BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//PKI Consortium//Conference Agenda//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-WR-CALNAME:Post-Quantum Cryptography Conference X-WR-TIMEZONE:Europe/Amsterdam BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-87f02524-11c3-46d4-b998-8f94da20126f@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261201T070000Z DTEND:20261201T080000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Registration DESCRIPTION: URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-fa8c0a65-58fd-4901-9a6c-3ab2dc5a7989@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261201T080000Z DTEND:20261201T083000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Opening DESCRIPTION:Welcome to the 2026 PQC Conference. The chairs open the confere nce\, set the agenda for the three days ahead\, and invite some attending s ponsors for a one-minute pitch (the only commercial message allowed at this conference).\n\n\nSpeakers: Paul van Brouwershaven\, Albert de Ruiter LOCATION:Red hall CATEGORIES:Red hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-3c83184e-340e-4cb5-911a-9c158083e58d@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T124925Z DTSTART:20261201T083000Z DTEND:20261201T085000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:To be announced DESCRIPTION:Session details will be announced soon.\n LOCATION:Red hall CATEGORIES:Red hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-e99fe8a9-1e85-46a9-b310-f5f6cc891a2b@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261023T124925Z DTSTART:20261201T085000Z DTEND:20261201T091500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:The State of Quantum Computing in 2026 DESCRIPTION:Quantum computing has made substantial progress over the past f ew years\, but it has also become increasingly difficult to tell which deve lopments really matter. More qubits\, better fidelities\, demonstrations of error correction\, new architectures\, and increasingly sophisticated soft ware all point toward a maturing field. At the same time\, large-scale\, fa ult-tolerant quantum computing remains an engineering challenge rather than an accomplished fact.\n\nThis talk takes stock of where quantum computing stands in 2026\, with a focus on the developments that are most relevant fo r scaling towards useful quantum computation. It looks at how recent progre ss fits into the broader trajectory of the field and where the main technic al limitations still lie.\n\nAI has also entered this discussion. There are already meaningful ways in which machine learning and AI can help us desig n\, control\, compile\, and operate quantum systems. The opposite direction \, using quantum computers to improve AI\, is much less settled. Separating these two directions is important for understanding where there is tangibl e progress and where expectations still run ahead of evidence.\n\nSpeakers: Sebastian Feld LOCATION:Red hall CATEGORIES:Red hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-4554a085-ef85-470f-b1e4-d38813754ca4@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:2 DTSTAMP:20261023T135754Z DTSTART:20261201T091500Z DTEND:20261201T094500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Break DESCRIPTION: URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-028c6b17-e8d4-4737-bb3d-2fdf73bc48c5@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261201T094500Z DTEND:20261201T101000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:From Inventory to Action: A Risk-Based Scoring Model for Prioritizi ng PQC Migration at Enterprise Scale DESCRIPTION:Many enterprises have now begun cryptographic discovery and bui lt Cryptographic Bills of Materials (CBOMs)\, only to find themselves facin g a new problem: a list of tens of thousands\, sometimes millions\, of cryp tographic artifacts with no clear way to decide what to remediate first. In ventory answers "what do we have?" but it doesn't answer "where do we start ?"\nThis session presents a practical\, risk-based scoring model for priori tizing post-quantum migration at enterprise scale\, developed and applied i n a large organizational environment. Rather than treating all inventoried artifacts as equally urgent\, the model scores each one against a set of fa ctors: exposure (internet-facing vs. internal-only)\, data sensitivity clas sification (e.g.\, PCI\, PII\, PHI)\, the harvest-now-decrypt-later (HNDL) risk window based on data longevity relative to projected quantum timelines \, the availability of a non-invasive remediation path\, business criticali ty\, and environmental readiness (including whether the underlying platform even supports the protocols required for migration\, since gaps here can m ean a hardware refresh rather than a configuration change).\nAttendees will see how these factors combine into a composite priority score\, walk throu gh worked examples showing how superficially similar systems can land in ve ry different priority tiers\, and examine the model's limits\, which will i nclude a deliberate\, defensible "cost exceeds risk\, do not migrate yet" d ecision point and how to document that decision for auditors and leadership rather than treating it as an oversight.\nThe session will also cover the organizational friction this approach surfaces in practice: who owns the sc oring process\, how it integrates with existing GRC and risk functions\, an d what changes as quantum timelines and remediation costs shift over time.\ nAttendees will leave with an adaptable scoring rubric\, a set of questions to apply to their own CBOM data\, and a framework for prioritizing migrati on work that can be defended to stakeholders\, not just executed against a spreadsheet.