PKI Consortium blog
Posts by tag Firefox
The CA Security Council Looks Ahead to 2020 and Beyond
January 9, 2020 by Patrick Nohe (GlobalSign), Doug Beattie (GlobalSign) Apple CA/Browser Forum Chrome Edge Encryption EV Firefox Forward Secrecy GDPR Google Identity Microsoft Mozilla PKI Policy Qualified SSL 3.0 SSL/TLS TLS 1.0 TLS 1.1 TLS 1.2 TLS 1.3 Web PKI
A whirlwind of activity will cause dramatic shifts across the PKI world in the year ahead Suffice it to say that 2019 was filled with challenges and contentiousness as Certificate Authorities and Browsers began to watch their shared visions diverge. The debate around Extended Validation continued as CAs pushed for a range of reforms and browsers pushed to strip its visual indicators. And a ballot to shorten maximum certificate validity periods exposed fault-lines at the CAB Forum.
Chrome Kills Mixed Content for HTTPS
December 6, 2019 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) Attack Chrome Firefox Mixed Content Policy SSL/TLS
In a phased approach, Chrome plans to block mixed content on secure websites to improve user security. Most browsers already block some mixed content such as scripts and iframes by default. Chrome is amping it up by gradually taking steps to also block images, audio recordings and videos, according to a recent Google Security blog. Preventing mixed content to load will eventually result in HTTPS websites losing their security indicator downgrading the site to HTTP, which alerts visitors that the site is not secure.
The Insecure Elephant in the Room
October 10, 2019 by Paul Walsh 2FA Android Attack Chrome DV Encryption EV Firefox Google Identity Malware Microsoft Mozilla Phishing Policy Revocation SSL/TLS Vulnerability W3C
The purpose of this article The purpose of this article is to demonstrate why I believe browser-based UI for website identity can make the web safer for everyone. I explain in great detail, the reasons why the UI and UX didn’t work in the past. And what’s left is only making the problem worse instead of better. Some people seem to find it difficult to consume my thoughts about the enforcement of “HTTPS EVERYWHERE”, free DV certs and the browser padlock.
Why Are You Removing Website Identity, Google and Mozilla?
August 27, 2019 by Tim Callan (Sectigo), Kirk Hall CA/Browser Forum Chrome DV Encryption EV Firefox GDPR Google Identity Malware Mozilla Phishing SSL/TLS
You can’t have consumer privacy without having strong website identity Today there’s a huge wave toward protecting consumer privacy – in Congress, with the GDPR, etc. – but how can we protect user privacy on the web without establishing the identity of the websites that are asking for consumer passwords and credit card numbers? Extended Validation (EV) certificates provide this information and can be very useful for consumers. Recently, Google and Mozilla have announced plan to eliminate the distinctive indicators in the Chrome and Firefox browsers that let consumers know that they are looking at a site authenticated with an EV certificate.
What the Latest Firefox Update Means for SSL Certificates
June 14, 2019 by Tim Callan (Sectigo) CASC EV Firefox SSL/TLS Vulnerability
Last month marked the release of Firefox 66, the newest iteration of the ever-popular web browser. The update adds a number of interesting new features, including improvements to content loading and extension storage, auto-play sound blocking, and support for the AV1 codec (on the Windows version at least). The search feature has also been improved, and, as is typical of browser updates, a number of known security vulnerabilities have been patched.
CA Security Council (CASC) 2019 Predictions: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
December 6, 2018 by Bruce Morton (Entrust), Chris Bailey (Entrust), Jay Schiavo (Entrust) Apple Attack CASC Chrome DV Encryption EV Firefox Google Identity IETF Malware Microsoft Phishing SSL/TLS TLS 1.0 TLS 1.2 TLS 1.3
As the legendary coach of the NY Yankees Yogi Berra allegedly said, “It’s difficult to make predictions, especially about the future.” But we’re going to try. Here are the CA Security Council (CASC) 2019 Predictions: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly. The Good Prediction: By the end of 2019, over 90% of the world’s http traffic will be secured over SSL/TLS Encryption boosts user security and privacy, and the combined efforts of browsers and Certification Authorities (CAs) over the past few years have moved us rapidly to a world approaching 100% encryption.
Fortify Allows Users to Generate X.509 Certificates in Their Browser
June 19, 2018 by Tim Hollebeek Chrome Code Signing Encryption Firefox Google HSM Microsoft Mozilla S/MIME W3C
2017 – Looking Back, Moving Forward
January 13, 2017 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) 3DES Apple Attack CA/Browser Forum CAA Chrome Code Signing Encryption Firefox Google Identity Malware MITM Policy Revocation RSA SSL 3.0 SSL/TLS TLS 1.3 TSA Vulnerability
Looking Back at 2016 Fortunately, 2016 was not a year full of SSL/TLS vulnerabilities. Although some researchers did prove old cryptography algorithms should be put out to pasture. The year showed the end of public-trusted SHA-1 SSL/TLS certificates. It also showed more transparency should be considered due to issues discovered with a few certification authorities (CAs). The great news is HTTPS is no longer the minority — after 20 years, connections using HTTPS has surpassed HTTP.
Trust on the Public Web – The Consequences of Covert Action
November 11, 2016 by Dean Coclin Apple Chrome Firefox Mis-issued Mozilla SSL/TLS
You may have heard in the news that the Chinese Certificate Authority, WoSign, was caught backdating SHA-1 certificates to make it look like they were issued before the December 31, 2015 deadline. Why is this newsworthy? For web-based security to remain an integral part of an ecosystem used every day by millions of people around the world, it all comes down to Trust; trust in the organization issuing the certificates, trust in the browsers that validate and display certificate information to the user, and trust by relying parties browsing web pages secured by certificates.
September 30, 2016 by Rick Andrews, Ben Wilson Encryption Firefox Google Identity Microsoft Mixed Content OpenSSL Policy Qualified SSL/TLS
There is no doubt that content owners and publishers have a duty to encourage trust and the confidence during internet usage by adopting security best practices. If a customer believes that their data and identity are safe and protected, they are more inclined to continue their online transactions. Industry best practices for website protection should be vendor-neutral, easy to implement, and globally accessible. Websites should take all the reasonable steps possible to adopt best practices in secure design and implementation, and this includes using Always-On SSL across the entire website.