PKI Consortium blog
Posts by tag EV
Don’t ‘Compromise’ Your Code Amid Malware Mayhem
May 12, 2020 by
Abul Salek
(Sectigo)
CA/Browser Forum
Code Signing
EV
FIPS
HSM
Malware
Microsoft
Phishing
SSL/TLS
Code Signing Certificates demand a price premium in the underground online marketplace. This is no surprise considering that criminals sometimes use them to dupe their potential victims into installing malware in their machine.
The CA Security Council Looks Ahead to 2020 and Beyond
January 9, 2020 by
Patrick Nohe
(GlobalSign),
Doug Beattie
(GlobalSign)
Apple
CA/Browser Forum
Chrome
Edge
Encryption
EV
Firefox
Forward Secrecy
GDPR
Google
Identity
Microsoft
Mozilla
PKI
Policy
Qualified
SSL 3.0
SSL/TLS
TLS 1.0
TLS 1.1
TLS 1.2
TLS 1.3
Web PKI
A whirlwind of activity will cause dramatic shifts across the PKI world in the year ahead Suffice it to say that 2019 was filled with challenges and contentiousness as Certificate Authorities and Browsers began to watch their shared visions diverge. The debate around Extended Validation continued as CAs pushed for a range of reforms and browsers pushed to strip its visual indicators. And a ballot to shorten maximum certificate validity periods exposed fault-lines at the CAB Forum.
Online Identity Is Important: Let’s Upgrade Extended Validation
October 21, 2019 by
Patrick Nohe
(GlobalSign)
Apple
CA/Browser Forum
Chrome
Code Signing
Encryption
EV
Google
Identity
Mozilla
Phishing
SSL/TLS
It’s time for the CA/Browser Forum to focus on the other half of its mandate Let’s have a candid discussion about Extended Validation SSL. What’s working. What’s NOT. And what can be done to fix it so that all parties involved are satisfied.
But first, let’s zoom out and talk big picture. The vast majority of website owners almost never think of SSL. They worry about it once every year or so when it needs to be replaced, but it’s not really a major point of consideration.
The Insecure Elephant in the Room
October 10, 2019 by
Paul Walsh
2FA
Android
Attack
Chrome
DV
Encryption
EV
Firefox
Google
Identity
Malware
Microsoft
Mozilla
Phishing
Policy
Revocation
SSL/TLS
Vulnerability
W3C
The purpose of this article The purpose of this article is to demonstrate why I believe browser-based UI for website identity can make the web safer for everyone. I explain in great detail, the reasons why the UI and UX didn’t work in the past. And what’s left is only making the problem worse instead of better.
Some people seem to find it difficult to consume my thoughts about the enforcement of “HTTPS EVERYWHERE”, free DV certs and the browser padlock.
Why Are You Removing Website Identity, Google and Mozilla?
August 27, 2019 by
Kirk Hall
(Entrust),
Tim Callan
(Sectigo)
CA/Browser Forum
Chrome
DV
Encryption
EV
Firefox
GDPR
Google
Identity
Malware
Mozilla
Phishing
SSL/TLS
You can’t have consumer privacy without having strong website identity Today there’s a huge wave toward protecting consumer privacy – in Congress, with the GDPR, etc. – but how can we protect user privacy on the web without establishing the identity of the websites that are asking for consumer passwords and credit card numbers? Extended Validation (EV) certificates provide this information and can be very useful for consumers.
Recently, Google and Mozilla have announced plan to eliminate the distinctive indicators in the Chrome and Firefox browsers that let consumers know that they are looking at a site authenticated with an EV certificate.
What Are Subordinate CAs and Why Would You Want Your Own?
June 26, 2019 by
Doug Beattie
(GlobalSign)
CA/Browser Forum
Chrome
Code Signing
CRL
ECC
eIDAS
Encryption
EV
HSM
Identity
Microsoft
OCSP
PKI
Policy
Revocation
RSA
S/MIME
SSL/TLS
Digital certificate and PKI adoption has changed quite a bit in recent years. Gone are the days where certificates were only synonymous with SSL/TLS; compliance drivers like stronger authentication requirements and digital signature regulations (e.g. eIDAS) have greatly expanded the role of PKI within the enterprise.
As PKI usage has expanded, conversation has moved beyond just the number and type of certificates needed and onto deeper dialogue about custom PKI deployments.
What the Latest Firefox Update Means for SSL Certificates
June 14, 2019 by
Tim Callan
(Sectigo)
CASC
EV
Firefox
SSL/TLS
Vulnerability
Last month marked the release of Firefox 66, the newest iteration of the ever-popular web browser. The update adds a number of interesting new features, including improvements to content loading and extension storage, auto-play sound blocking, and support for the AV1 codec (on the Windows version at least). The search feature has also been improved, and, as is typical of browser updates, a number of known security vulnerabilities have been patched.
2019 – Looking Back, Moving Forward
January 3, 2019 by
Bruce Morton
(Entrust)
Attack
CA/Browser Forum
Certificate Expiry
Chrome
Code Signing
DV
ECC
EV
Forward Secrecy
Identity
Mis-issued
Phishing
PKI
Policy
Qualified
Revocation
RSA
SSL/TLS
TLS 1.0
TLS 1.3
Vulnerability
Looking Back at 2018 2018 was an active year for SSL/TLS. We saw the SSL/TLS certificate validity period drop to 825-days and the mass deployment of Certificate Transparency (CT). TLS 1.3 protocol was finally completed and published; and Chrome status bar security indicators changing to remove “secure” and to concentrate on “not secure.” The CA/Browser Forum has been reformed, the London Protocol was announced and the nearly full distrust of Symantec SSL completed.
CA Security Council (CASC) 2019 Predictions: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
December 6, 2018 by
Bruce Morton
(Entrust),
Chris Bailey
(Entrust),
Jay Schiavo
(Entrust)
Apple
Attack
CASC
Chrome
DV
Encryption
EV
Firefox
Google
Identity
IETF
Malware
Microsoft
Phishing
SSL/TLS
TLS 1.0
TLS 1.2
TLS 1.3
As the legendary coach of the NY Yankees Yogi Berra allegedly said, “It’s difficult to make predictions, especially about the future.” But we’re going to try.
Here are the CA Security Council (CASC) 2019 Predictions: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.
The Good Prediction: By the end of 2019, over 90% of the world’s http traffic will be secured over SSL/TLS
Encryption boosts user security and privacy, and the combined efforts of browsers and Certification Authorities (CAs) over the past few years have moved us rapidly to a world approaching 100% encryption.
CASC Announces Launch of London Protocol to Improve Identity Assurance and Minimize Phishing on Identity Websites
June 27, 2018 by
CA Security Council
Attack
CA/Browser Forum
CASC
DV
EV
Identity
OV
Phishing
SSL/TLS
LONDON – (June 27, 2018) – The Certificate Authority Security Council (CASC), an advocacy group committed to the advancement of the security of websites and online transactions, announced at the CA/Browser Forum event in London the launch of the London Protocol – an initiative to improve identity assurance and minimize the possibility of phishing activity on websites encrypted with organization validated (OV) and extended validation (EV) certificates, which contain organization identity information (Identity Certificates).