\n\nSpeakers: Elizabeth Wood LOCATION:Red hall CATEGORIES:Red hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-ae178bde-83e6-47ce-a94b-95641dea617f@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261201T094500Z DTEND:20261201T113000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Roundtable: Securing Transportation for the Quantum Era DESCRIPTION:Aircraft\, rolling stock\, vehicles\, and vessels stay in servi ce for decades\, so the cryptography designed into them today must hold wel l into the quantum era. Transportation systems also depend on long and comp lex supply chains: tier-one suppliers\, chip vendors\, onboard and backend PKI\, charging and ground infrastructure\, and standards set by many differ ent bodies. Industry and regulators are now beginning to set expectations f or the post-quantum transition. The open question is how to plan migrations for systems that cannot simply be patched.\n\nThis roundtable brings toget her people from aviation\, rail\, automotive\, mobility\, shipping\, and EV charging for a working discussion rather than a series of presentations. A fter a short introduction from the moderator\, participants will compare wh ere their organizations are starting in practice: cryptographic inventory a cross fleets and onboard systems\, in-vehicle and onboard PKI\, V2X and cha rging infrastructure\, over-the-air and software updates\, and the long-liv ed assets that will outlive today's algorithms.\n\nThe discussion will give particular attention to the dependencies no single operator or manufacture r can resolve alone\, from suppliers and chip vendors to certification and the timing of standards\, and to what the sector needs from regulators to k eep migration aligned across borders.\n\nThe main conclusions will feed int o a brief recap during the conference's closing session.\n\nSpeakers: Nina Kattwinkel *\, Peer Eichler * LOCATION:Room F (6&7) CATEGORIES:Room F (6&7) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-be4d06e3-2dd4-430a-985c-a181dba4fe39@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261023T124925Z DTSTART:20261201T094500Z DTEND:20261201T101000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Post-Quantum Migration at Anduril DESCRIPTION:Anduril's post-quantum cryptography (PQC) migration is well und erway. Our particular focus is on the most constrained\, most possibly comp licated signals environments in which to establish secure\, modern communic ations infrastructure. In this talk\, I survey the technical roadmap of And uril Industries from no-PQC to full-PQC\, with special emphasis on DDIL (De nied\, Disrupted\, Intermittent\, and Limited) communication scenarios. Thi s talk discusses organizational challenges\, engineering roadblocks (and su ccesses)\, ranging from early planning and implementation\, to simulation t esting\, live field testing\, and deployment roll-out. A special emphasis i s on interoperability of protocols and cryptographic primitives\, and how t o effectively handle various international regulation jurisdictions\, as we ll as a call for further\, future collaboration in this space\, especially on common standards across various standardization bodies.\n\n\nSpeakers: D aniel Apon LOCATION:Blue hall CATEGORIES:Blue hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-6d8f6f73-8681-43e6-a9ae-e201eafa90d5@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261023T124925Z DTSTART:20261201T101500Z DTEND:20261201T104000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Towards Coordinated Quantum Security in the Financial Sector: Risks \, Priorities\, and a Framework for Market Action DESCRIPTION:The transition to quantum security in the financial sector is n ot only a technological undertaking\, but also a coordination challenge for a highly interconnected global ecosystem. Misaligned transition efforts ma y create operational risks\, including interoperability tensions across mar kets\, infrastructures\, and jurisdictions\, prolonged reliance on quantum- vulnerable cryptography\, inefficient duplication of effort\, and ecosystem fragmentation.\n\nTo address these risks\, the Europol Quantum Safe Financ ial Forum\, in collaboration with FS-ISAC and CFDIR\, has proposed an opera tional framework for coordinated action. The framework focuses on identifyi ng and prioritising critical use cases\, structuring the transition through shared implementation waves\, and defining three use-case-specific milesto nes to align sequencing and execution.\n\nThis session examines that priori tisation framework and provides an update on the state of quantum security in the financial sector\, relevant not only to financial sector professiona ls\, but to the wider community as an early example of ecosystem-wide coord ination and its associated challenges.\n\n\nSpeakers: Jaime Gómez García LOCATION:Red hall CATEGORIES:Red hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-75748a6b-3388-4ed4-bfe3-4ba36655dad6@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261023T124925Z DTSTART:20261201T101500Z DTEND:20261201T104000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Post-Quantum Security of IPsec / IKEv2 DESCRIPTION:IKEv2 is the key exchange protocol that drives IPsec\, the ente rprise workhorse VPN. In this talk\, I will recap the standardization of ex tensions that allow us to use IPsec with post-quantum key exchange\, and ex plain what features you need to turn on (or make sure to ask your suppliers for) to be secure against post-quantum adversaries\, both for harvest-now decrypt-later and fully post-quantum adversaries. I will support these clai ms through a security analysis of IKEv2 and its extensions that we submitte d to a major academic security conference.