PKI Consortium blog

Google Plans to Deprecate SHA-1 Certificates
August 28, 2014 by CA Security Council Attack CASC Chrome Code Signing Google Microsoft Policy SSL/TLS
On August 19, Google announced a new policy that accelerates the deprecation of SHA-1 certificates, potentially causing websites using SHA-1 certificates to display warnings in the near future. With the change, Chrome 39 will show a warning for sites that have a SHA-1 certificate expiring in 2016 and require a click through warning for sites with a SHA-1 certificate expiring in 2017 or later. This proposal is scheduled for Chrome 39, which could be released as early as 12 weeks from now.

Who Sets the Rules Governing Certification Authorities?
August 19, 2014 by Kirk Hall (Entrust) CA/Browser Forum Code Signing DV Encryption ETSI EV Google Hash Function Identity IETF Microsoft Mozilla OCSP Policy Revocation Root Program SSL/TLS WebTrust
Every time something positive is published about SSL and encryption,such as Google’s recent decision making use of https encryption a favorable rating factor for a website, or negative, such as the Heartbleed issue – bloggers and others always post questions about public Certification Authorities (CAs), including general questions on who sets the rules that govern CAs. Some bloggers seem to assume there are no rules or standards, and that CAs can operate without any requirements or limitations at all — that’s incorrect.

2014 – Looking Back, Moving Forward
January 6, 2014 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) Attack BEAST CA/Browser Forum CAA Code Signing ECC Encryption Forward Secrecy HSTS ICANN IETF Microsoft MITM Mozilla PKI Policy RC4 RSA SHA1 SSL/TLS TLS 1.2
Looking Back at 2013 Protocol Attacks The year started with a couple of SSL/TLS protocol attacks: Lucky Thirteen and RC4 attack. Lucky Thirteen allows the decryption of sensitive information, such as passwords and cookies, when using the CBC-mode cipher suite. Lucky Thirteen can be mitigated by implementing software patches or preferring the cipher suite RC4. That being said, RC4 was also attacked, where through 16 million sessions a small amount of plaintext can be recovered.

SHA-1 Deprecation, On to SHA-2
December 16, 2013 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) Code Signing Microsoft PKI Policy SHA1 SSL/TLS
We have previously reviewed implementation of SHA-2, but with Bruce Schneier stating the need to migrate away from SHA-1 and the SHA-1 deprecation policy from Microsoft, the industry must make more progress in 2014. Web server administrators will have to make plans to move from SSL and code signing certificates signed with the SHA-1 hashing algorithm to certificates signed with SHA-2. This is the result of the new Microsoft Root Certificate Policy where Microsoft deprecates SHA-1 and imposes the following requirements:

Java Secures Supply Chains Through Code Signing
December 9, 2013 by Bruce Morton (Entrust), Erik Costlow (Oracle) Code Signing Identity PDF
We have recently discussed the benefits of code signing in two posts: Securing Software Distribution with Digital Signatures and Improving Code Signing. These posts covered the role of code signatures as a “digital shrinkwrap” designed to answer a simple question: Did the software I am about to run actually come from the author or has someone changed it along the way? As software is downloaded, assembled, copied, distributed and redistributed, it can be modified at any point along the supply chain.

Improving Code Signing
November 14, 2013 by Jeremy Rowley CA/Browser Forum Code Signing Identity Malware SSL/TLS
Previously, we discussed how code signing certificates play a key role in the trust framework by proving the authenticity of software. As mentioned, code signing certificates act as a certification that the software was unmodified after publication. Although current code signing practices greatly reduce the threats of malware and adware embedded in signed objects, the sophistication of threats has risen and there is a need for improvement. When code signing was new, skilled criminal hackers were the exception and script kiddies were the norm.

Securing Software Distribution with Digital Code Signing
October 16, 2013 by Bruce Morton (Entrust), Jeremy Rowley CASC Code Signing Malware SSL/TLS
Code signing certificates from publicly trusted Certification Authorities (CAs) fulfill a vital need for authentication of software distributed over the Internet in our interconnected world. As the commonly referred to “Internet of things” continues to grow, consumers have access to millions of applications for their desktops, laptops, and mobile devices. Creative software engineers provide us with applications to cover any of our potential needs or interests. Cybercriminals and others with malicious intent recognize this as an opportunity and seek to trick us into installing malicious software (malware) — programs that hijack our computers, steal our money, or try to inflict harm.

The Importance of Revocation Checking Part 2: A Real World Example
March 11, 2013 by Wayne Thayer Attack Code Signing CRL Encryption Identity Malware OCSP Revocation SSL/TLS
Just last week, a new security incident related to certificate revocation checking made headlines. It was discovered that a legitimate website was hosting a malicious Java application that installed malware on the computers of people who visited the site. This comes after recent updates that introduced Security Level settings in Java, and then raised the default from Medium to High. At the high level, users are shown a warning before any unsigned Java code is executed.