PKI Consortium blog

Posts by tag CA/Browser Forum

One Year Certs
July 9, 2020 by Patrick Nohe (GlobalSign) Apple CA/Browser Forum DV Google Identity Microsoft PKI Policy Root Program SHA1 SHA2 SSL/TLS
Starting on September 1st, SSL/TLS certificates cannot be issued for longer than 13 months (397 days). This change was first announced by Apple at the CA/Browser Forum Spring Face-to-Face event in Bratislava back in March.

Don’t ‘Compromise’ Your Code Amid Malware Mayhem
May 12, 2020 by Abul Salek (Sectigo) CA/Browser Forum Code Signing EV FIPS HSM Malware Microsoft Phishing SSL/TLS
Code Signing Certificates demand a price premium in the underground online marketplace. This is no surprise considering that criminals sometimes use them to dupe their potential victims into installing malware in their machine.

The CA Security Council Looks Ahead to 2020 and Beyond
January 9, 2020 by Patrick Nohe (GlobalSign), Doug Beattie (GlobalSign) Apple CA/Browser Forum Chrome Edge Encryption EV Firefox Forward Secrecy GDPR Google Identity Microsoft Mozilla PKI Policy Qualified SSL 3.0 SSL/TLS TLS 1.0 TLS 1.1 TLS 1.2 TLS 1.3 Web PKI
A whirlwind of activity will cause dramatic shifts across the PKI world in the year ahead Suffice it to say that 2019 was filled with challenges and contentiousness as Certificate Authorities and Browsers began to watch their shared visions diverge. The debate around Extended Validation continued as CAs pushed for a range of reforms and browsers pushed to strip its visual indicators. And a ballot to shorten maximum certificate validity periods exposed fault-lines at the CAB Forum.

Online Identity Is Important: Let’s Upgrade Extended Validation
October 21, 2019 by Patrick Nohe (GlobalSign) Apple CA/Browser Forum Chrome Code Signing Encryption EV Google Identity Mozilla Phishing SSL/TLS
It’s time for the CA/Browser Forum to focus on the other half of its mandate Let’s have a candid discussion about Extended Validation SSL. What’s working. What’s NOT. And what can be done to fix it so that all parties involved are satisfied. But first, let’s zoom out and talk big picture. The vast majority of website owners almost never think of SSL. They worry about it once every year or so when it needs to be replaced, but it’s not really a major point of consideration.

Why Are You Removing Website Identity, Google and Mozilla?
August 27, 2019 by Tim Callan (Sectigo), Kirk Hall CA/Browser Forum Chrome DV Encryption EV Firefox GDPR Google Identity Malware Mozilla Phishing SSL/TLS
You can’t have consumer privacy without having strong website identity Today there’s a huge wave toward protecting consumer privacy – in Congress, with the GDPR, etc. – but how can we protect user privacy on the web without establishing the identity of the websites that are asking for consumer passwords and credit card numbers? Extended Validation (EV) certificates provide this information and can be very useful for consumers. Recently, Google and Mozilla have announced plan to eliminate the distinctive indicators in the Chrome and Firefox browsers that let consumers know that they are looking at a site authenticated with an EV certificate.

9 Common Myths About CAs
August 1, 2019 by Tim Callan (Sectigo) CA/Browser Forum CASC Code Signing Encryption ETSI Identity Malware PKI Qualified Revocation SSL/TLS Vulnerability WebTrust
Over the years misconceptions about CAs and the SSL infrastructure have arisen. Below is a list of common myths related to SSL and CAs. Myth #1: CAs are not regulated Fact: CAs are subject to various checks and balances, including third-party qualified audits through WebTrust or ETSI and strict criteria set forth by leading browsers, before they are accepted in browser root stores. Similarly, the CA/Browser Forum’s Baseline Requirements and Network Security Guidelines establish global standards for certificate issuance and CA controls that will soon be included in third-party auditing standards.

What Are Subordinate CAs and Why Would You Want Your Own?
June 26, 2019 by Doug Beattie (GlobalSign) CA/Browser Forum Chrome Code Signing CRL ECC eIDAS Encryption EV HSM Identity Microsoft OCSP PKI Policy Revocation RSA S/MIME SSL/TLS
Digital certificate and PKI adoption has changed quite a bit in recent years. Gone are the days where certificates were only synonymous with SSL/TLS; compliance drivers like stronger authentication requirements and digital signature regulations (e.g. eIDAS) have greatly expanded the role of PKI within the enterprise. As PKI usage has expanded, conversation has moved beyond just the number and type of certificates needed and onto deeper dialogue about custom PKI deployments.

2019 – Looking Back, Moving Forward
January 3, 2019 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) Attack CA/Browser Forum Certificate Expiry Chrome Code Signing DV ECC EV Forward Secrecy Identity Mis-issued Phishing PKI Policy Qualified Revocation RSA SSL/TLS TLS 1.0 TLS 1.3 Vulnerability
Looking Back at 2018 2018 was an active year for SSL/TLS. We saw the SSL/TLS certificate validity period drop to 825-days and the mass deployment of Certificate Transparency (CT). TLS 1.3 protocol was finally completed and published; and Chrome status bar security indicators changing to remove “secure” and to concentrate on “not secure.” The CA/Browser Forum has been reformed, the London Protocol was announced and the nearly full distrust of Symantec SSL completed.

CASC Announces Launch of London Protocol to Improve Identity Assurance and Minimize Phishing on Identity Websites
June 27, 2018 by CA Security Council Attack CA/Browser Forum CASC DV EV Identity OV Phishing SSL/TLS
LONDON – (June 27, 2018) – The Certificate Authority Security Council (CASC), an advocacy group committed to the advancement of the security of websites and online transactions, announced at the CA/Browser Forum event in London the launch of the London Protocol – an initiative to improve identity assurance and minimize the possibility of phishing activity on websites encrypted with organization validated (OV) and extended validation (EV) certificates, which contain organization identity information (Identity Certificates).

CA/Browser Forum Governance Reform
May 18, 2018 by Dean Coclin Apple CA/Browser Forum Code Signing Policy S/MIME SSL/TLS
In March 2016, the CA/Browser Forum formed a working group to review potential ways to restructure the forum. The primary goal was to examine ideas so the Forum could work on other types of standards besides TLS. Ben Wilson and I chaired this group with excellent participation from a cross functional team of browser and certificate authority representatives as well as interested parties. After 2 years of efforts, the working group produced Ballot 206 which passed in April 2017.

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