\n\nThis talk is based on joint w ork with Benedikt Auerbach\, Keitaro Hashimoto\, and Shuichi Katsumata.\n\n \nSpeakers: Thom Wiggers LOCATION:Blue hall CATEGORIES:Blue hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-a70d76ed-02c2-4bd0-8d4b-11c6d935b09b@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261201T104500Z DTEND:20261201T113000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Where the PQC Migration Actually Stands: A Cross-Ecosystem Census o f 2.8 Million Packages DESCRIPTION:The NIST 2030 deprecation deadline for quantum-vulnerable publi c-key algorithms is 1\,386 days away as of March 2026. Every PKI operator\, certificate authority\, and security team needs to know how the software s upply chain they depend on is responding. No cross-ecosystem measurement ex isted. We built one. This session presents findings from the first cross-ec osystem cryptographic census\, scanning 2\,809\,479 packages across 11 pack age ecosystems including npm\, PyPI\, Go\, Maven\, crates.io\, NuGet\, and others. The results reveal the actual state of PQC adoption in the open-sou rce supply chain that PKI infrastructure depends on. Of the 2.8 million pac kages scanned\, 108\,145 use cryptographic libraries. Among those\, 21\,332 depend on weak or deprecated algorithms such as MD5\, SHA-1\, DES\, and RC 4. Only 188 packages\, or 0.17 percent of crypto-using packages\, have any post-quantum cryptography dependency. PQC adoption is concentrated in 5 of 11 ecosystems\, with crates.io accounting for 58 percent of all PQC-depende nt packages. Six ecosystems show zero PQC adoption. Maven has the worst wea k crypto rate at 51.6 percent.\n\nBeyond the headline numbers\, the talk ad dresses the migration gap that matters most for PKI operators. Dependency-l evel scanning\, the foundation of most software composition analysis tools\ , misses approximately 4 times the cryptographic surface area visible to so urce-level analysis. We validated this gap on 20 production projects and fo und that 30 percent of projects with active cryptographic code show zero de pendency-level signal. For PKI operators conducting cryptographic inventori es under NIST IR 8547 or OMB M-23-02\, this means current tooling systemati cally undercounts exposure.\n\nAttendees leave with three actionable outcom es: the current state of PQC adoption in their language ecosystem with name d libraries and migration paths\; a reproducible census methodology they ca n apply to internal package registries and vendor assessments\; and a clear understanding of why dependency scanning alone fails for cryptographic inv entory and what to do about it.\n\nAll scanning tools\, the 357-library cla ssification catalog\, the full scan dataset\, and a live dashboard are rele ased open source.\n\n\nSpeakers: Abdel Fane LOCATION:Blue hall CATEGORIES:Blue hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-c89c038f-1c77-460a-9ebe-cfedacc8adea@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261201T104500Z DTEND:20261201T113000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Business implications of the PQC transition DESCRIPTION:This panel session will discuss the next phase of migration to Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC). As organizations move from discovery and s trategy into their respective (but interconnected!) transition journeys\, i t is important that business continuity and interoperability be maintained throughout. This session will discuss strategic business factors that are i mportant to consider for this transition and how industries can stay aligne d.\n\nSpeakers: Sarah McCarthy\, Murugiah Souppaya\, Michele Mosca\, Colin Soutar * LOCATION:Red hall CATEGORIES:Red hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-7198453f-0a16-4612-91a1-39edaf4409d6@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261201T113000Z DTEND:20261201T130000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Lunch DESCRIPTION: URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-2fc3c661-0561-497b-aa14-c68b0de47c70@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261201T130000Z DTEND:20261201T132500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:From Fear to Hybrid: Making PQC Less Scary DESCRIPTION:European agencies such as ANSSI and BSI recommend the hybrid us e of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms alongside traditional schemes\, driven by concerns regarding the maturity and long-term security assurance of purely post-quantum solutions. This talk focuses on two prominent approa ches to fulfilling this requirement through compound algorithms: the IETF's composite signatures and KEMs\, as well as Intelligent Composed Algorithms .\n\nThe original motivations behind each approach and their respective des ign decisions will be presented in detail\, including the cryptographic con struction and the security properties they aim to achieve. The advantages a nd drawbacks of both approaches will be examined\, highlighting how they ca n contribute to crypto agility and how they differ from other hybridization concepts such as hybrid certificates or multiple signatures. The talk also addresses current interoperability considerations and implementation chall enges. Finally\, the state of standardization within the IETF and other rel evant bodies will be reviewed\, alongside existing support and an outlook o n future work in the field of hybrid algorithms.