PKI Consortium blog
Posts by tag Code Signing
Leading Certificate Authorities and Microsoft Introduce New Standards to Protect Consumers Online
December 8, 2016 by
CA Security Council
CASC
Code Signing
FIPS
HSM
Identity
Malware
Microsoft
Revocation
SSL/TLS
TSA
San Francisco –December 8, 2016 – the Certificate Authority Security Council (CASC), an advocacy group committed to the advancement web security, today announced the Code Signing Working Group has released new Minimum Requirements for Code Signing for use by all Certificate Authorities (CA). These requirements represent the first-ever standardized code signing guidelines. Code signing is the method of using a certificate-based digital signature to sign executables and scripts in order to verify the author’s identity and ensure that the code has not been changed or corrupted.
Minimum Requirements for Code Signing Certificates
July 20, 2016 by
Bruce Morton
(Entrust)
CA/Browser Forum
CASC
Code Signing
FIPS
HSM
Malware
Microsoft
Revocation
TSA
It is time for an update on the Baseline Requirements for Code Signing.
First the bad news, the new standard was not approved by the CA/Browser Forum due to philosophical differences among some forum members who felt code signing was not in scope with the Forum’s charter.
The good news is the document was created in a multi-stakeholder environment and substantially improves the current management processes. As such, it was decided to bring the document outside of the forum and finalize it as part of the CA Security Council.
TLS Certificates on the Web – The Good, The Bad and The Ugly
May 17, 2016 by
Rick Andrews
CA/Browser Forum
Code Signing
ECC
Encryption
EV
Hash Function
PKI
Policy
RSA
SSL/TLS
It might be hard to believe, but the SSL/TLS Ecosystem is nearly 20 years old. It’s time to take stock and see how we’re doing with regards to TLS certificates. In this article, we’ll primarily discuss certificates themselves and not web server configuration, although that is often a source of problems.
In the last few years, we’ve endured three major certificate-based migrations:
Away from the MD2 and MD5 hash algorithms to SHA-1 Away from small RSA keys to 2048-bit keys or larger Away from the SHA-1 hash algorithm to SHA-256 What’s driving these migrations?
2016 – Looking Back, Moving Forward
December 14, 2015 by
Bruce Morton
(Entrust)
Attack
CA/Browser Forum
CAA
Chrome
Code Signing
DH
Encryption
Firefox
Google
Hash Function
IETF
Microsoft
MITM
OpenSSL
Policy
RC4
Revocation
RSA
SSL/TLS
TLS 1.2
TLS 1.3
Vulnerability
Looking Back at 2015 A number of new tactics proved 2015 was no exception to an active year defending against ever increasing security issues. Vendors found new and creative ways to provide vulnerabilities including the now popular man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks. MitM as well as a host of other new vulnerabilities caused browsers to rethink their security requirements. This article gives a flashback of the exploits and industry changes from 2015 and looks ahead at the latest security requirements and how it impacts IT security teams.
Code Signing Baseline Requirements
November 30, 2015 by
CA Security Council
CA/Browser Forum
CASC
Code Signing
Identity
Malware
You may have heard that the CA/Browser Forum is getting ready to approve Baseline Requirements for Code Signing certificates. But why is this important?
Let’s back up and get some background on code signing. Software code that is digitally signed indicates to the user that the code has not been tampered with since it was signed. It also provides authenticity as to who signed it and when. With the advent of malware, it’s important to insure that the code which was written by the developer is the same code which you downloaded and installed into your computer or mobile phone.
What Are “Application Reputation” and “Publisher Reputation”?
August 27, 2015 by
Ben Wilson
Code Signing
Malware
Microsoft
As one dog says to the other in Peter Steiner’s classic New Yorker cartoon– “On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog.”
Software downloaded from the Internet is similar to people on the Internet–it is hard to tell which ones are dogs–without help, which is what “application reputation” technology provides. “Application reputation” and “publisher reputation” are methods employed by Microsoft’s SmartScreen and other systems to distinguish good software from bad software as it is downloaded from the Internet.
Lenovo Enables Man-in-the-Middle Attacks Via Superfish Adware
February 20, 2015 by
Doug Beattie
(GlobalSign)
Attack
Code Signing
Firefox
Malware
Microsoft
MITM
Mixed Content
SSL/TLS
Vulnerability
Lenovo is selling computers that contain the Superfish application which “supplements” the user’s SSL sessions to enable their adware application to deliver content transparently; however, due to poor security design this leaves users vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks.
How it was supposed to work Superfish uses the program “Visual Discovery” to process images in browser content and then displays ads for similar goods and services. This sounds like any other adware application, but in order to maintain SSL sessions and not alert users with security warnings, Superfish is serving up these images over https.
2015 – Looking Back, Moving Forward
January 6, 2015 by
Bruce Morton
(Entrust)
Apple
Attack
CA/Browser Forum
CAA
Chrome
Code Signing
EV
Firefox
Forward Secrecy
Google
IETF
Malware
Microsoft
MITM
Mozilla
OpenSSL
PKI
Policy
RSA
SHA1
SSL 3.0
SSL/TLS
TLS 1.0
TLS 1.2
TLS 1.3
Vulnerability
Looking Back at 2014 End of 1024-Bit Security In 2014, the SSL industry moved to issuing a minimum security of 2048-bit RSA certificates. Keys smaller than 2048 are no longer allowed in server certificates. In addition, Microsoft and Mozilla started to remove 1024-bit roots from their certificate stores. Hopefully, the key size change will support users through to 2030.
Push to Perfect Forward Secrecy Following the Edward Snowden revelations of pervasive surveillance, there was a big push to configure web servers to support Perfect Forward Secrecy.
Code Signing Baseline Requirements
October 20, 2014 by
Jeremy Rowley
CA/Browser Forum
CASC
Code Signing
Malware
Microsoft
Vulnerability
Code signing certificates are used to sign software objects to authenticate that they originated from a verified source, allowing developers to avoid warnings commonly displayed by application software vendors such as Microsoft operating systems and Java. A fraudulent code signing certificate can wreak havoc on networks, spreading malware and adware without restraint. Certificate Authorities are tasked with ensuring that code signing applicants are legitimate entities and provide accountability for use of the certificate.
Google Plans to Deprecate SHA-1 Certificates – Updated
September 24, 2014 by
CA Security Council
Announcement
Attack
CASC
Chrome
Code Signing
Google
Microsoft
Policy
SHA1
SSL/TLS
UPDATED September 23, 2014: The following blog post has been updated with action taken in recent weeks, as well as to reflect helpful user comments left on our August 28 blog post on this topic.
On August 19, Google announced a new policy that accelerates the deprecation of SHA-1 certificates, potentially causing websites using SHA-1 certificates to display warnings in the near future. While keeping with an earlier Microsoft announcement to accept SHA-1 certificates with an expiration date before Jan.