/TLS Web PKI
At the IETF 86 meeting in Orlando last week, there was a working group meeting discussing the operations of the Web PKI. At the previous IETF 85 meeting a birds-of-a-feather was held to discuss the purpose of having such a group. The result of the meeting was an established group with the charter that states purposes such as: Working group will work to improve the consistency of Web security behavior Address problems as seen by the end-users, certificate holders and CAs Describe how the Web PKI actually works Prepare documented deliverables as discussed below The meeting discussed the charter and the four following deliverables.