\n\n\nSpeakers: Jan Klaußn er LOCATION:Room A (2) CATEGORIES:Room A (2) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-4bdb0afd-93a2-4d20-8789-3eb44ce1f7d0@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261201T130000Z DTEND:20261201T132500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:You Can't Patch the Silicon: Post-Quantum Migration Realities in Au tomotive HSM and AUTOSAR Crypto Stacks DESCRIPTION:Post-quantum migration guidance is largely written for systems that can be patched in place: swap a TLS library\, rotate a certificate aut hority\, roll out a firmware update to a fleet of servers. Automotive embed ded systems break almost every one of those assumptions\, and this talk is a practitioner's account of what actually happens when you run a real PQC r isk and migration assessment against an in-vehicle HSM and AUTOSAR crypto s tack instead of a data center.\n\nThree constraints define the problem. Fir st\, SecOC authenticates every CAN and CAN-FD frame in real time\, inside p ayloads that top out around 64 bytes — ML-DSA signatures and ML-KEM ciphe rtexts run into the kilobytes\, so the real-time authentication path cannot simply be re-signed with a post-quantum primitive\; the migration has to h appen somewhere else in the chain. Second\, the HSM is fixed-function silic on soldered into a vehicle that will still be on the road in fifteen to twe nty years\, with no OTA path to add lattice-math acceleration after the fac t — so "harvest now\, decrypt later" isn't an abstract future risk\, it's a clock already running against hardware that shipped years ago. Third\, t he AUTOSAR crypto stack (CSM\, CryIf\, KeyM) was built around parameter ass umptions that classical algorithms never forced anyone to question\, which turns crypto-agility into a real integration problem rather than a configur ation flag.\n\nThis talk walks through where post-quantum primitives map cl eanly today (OTA backend TLS\, V2X certificate issuance\, secure boot signi ng)\, what has to stay symmetric and why\, and how an ISO 21434-aligned ris k assessment was used to decide which ECUs and assets get migrated first wh en neither silicon nor budget allow migrating everything at once.\n\n## Key Takeaways\n\nAttendees will leave with:\n\n- A concrete picture of what do es and doesn't map onto NIST's PQC primitives in a real-time embedded authe ntication path\, and why\n- A working model for why "harvest now\, decrypt later" timelines look different for fixed-lifecycle hardware than for patch able infrastructure\n- A risk-based method\, grounded in ISO 21434 clause 8 \, for sequencing PQC migration across an ECU portfolio under real budget a nd silicon constraints\n- Open questions the automotive supply chain hasn't answered yet — useful for anyone assessing vendor or supplier readiness in this sector\n\nSpeakers: Swathi C L LOCATION:Room C (8) CATEGORIES:Room C (8) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-80cdfea0-e279-4b7b-a52b-0bbe25903511@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261201T130000Z DTEND:20261201T132500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:From ECDSA to Post-Quantum Signatures: Practical Lessons from Migra ting Wallet-Based Transaction PKI DESCRIPTION:Many post-quantum migration discussions focus on TLS\, certific ates\, and enterprise PKI. A different but increasingly important case is w allet-based transaction infrastructure\, where long-lived accounts\, public -key exposure\, signature verification\, hardware constraints\, recovery fl ows\, and user experience all interact with cryptographic migration.\n\nThi s session presents practical lessons from designing and implementing a migr ation path from ECDSA-based transaction signing toward post-quantum signatu res in an EVM-like blockchain environment. It focuses on architecture and e ngineering trade-offs rather than product claims: key generation and storag e\, address derivation\, signature-size impact\, transaction encoding\, ver ification cost\, backward compatibility\, testnet strategy\, smart-account and vault-based migration models\, and how to avoid creating unsafe hybrid systems that merely add complexity without reducing risk.\n\nThe talk also examines the relationship between blockchain wallet infrastructure and trad itional PKI concepts: identity binding\, certificate-like assertions\, key lifecycle management\, recovery\, revocation\, policy enforcement\, auditab ility\, and hardware-backed key protection. Special attention is given to m igration patterns that allow existing assets or accounts to gain post-quant um authorization controls without assuming an overnight replacement of lega cy systems.\n\nAttendees will leave with a concrete checklist for evaluatin g post-quantum readiness in transaction-signing systems: where classical si gnatures remain a dependency\, which components need cryptographic agility\ , what must be measured before migration\, and which design decisions can c reate operational or security risks during the transition.\n\n\nSpeakers: R icardo Agustin Toledo Mañani LOCATION:Room B (5) CATEGORIES:Room B (5) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-83fdbcd1-6b28-4a23-bb7d-63aa6f51aaf4@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261201T130000Z DTEND:20261201T140000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Workshop: Post-Quantum Trails Board Game DESCRIPTION:This interactive\, hands-on workshop is centred around Post-Qua ntum Trails\, an educational board game designed to demystify the complexit ies of migrating to post-quantum cryptography (PQC)\, a joint project broug ht to life by Cybernetica and the OpenSSL Foundation.\n\nAs quantum computi ng advances\, the transition to quantum-safe cryptographic standards is no longer optional\; it has become urgent. Yet for many developers and stakeho lders\, the migration process feels overwhelming and too abstract. The game brings this journey to life\, guiding players through the real-world chall enges of developing\, standardizing\, and deploying PQC solutions\, and hig hlighting both the technical problems and the strategic trade-offs involved .