PKI Consortium blog

Posts by tag Google

    2016 – Looking Back, Moving Forward
    December 14, 2015 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) Attack CA/Browser Forum CAA Chrome Code Signing DH Encryption Firefox Google Hash Function IETF Microsoft MITM OpenSSL Policy RC4 Revocation RSA SSL/TLS TLS 1.2 TLS 1.3 Vulnerability

    Looking Back at 2015

    A number of new tactics proved 2015 was no exception to an active year defending against ever increasing security issues. Vendors found new and creative ways to provide vulnerabilities including the now popular man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks.  MitM as well as a host of other new vulnerabilities caused browsers to rethink their security requirements.  This article gives a flashback of the exploits and industry changes from 2015 and looks ahead at the latest security requirements and how it impacts IT security teams.

    How Safe Are Your Business’ Online Payments?: E-Commerce Sites and Protected Payment Gateways
    October 21, 2015 by CA Security Council Encryption Google SSL/TLS

    This blog was originally posted on staysafeonline.org on June 29, 2015.


    Online payments can be made in a variety of ways, but majority of the online financial transactions are done through secured payment gateways. Secure payment gateways, as the name suggests, are application service providers for ecommerce websites that authorize various financial transactions taking place on online stores for ensuring safety for both the retailers and the online buyers. The key goal of payment gateways is to secure personal information like cconsumers’ credit card numbers by encrypting their personal and confidential information. Learn more about what these gateways are and how they help protect your online transactions.

    OpenSSL High Severity Vulnerability
    July 10, 2015 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) Attack DTLS Google MITM OpenSSL SSL/TLS Vulnerability

    OpenSSL has announced a high severity vulnerability, CVE-2015-1793 which will require an upgrade to some OpenSSL installations.

    The vulnerability was discovered by Google personnel Adam Langley and David Benjamin on June 24, 2015. Google has been working on an alternative to OpenSSL called BoringSSL. This has allowed Google to reduce vulnerabilities in their installations, but is also a benefit to OpenSSL as issues have been reported. Note that BoringSSL is not impacted.

    Practical Steps to Counter the Logjam Attack
    May 26, 2015 by Kirk Hall (Entrust) Apple Attack Encryption Google MITM SSL/TLS Vulnerability

    Another flaw has been found in the basic encryption algorithms that secure the Internet. This flaw, named the Logjam attack by its discoverers (researchers from various universities and companies), allows an attacker that can carry out man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks to weaken the encryption used in secure connections (such as HTTPS, SSH, and VPNs). In theory, this means that an attacker (with sufficient resources) can break the encryption and read the “secure” traffic.

    HTTP/2 Is Speedy and Secure
    April 20, 2015 by Wayne Thayer Announcement Chrome Firefox Forward Secrecy Google HSTS IETF Microsoft Mozilla SSL/TLS Vulnerability

    Since we last wrote about SSL/TLS performance, there has been a lot of activity in the IETF HTTP Working Group, resulting in the February announcement that the next version of HTTP has been approved. This is big news because it means that major SSL/TLS performance improvements are on the way.

    Background

    When your browser connects to a website today, it most likely uses the HTTP/1.1 protocol that was defined in 1999 in RFC 2616. Over the past 15 years, HTTP/1.1 has served us well and many tweaks have been discovered to make the most of it. However, in that time the web has transformed into a platform for interactive content and applications. Today, browsers load much more data from many more sources to build the typical web page.

    CA Security Council Report: Consumers Don’t Know Much About Security, But They Trust the Padlock and Green Bar When Shopping Online
    April 13, 2015 by CA Security Council CASC EV Google Identity SSL/TLS

    San Francisco – April 13, 2015 – The CA Security Council (CASC), an advocacy group committed to the advancement of the security of websites and online transactions, today released its 2015 Consumer Trust Survey which found that validation matters.  While consumers are confused about some aspects of security, they recognize and trust the security that SSL brings to e-commerce sites.  Fifty-three percent of respondents identify the padlock as adding confidence in an e-commerce site, with 42 percent associating the green bar and organization name in the URL with greater safety.

    Microsoft Deploys Certificate Reputation
    April 9, 2015 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) EV Google Identity Microsoft Mis-issued SSL/TLS

    As we have stated previously, website owners have a concern that an attacker can have a certificate issued for their domain name. We now have two systems which will help monitor certificates for domains: Certificate Transparency (CT) and Certificate Reputation.

    At the start of 2015, most certification authorities (CAs) support CT as requested by Google. CT works for extended validation (EV) SSL certificates and will allow all EV certificates to be monitored.

    In March 2015, Microsoft deployed Certificate Reputation. Through the use of Windows, Internet Explorer and other applications, certificate data for all types of SSL certificates is collected and provided to Microsoft. In addition, Microsoft has stated that they don’t collect any information that could be used to identify the user.

    Fighting the Good Fight for Online Trust
    April 2, 2015 by CA Security Council Apple CAA CASC Google HSM Mis-issued MITM Mozilla Policy Root Program SSL/TLS WebTrust

    Once again Browsers and Certificate Authorities are in the news over the reported mis-issuance of an SSL server certificate to a google.com domain. Discovered by Google most likely via technology known as key pinning and discussed by Google’s Adam Langley in this blog, a Chinese certificate authority, CNNIC (Chinese Internet Network Information Center), apparently issued an intermediate certificate to an Egyptian company called MCS Holdings. Because the CNNIC root certificate is included in the root store of most major browsers, users would not see any warnings on sites that have certificates issued by CNNIC or MCS Holdings. When MCS installed their intermediate into a Man in the Middle (MITM) proxy device, that device could then issue certificates for sites which users connected to that proxy would visit. (MITM is described in more detail in our previous blog here: https://casecurity.org/2015/01/08/gogo-found-spoofing-google-ssl-certificates/)

    Gogo Found Spoofing Google SSL Certificates
    January 8, 2015 by Rick Andrews Google Malware MITM SSL/TLS

    It was recently disclosed that Gogo, a provider of Wi-Fi Internet services on commercial aircraft, has been issuing spoofed SSL certificates for Google sites that were viewed by customers of Gogo’s service. It appears that Gogo Inflight Internet was acting as an SSL Man-in-the-middle (MITM), a technique used within some enterprises to allow themselves to inspect and control all web traffic, even traffic to secure web sites.  To understand what this means, let me explain MITM in a bit more detail.

    2015 – Looking Back, Moving Forward
    January 6, 2015 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) Apple Attack CA/Browser Forum CAA Chrome Code Signing EV Firefox Forward Secrecy Google IETF Malware Microsoft MITM Mozilla OpenSSL PKI Policy RSA SHA1 SSL 3.0 SSL/TLS TLS 1.0 TLS 1.2 TLS 1.3 Vulnerability

    Looking Back at 2014

    End of 1024-Bit Security

    In 2014, the SSL industry moved to issuing a minimum security of 2048-bit RSA certificates. Keys smaller than 2048 are no longer allowed in server certificates. In addition, Microsoft and Mozilla started to remove 1024-bit roots from their certificate stores. Hopefully, the key size change will support users through to 2030.

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