PKI Consortium blog

Posts by tag Code Signing

Don’t ‘Compromise’ Your Code Amid Malware Mayhem
May 12, 2020 by Abul Salek (Sectigo) CA/Browser Forum Code Signing EV FIPS HSM Malware Microsoft Phishing SSL/TLS
Code Signing Certificates demand a price premium in the underground online marketplace. This is no surprise considering that criminals sometimes use them to dupe their potential victims into installing malware in their machine.

5 Ways to Keep Up with Authentication Certificates
February 24, 2020 by Arvid Vermote Code Signing Encryption Identity ISO Malware Microsoft PKI SSL/TLS
When it comes to protecting an organization’s data and users, CISOs have no shortage of hurdles. Identity attacks have become sophisticated and convincing, thanks to ransomware, phishing and deep fakes. CISOs have long known the importance of strong identification and authentication controls, but with threats constantly changing and intensifying, having these controls in place is just one piece of the puzzle; they must be managed correctly in order to do their job.

Online Identity Is Important: Let’s Upgrade Extended Validation
October 21, 2019 by Patrick Nohe (GlobalSign) Apple CA/Browser Forum Chrome Code Signing Encryption EV Google Identity Mozilla Phishing SSL/TLS
It’s time for the CA/Browser Forum to focus on the other half of its mandate Let’s have a candid discussion about Extended Validation SSL. What’s working. What’s NOT. And what can be done to fix it so that all parties involved are satisfied. But first, let’s zoom out and talk big picture. The vast majority of website owners almost never think of SSL. They worry about it once every year or so when it needs to be replaced, but it’s not really a major point of consideration.

9 Common Myths About CAs
August 1, 2019 by Tim Callan (Sectigo) CA/Browser Forum CASC Code Signing Encryption ETSI Identity Malware PKI Qualified Revocation SSL/TLS Vulnerability WebTrust
Over the years misconceptions about CAs and the SSL infrastructure have arisen. Below is a list of common myths related to SSL and CAs. Myth #1: CAs are not regulated Fact: CAs are subject to various checks and balances, including third-party qualified audits through WebTrust or ETSI and strict criteria set forth by leading browsers, before they are accepted in browser root stores. Similarly, the CA/Browser Forum’s Baseline Requirements and Network Security Guidelines establish global standards for certificate issuance and CA controls that will soon be included in third-party auditing standards.

What Are Subordinate CAs and Why Would You Want Your Own?
June 26, 2019 by Doug Beattie (GlobalSign) CA/Browser Forum Chrome Code Signing CRL ECC eIDAS Encryption EV HSM Identity Microsoft OCSP PKI Policy Revocation RSA S/MIME SSL/TLS
Digital certificate and PKI adoption has changed quite a bit in recent years. Gone are the days where certificates were only synonymous with SSL/TLS; compliance drivers like stronger authentication requirements and digital signature regulations (e.g. eIDAS) have greatly expanded the role of PKI within the enterprise. As PKI usage has expanded, conversation has moved beyond just the number and type of certificates needed and onto deeper dialogue about custom PKI deployments.

2019 – Looking Back, Moving Forward
January 3, 2019 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) Attack CA/Browser Forum Certificate Expiry Chrome Code Signing DV ECC EV Forward Secrecy Identity Mis-issued Phishing PKI Policy Qualified Revocation RSA SSL/TLS TLS 1.0 TLS 1.3 Vulnerability
Looking Back at 2018 2018 was an active year for SSL/TLS. We saw the SSL/TLS certificate validity period drop to 825-days and the mass deployment of Certificate Transparency (CT). TLS 1.3 protocol was finally completed and published; and Chrome status bar security indicators changing to remove “secure” and to concentrate on “not secure.” The CA/Browser Forum has been reformed, the London Protocol was announced and the nearly full distrust of Symantec SSL completed.

Fortify Allows Users to Generate X.509 Certificates in Their Browser
June 19, 2018 by Tim Hollebeek Chrome Code Signing Encryption Firefox Google HSM Microsoft Mozilla S/MIME W3C
Fortify, an open source application sponsored by Certificate Authorities through the CA Security Council, is now available for Windows and Mac. The Fortify app, which is free for all users, connects a user’s web browsers to smart cards, security tokens, and certificates on a user’s local machine. This can allow users to generate X.509 certificates in their browser, replacing the need for the deprecated <keygen> functionality. Certificate Generation In The Browser The Web Cryptography API, also known as Web Crypto, provides a set of cryptographic capabilities for web browsers through a set of JavaScript APIs.

Fortify Provides a More Secure Web Experience for Certificates and Smart Cards
June 19, 2018 by CA Security Council CASC Code Signing S/MIME SSL/TLS
San Francisco – June 19, 2018 – The Certificate Authority Security Council (CASC), an advocacy group committed to the advancement of web security, today announced that Fortify, an open source application sponsored by the Council, is now available for Windows and Mac. Fortify, a free app, connects a user’s web browsers to smart cards, security tokens, and certificates on a user’s local machine. This allows users to generate X.509 certificates in their browser, replacing the loss of key generation functionality.

CA/Browser Forum Governance Reform
May 18, 2018 by Dean Coclin Apple CA/Browser Forum Code Signing Policy S/MIME SSL/TLS
In March 2016, the CA/Browser Forum formed a working group to review potential ways to restructure the forum. The primary goal was to examine ideas so the Forum could work on other types of standards besides TLS. Ben Wilson and I chaired this group with excellent participation from a cross functional team of browser and certificate authority representatives as well as interested parties. After 2 years of efforts, the working group produced Ballot 206 which passed in April 2017.

2017 – Looking Back, Moving Forward
January 13, 2017 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) 3DES Apple Attack CA/Browser Forum CAA Chrome Code Signing Encryption Firefox Google Identity Malware MITM Policy Revocation RSA SSL 3.0 SSL/TLS TLS 1.3 TSA Vulnerability
Looking Back at 2016 Fortunately, 2016 was not a year full of SSL/TLS vulnerabilities. Although some researchers did prove old cryptography algorithms should be put out to pasture. The year showed the end of public-trusted SHA-1 SSL/TLS certificates. It also showed more transparency should be considered due to issues discovered with a few certification authorities (CAs). The great news is HTTPS is no longer the minority — after 20 years, connections using HTTPS has surpassed HTTP.

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