\n\nParticipants will learn about the PQC landscape\, understand the risks of delayed migration\, and engage in a collaborative simulation that refle cts actual industry challenges. Earlier versions of this workshop have been run at the OpenSSL Conference and NordSec 2025\, and the facilitators will introduce the game\, explain the rules\, and be on hand throughout to help players\, answer questions\, and discuss the awareness aspect of PQC migra tion.\n\n\nSpeakers: Jelizaveta Vakarjuk\, Nikita Snetkov LOCATION:Room F (6&7) CATEGORIES:Room F (6&7),Workshop URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-a8d54724-afcd-4c8d-a5af-7fad1cae1e87@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261201T130000Z DTEND:20261201T132500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:What Breaks Between Assessment and Implementation: Lessons from PQC Migration Programs Across Organizations DESCRIPTION:Most PQC migration advice stops at the roadmap. This session pi cks up where the roadmap meets production\, drawing on assessment and migra tion work across many organizations in different sectors and at different l evels of maturity. The recurring lesson is that the same failure points sho w up again and again\, and that the gap is between a clean assessment\, a p ractical roadmap\, and successful implementation.\n\nThe talk follows the r eal arc of a program. It starts with discovery and assessment\, including w hat cryptographic inventory consistently misses: statically linked librarie s\, keys embedded in firmware\, proprietary protocols on operational networ ks\, and cryptography buried inside third-party appliances. It then moves t o the migration attempt and the things that broke in production. Hybrid and composite certificates issued into mutual TLS meshes triggered chain valid ation errors in older OpenSSL and JSSE clients. Handshake sizes grew large enough to fail through middleboxes and load balancers. Hardware security mo dule gaps for composite key generation surfaced only under load. The sessio n walks through the rollback decision and the redesign that held\, which wa s a parallel PQC hierarchy rather than swapping roots in place.\n\nThe seco nd half connects engineering reality to assurance reality\, because the sam e programs hit a second wall: producing evidence auditors accept. It maps w hat examiners actually request against NIS2\, DORA\, and the CRA\, includin g CBOMs as Article 21 documentation\, certificate lifecycle reports for ICT risk testing\, module attestations\, and the supplier readiness evidence c hain. The practical takeaway is to structure discovery and inventory output so it doubles as audit evidence from day one\, rather than rebuilding it u nder deadline.\n\nAttendees will leave with the failure modes that recur re gardless of sector\, a clear signal for when to abandon in-place hybrid roo ts\, and a sequence that links assessment\, migration\, and assurance so th e three are not rebuilt separately. The content is experience-led and vendo r-neutral\, framed entirely around what was observed in the field.\n\n\nSpe akers: Parnashree Saha LOCATION:Red hall CATEGORIES:Red hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-e7212627-e45d-44ff-a5fa-29a95fd9eb8a@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261201T130000Z DTEND:20261201T132500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:The Other End of the Handshake: Cryptographic Dependency Mapping fo r PQC Migration DESCRIPTION:Two years into the post-quantum readiness era\, aligning on the algorithms is the easy part - NIST has standardized them. The hard part\, that quietly derails migration programs\, is the wiring: knowing what crypt ography you run\, where it lives\, and\, critically\, what is connected to what and more importantly what communicates with what.\nThis session makes the case that PQC remediation is fundamentally a dependency problem\, not s imply discovery and visibility. A weak protocol or a quantum-vulnerable key almost never affects only a single endpoint\; it affects the relationship between 2 entities. Disable TLS 1.1 on one side of a handshake while the pe er can only speak the old protocol\, and you don't harden the channel\, ins tead you break it\, often a production-critical one. Fix the wrong end firs t and you simply relocate the weakness. Remediation must be enforced on bot h ends of every cryptographic relationship\, at the same time.\nDrawing on real enterprise migration experience - including the realities of large fin ancial-sector estates\, this session will walk through a dependency-first m ethod any organization can start with as a foundation. We start with a simp le example: a single scanner finding of TLS 1.1 on a payments endpoint\, an d how mapping it’s peer communication set\, turns the remediation ticket into much more than just remediating a single endpoint. We will look at how organizations can lay the foundation to building and maintaining a cryptog raphic dependency graph from layered telemetry.\nWe go deep on the hardest dependency tree of all: certificate hierarchies and machine identities. A q uantum-vulnerable root doesn't invalidate a service\; it invalidates a trus t fabric. PKI and the exploding population of non-human identities must be mapped first and then migrated\, a Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM)\, which is dependency-aware by design\, becomes a living source of truth rat her than a one-time inventory.