BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//PKI Consortium//Conference Agenda//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME:Post-Quantum Cryptography Conference
X-WR-TIMEZONE:Europe/Amsterdam
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:agenda-b935c129-e4b2-4e6f-9f26-a65b850e3399@ics.pkic.org
SEQUENCE:1
DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z
DTSTART:20261202T130000Z
DTEND:20261202T132500Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SUMMARY:Quantum-Safe Audit Log Relying on Attestation Procedures
DESCRIPTION:Last year\, we examined how hardware security modules can provi
 de cryptographic attestation\, i.e.\, a signed snapshot of the state of an 
 HSM and/or of its keys. Trust in cryptographic infrastructure\, however\, o
 ften requires more than a snapshot\; it requires proof of history. This pre
 sentation introduces cryptographically verifiable audit logs for hardware s
 ecurity modules\, a mechanism that produces a tamper-evident\, independentl
 y verifiable record of every operation performed on a cryptographic object 
 over its lifetime. Where attestation tells you what a key looks like today\
 , an audit log tells you everything that was done to it and when. Key cerem
 onies require a verifiable sequence of authorized operations that no snapsh
 ot can reconstruct\; key migration requires a temporary export\, so the des
 tination device's attestation cannot prove the process was correct\, but th
 e combined audit logs of both devices can. The cryptographic architecture b
 ehind this relies on event chaining and attested log state\, with tooling t
 hat runs entirely outside the HSM so that an auditor can verify the record 
 without device access. For long-term validity\, all of this must rest on qu
 antum-safe roots of trust provisioned at manufacturing time.\n\n\nSpeakers:
  Olivier Couillard
LOCATION:Room A (2)
CATEGORIES:Room A (2)
URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR