PKI Consortium blog

What the ICANN SSAC Report Doesn’t Tell You
March 22, 2013 by CA Security Council CA/Browser Forum CASC ICANN SSL/TLS

The CA Security Council, which comprises seven of the largest CAs, read with interest the article titled, “Internal-use SSL certificates pose security risk for upcoming domain extensions.” As a group in one of the best positions to understand the impact of the new gTLDs on organizational security infrastructure and the Internet as a whole, we felt it appropriate to comment on this and related stories which summarize the ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC) report sac 045 Invalid Top Level Domain Queries at the Root Level of the Domain Name System.

All You Need to Know About the RC4 Encryption Scheme
March 14, 2013 by Rick Andrews Attack CASC Encryption RC4 RSA SSL/TLS Vulnerability

The latest published attacks target specific algorithms used within SSL/TLS. Those algorithms are used when a client connects to a server via SSL/TLS; they’re not used when a Certificate Authority signs a certificate. The attacks demonstrate potential weaknesses in the use of the algorithms.

While interesting, the attacks don’t represent an immediate practical threat to users of SSL/TLS (including online banking, e-commerce, social networking, etc.). Such attacks require an attacker to run malicious software on a user’s computer which would connect to a particular web site and send the same message over and over again many times. In fact, if the attacker’s software could send the same message over and over 10 times per second, it would still take more than 3 years for the attack to succeed.

RSA Recap – Securing Your Site
March 8, 2013 by Ben Wilson BEAST CASC Encryption Firefox Hash Function HSTS OpenSSL Policy RSA SSL/TLS TLS 1.1 TLS 1.2 Vulnerability

At RSA last week a few of us participated in panel discussions that focused on SSL/TLS. During the panel that I moderated on Friday, one theme we addressed was secure server configuration. One of CASC’s goals is to help harden existing SSL/TLS implementations against vulnerabilities—because most SSL/TLS exploits arise from suboptimal website configurations. These vulnerabilities and attacks can be mitigated or even eliminated with proper server configuration and good website design.

CASC Happenings at RSA
February 25, 2013 by CA Security Council Attack CASC Identity PKI RSA SSL/TLS

We are excited to have members of the CASC attending and speaking at this year’s RSA Conference. The events and panels will cover various topics that revolve around the security of the Internet and CAs as a whole. You can follow the CASC on Twitter for more information and news at @CertCouncil, as well as see some of the presentations after the events on our SlideShare page. Please join us for the following CASC member events:

OCSP Stapling: Improved Performance and Security, a Win-Win
February 14, 2013 by Jeremy Rowley CASC OCSP Revocation SSL/TLS

The launch of the CASC has given its members a unique platform through which we can educate users about online security and the best practices in utilizing SSL. That’s why we’ve decided to pair the group’s launch with a focused effort on OCSP stapling.

Why OCSP stapling? For one, stapling is already supported by IIS and the newest versions of Apache and nginx. Although server software does not enable OCSP by default, servers can be re-configured with a little education. OCSP stapling is a significant improvement on traditional CRLs and OCSP revocation mechanisms because it eliminates the communication between the browser and CA when establishing the SSL connection. This leads to an increase in browsing performance and eliminates an attacker’s ability to successfully block a CA’s ability to provide revocation information. Stapled OCSP responses are cached by the web administrator and sent back to the relying party during the communication, effectively reducing bandwidth requirements and speeding up the SSL connection.

Certificate Revocation and OCSP Stapling
February 14, 2013 by CA Security Council Attack CASC CRL IETF OCSP Revocation SSL/TLS

Revocation

As a body of global CAs, the CA Security Council is committed to educating server administrators, end-users and other interested parties about SSL enhancements and best practices that can better protect everyone. An important initiative that can make a practical difference right now is addressing easily implemented improvements to certificate status services that handle revocation of invalid or expired certificates, specifically the implementation of OCSP stapling.

World’s Leading Certificate Authorities Come Together to Advance Internet Security and the Trusted SSL Ecosystem
February 14, 2013 by CA Security Council CA/Browser Forum CASC CRL OCSP Revocation SSL/TLS

San Francisco, CA. – February 14, 2013 – Leading global certificate authorities announced the creation of the Certificate Authority Security Council (CASC), an advocacy group, committed to the exploration and promotion of best practices that advance the security of websites and online transactions. Through public education, collaboration, and advocacy, the CASC strives to improve understanding of critical policies and their potential impact on the internet infrastructure. Members of the CASC include Comodo, DigiCert, Entrust, GlobalSign, Go Daddy, Symantec, and Trend Micro.

CAs Unite
February 14, 2013 by Robin Alden (Sectigo) Announcement CA/Browser Forum CASC SSL/TLS

Today marks an important day for internet security and future SSL enhancements, as the world’s seven largest publicly trusted Certificate Authorities are announcing the formation of the Certificate Authority Security Council.

While leading CAs have worked together for years to address security challenges and meet them with evolving and increasingly strict standards and best practices through the CA/Browser Forum and other industry venues, we’ve lacked a union where we can come together and speak with a unified CA voice.