\nWe aim to have attendees leave with a concr ete\, vendor-neutral playbook: how to assemble the dependency graph\, how t o compute remediation clusters and surface blockers before a change window\ , how to sequence coordinated "add-then-remove" cutovers\, and how to prior itize by secrecy lifetime based on the harvest-now-decrypt-later attack vec tor.\n\nSpeakers: Revathi Chandrasekaran\, Rohan Ramesh LOCATION:Room D (9) CATEGORIES:Room D (9) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-fb501a67-40c4-4b02-98d8-b634380ece50@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261201T130000Z DTEND:20261201T132500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Beyond the Handshake: Enhancing PKI with Out-of-Band Key Agreement DESCRIPTION:Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) migration is accelerating\, but it also exposes a deeper reality: cryptography can no longer be treated as a one-time design choice embedded in protocols. As standards evolve\, orga nizations must prepare for a future where multiple cryptographic assumption s coexist and continuously change\, while advances in automation and AI shr ink the window to respond to emerging cryptographic risks.\n\nThis talk int roduces Out-of-Band (OOB) Key Agreement as a practical way to enhance PKI\, establishing an independent cryptographic control layer that complements e xisting protocols such as TLS and IPsec. Rather than replacing in-band key exchange\, OOB mechanisms derive additional authenticated symmetric keys th rough a separate\, policy-governed channel rooted in PKI identity\, enablin g organizations to introduce new cryptographic methods\, rotate algorithms\ , and respond to emerging threats without requiring changes to application or transport layers.\n\nIn this model\, PKI evolves from a foundational tru st anchor into a central orchestrator of cryptographic policy and lifecycle management across multiple key establishment channels\, enabling both resi lience through diversity and operational simplicity in a post-quantum world .\n\n\nSpeakers: Michele Mosca LOCATION:Blue hall CATEGORIES:Blue hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-1e010cba-a346-4525-9772-4639550fef44@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261201T133000Z DTEND:20261201T140000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:PQC Transition in Production\, Season 1: Network Encryption DESCRIPTION:As a provider of cybersecurity solutions\, Stormshield has been working on the post-quantum transition for years\, for its products but al so for its own IT transition. 2026 is the year when the transition starts t o reach production. Focus is put on encryption\, because of the store-now-d ecrypt-later risk\, and on the network\, for various reasons presented duri ng the talk.\n\nIn this session we look at both technical aspects (which pr otocols\, which tools\, hints and feedback) and strategic aspects: what to do first\, what to delay\, and the non-technical issues. The session closes with a first feedback on what was easy\, what was not\, and what has not b een migrated as expected during this year.\n\n\nSpeakers: Yvan Vanhullebus LOCATION:Blue hall CATEGORIES:Blue hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-98c36aa4-bb91-4571-813a-b0ba65d43713@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261201T133000Z DTEND:20261201T140000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Governing the PQC Transition in the US and the EU: A Comparative An alysis DESCRIPTION:Although the US has been regarded as a frontrunner in the globa l pursuit of quantum-readiness\, distinguished by its top-down approach to the PQC transition\, hosting the main institutional venue undertaking PQC s tandardisation\, and producing a considerable amount of technical guidance through its specialist agencies\, it has been facing significant domestic i mplementation challenges. Both executive and legislative bodies have cast a critical light\, citing the slow pace of progress\, the limited scope of t he current US PQC migration strategy (making it mandatory only for federal government) and the lack of appropriate leadership.\n\nThe adjustments that have been proposed include\, among others\, more streamlined governance\, performance measurement\, and better encouragement for all sectors to embra ce this change. New legislative proposals addressing the PQC transition hav e since proliferated and executive actions have reportedly been in the pipe line. After backsliding from some elements of the previous administration's PQC transition course in June 2025\, the current administration released i ts Cyber Strategy in March 2026\, promising to accelerate PQC deployment. M eanwhile CISA\, one of the key actors in facilitating this transition\, has been exposed to a rather precarious situation\, leading to a sizeable redu ction of its workforce\, which may have some disruptive impact on the gover nance of this process.\n\nIn the EU the PQC migration has been unfolding qu ite differently. Here\, the process has been driven for some time by strong policy entrepreneurship and expertise coming from national cybersecurity a uthorities in several Member States\, which can be viewed as a bottom-up dy namic. The EU-level strategy formulated in 2024 appears to be more comprehe nsive than the US equivalent\, as alongside public administrations it encom passes critical infrastructures. There is also a sound legal base in EU law \, consisting of a set of regulatory instruments requiring state-of-the-art cybersecurity measures commensurate with the risks and fulfilment of the p rinciples of privacy-by-design and security-by-design.