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PRODID:-//PKI Consortium//Conference Agenda//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
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X-WR-CALNAME:Post-Quantum Cryptography Conference
X-WR-TIMEZONE:Europe/Amsterdam
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UID:agenda-98c36aa4-bb91-4571-813a-b0ba65d43713@ics.pkic.org
SEQUENCE:1
DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z
DTSTART:20261201T133000Z
DTEND:20261201T140000Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SUMMARY:Governing the PQC Transition in the US and the EU: A Comparative An
 alysis
DESCRIPTION:Although the US has been regarded as a frontrunner in the globa
 l pursuit of quantum-readiness\, distinguished by its top-down approach to 
 the PQC transition\, hosting the main institutional venue undertaking PQC s
 tandardisation\, and producing a considerable amount of technical guidance 
 through its specialist agencies\, it has been facing significant domestic i
 mplementation challenges. Both executive and legislative bodies have cast a
  critical light\, citing the slow pace of progress\, the limited scope of t
 he current US PQC migration strategy (making it mandatory only for federal 
 government) and the lack of appropriate leadership.\n\nThe adjustments that
  have been proposed include\, among others\, more streamlined governance\, 
 performance measurement\, and better encouragement for all sectors to embra
 ce this change. New legislative proposals addressing the PQC transition hav
 e since proliferated and executive actions have reportedly been in the pipe
 line. After backsliding from some elements of the previous administration's
  PQC transition course in June 2025\, the current administration released i
 ts Cyber Strategy in March 2026\, promising to accelerate PQC deployment. M
 eanwhile CISA\, one of the key actors in facilitating this transition\, has
  been exposed to a rather precarious situation\, leading to a sizeable redu
 ction of its workforce\, which may have some disruptive impact on the gover
 nance of this process.\n\nIn the EU the PQC migration has been unfolding qu
 ite differently. Here\, the process has been driven for some time by strong
  policy entrepreneurship and expertise coming from national cybersecurity a
 uthorities in several Member States\, which can be viewed as a bottom-up dy
 namic. The EU-level strategy formulated in 2024 appears to be more comprehe
 nsive than the US equivalent\, as alongside public administrations it encom
 passes critical infrastructures. There is also a sound legal base in EU law
 \, consisting of a set of regulatory instruments requiring state-of-the-art
  cybersecurity measures commensurate with the risks and fulfilment of the p
 rinciples of privacy-by-design and security-by-design.\n\nArguably\, howeve
 r\, this should be strengthened by making requirements regarding PQC more e
 xplicit and by streamlining them across the various existing instruments an
 d guidelines for consistency and legal certainty. There is also a need for 
 the EU to enhance its funding for PQC development and deployment\, based on
  the rationale that it represents the main solution in countering the quant
 um threat\, especially in the near term. Recent EU legislative proposals ha
 ve generally stressed the increasing urgency of enacting the PQC migration\
 , and although the EU has tangibly contributed to the US-led PQC standardis
 ation endeavours with its scientific excellence in the field of cryptograph
 y\, these new proposals also signal that the EU might now be set to pursue 
 its own framework.\n\nAttendees of this session will benefit from a granula
 r view of how the PQC transition has been governed in these two jurisdictio
 ns and what future projections can be identified.\n\n\nSpeakers: Laima Jan
 čiūtė
LOCATION:Room B (5)
CATEGORIES:Room B (5)
URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/
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