\n\nArguably\, howeve r\, this should be strengthened by making requirements regarding PQC more e xplicit and by streamlining them across the various existing instruments an d guidelines for consistency and legal certainty. There is also a need for the EU to enhance its funding for PQC development and deployment\, based on the rationale that it represents the main solution in countering the quant um threat\, especially in the near term. Recent EU legislative proposals ha ve generally stressed the increasing urgency of enacting the PQC migration\ , and although the EU has tangibly contributed to the US-led PQC standardis ation endeavours with its scientific excellence in the field of cryptograph y\, these new proposals also signal that the EU might now be set to pursue its own framework.\n\nAttendees of this session will benefit from a granula r view of how the PQC transition has been governed in these two jurisdictio ns and what future projections can be identified.\n\n\nSpeakers: Laima Jan čiūtė LOCATION:Room B (5) CATEGORIES:Room B (5) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-b438a4bf-0623-45c4-9961-90203709a224@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:2 DTSTAMP:20261027T224749Z DTSTART:20261201T133000Z DTEND:20261201T140000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Retaining Cryptographic Control When Agentic AI Accelerates PQC Mig ration DESCRIPTION:As organisations use AI to accelerate PQC migration\, they risk creating a new form of crypto sprawl: AI-generated code that embeds algori thms\, key references\, provider choices\, and local policy assumptions. Th is session shows how policy-bound cryptographic interfaces\, CI/CD guardrai ls\, and intent-level APIs can help teams use AI without losing cryptograph ic control.\n\nAs organisations prepare for PQC migration\, agentic AI intr oduces a new governance risk: coding agents can generate cryptographic inte grations faster than security teams can review\, approve\, and manage them. Without clear constraints\, AI-generated applications may hard-code algori thms\, key references\, provider calls\, fallback logic\, and local policy assumptions across the software estate. The result can be greater crypto sp rawl\, reduced crypto agility\, and new obstacles to controlled PQC migrati on.\n\nThis session presents an architecture and API approach for using AI safely in PQC migration programmes. Instead of allowing AI-generated applic ations to make cryptographic decisions\, applications should express crypto graphic intent while policy\, key association\, provider routing\, algorith m selection\, audit\, and lifecycle management remain centrally governed. T he session covers CI/CD guardrails\, coding standards\, policy-controlled m igration from classical to post-quantum algorithms\, and evidence collectio n for CBOM and phased cutover planning. Attendees will leave with a practic al model for preventing AI-generated crypto sprawl while still using AI to accelerate PQC readiness.\n\n\nSpeakers: Guillaume Forget LOCATION:Room D (9) CATEGORIES:Room D (9) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-bd09b566-78b1-4385-9e45-c4dddddb0029@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:2 DTSTAMP:20261026T152701Z DTSTART:20261201T133000Z DTEND:20261201T140000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:C509 PKI: A Lightweight PKI for Modern and Post-Quantum Application s DESCRIPTION:C509 is a lightweight approach to Public Key Infrastructure (PK I) that brings the established X.509 PKI model to constrained devices and m odern applications. Rather than focusing primarily on reducing certificate / CRL / OCSP size\, C509 simplifies the certificate structure and avoids mu ch of the complexity traditionally associated with ASN.1-based X.509 implem entations. This can reduce code complexity\, lower memory consumption\, and reduce the attack surface of PKI implementations.\n\nThis session presents the ongoing IETF work on C509 as a complete PKI ecosystem\, covering certi ficates and certification requests\, algorithm definitions\, revocation\, a nd integration with EST for certificate enrollment and lifecycle operations .\n\nThe session will also discuss the evolution of C509 for post-quantum c ryptography\, including the integration of PQC algorithms and the resulting considerations for certificate structures\, algorithm identifiers\, signat ures\, and interoperability.\n\nBased on ongoing standardization and implem entation experience\, the presentation will share design considerations and lessons learned from simplifying PKI data structures and protocols. It wil l conclude with remaining challenges and opportunities for deploying C509 a s a lightweight\, interoperable\, and crypto-agile PKI for IoT\, connected devices\, and other modern applications.\n\nSpeakers: Lijun Liao LOCATION:Room C (8) CATEGORIES:Room C (8) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-dc908e1c-7aaa-4c1f-8da0-11a0de6385b8@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261201T133000Z DTEND:20261201T140000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Implementing the PKI Consortium PQC Maturity Model at Siemens Trust Centre DESCRIPTION:As the transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) accelerate s\, organizations face a challenge that extends far beyond algorithm replac ement. Success depends on understanding cryptographic dependencies\, coordi nating multiple stakeholders\, managing supplier readiness\, and establishi ng a sustainable model for cryptographic agility. The PKI Consortium's Post -Quantum Cryptography Maturity Model (PQCMM) provides a structured framewor k for assessing the quantum readiness of products and services within the s upply chain. At Siemens Trust Centre\, we examine how this vendor-centric m odel can be expanded into an enterprise-wide governance and transformation framework.\n\nThis session presents Siemens' approach to adapting the PQCMM for one of the world's largest industrial and technology environments\, sp anning enterprise IT\, public key infrastructure\, product security\, and o perational technology. We describe how PQCMM was integrated into a broader cryptographic governance strategy\, enabling consistent assessment of suppl iers\, internal platforms\, PKI services\, smart card technologies and virt ual smart card solutions.\n\nThe presentation shares practical lessons lear ned while building a cryptographic inventory\, establishing quantum-readine ss assessment criteria\, evaluating strategic vendors\, and defining measur able maturity targets across diverse technology domains. Particular emphasi s is placed on translating technical PQC requirements into actionable gover nance mechanisms\, supplier management processes\, and migration roadmaps. We will present findings and obstacles from the implementation from HSMs\, CAs and RAs\, as well as governance mechanisms we had to redesign. Attendee s will learn why cryptographic visibility and dependency management often r epresent greater challenges than algorithm adoption itself\, and why crypto graphic agility must become a core enterprise capability rather than a one- time project outcome.\n\nThe session concludes with practical experiences t o operationalize PQC readiness\, establish common maturity metrics across t echnology ecosystems\, and align supplier management\, PKI modernization\, and enterprise transformation activities under a single strategic framework .\n\n\nSpeakers: Wilko Wenzel LOCATION:Red hall CATEGORIES:Red hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-f056ef07-c6a8-4b30-b30a-a70dfc0133f2@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261201T133000Z DTEND:20261201T140000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Hash based Signatures - A decision support DESCRIPTION:When it comes to the selection of a PQC signing algorithm the f amily of hash based signatures pose a valid and highly interesting choice. All of its family members like SLH-DSA\, LMS\, XMSS provide a very conserva tive and mature model of security and cover a brought span of parametric op tions. Hence\, they seem to be a natural choice in practice\, especially wh en NIST announced new parameter sets for SLH-DSA (NIST SP800-230). \nHoweve r\, due to their extreme diverse parametric options they are discussed most controversial: from super efficient on certain operations vs. challenging on others\, super mature in design vs. challenging in handling the state.\n In numerous projects we gained a large set of experiences how to select the optimal signing algorithm and what are the practical implications.\nIn thi s talk we want to share our experiences. We give an overview over the diffe rent advantages and challenges and provide a decision workflow to select th e optimal signing algorithm for dedicated classes of use cases.\n\nSpeakers : Volker Krummel LOCATION:Room E (10) CATEGORIES:Room E (10) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-feb5f45c-b316-4d08-80e1-9c41221a4cbb@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261201T133000Z DTEND:20261201T140000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:PQC Budgeting: How to Address the Costs of PQC Readiness DESCRIPTION:As governments and regulatory bodies around the world accelerat e guidance and migration timelines for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC)\, mi d-to-large enterprises face an increasingly urgent question: how much shoul d we budget\, and where do we begin? While the timeline for a cryptographic ally relevant quantum computer remains uncertain\, the need to prepare is b ecoming a board-level risk management priority.\n\nThis session presents a pragmatic approach to building a multi-year PQC budget that balances techni cal requirements\, operational realities\, and financial constraints. Atten dees will explore the primary cost drivers of a successful migration\, incl uding cryptographic discovery and the creation of a Cryptographic Bill of M aterials (CBOM)\, certificate lifecycle modernization\, crypto-agility init iatives\, HSM and key management upgrades\, application remediation\, testi ng\, governance\, and workforce enablement.\n\nThe presentation also discus ses how organizations can prioritize investments based on business risk\, r egulatory obligations\, and cryptographic exposure\, enabling a phased migr ation rather than a costly rip-and-replace approach. Participants will leav e with a practical budgeting framework\, recommended milestones\, and execu tive-level strategies for securing funding and building organizational cons ensus. The objective is to help enterprises transform PQC readiness from an abstract future concern into a measurable\, achievable cybersecurity progr am with clear business value.\n\n\nSpeakers: Blair Canavan\, Jaime Gómez G arcía LOCATION:Room A (2) CATEGORIES:Room A (2) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-f0e1889d-1265-4c32-980b-daf9b981991a@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261201T140000Z DTEND:20261201T143000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Break DESCRIPTION: URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-327da24b-e3e2-41c3-94a3-6cd5b4c6cd9e@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261201T143000Z DTEND:20261201T155500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Roundtable: Healthcare considerations for PQC DESCRIPTION:Securing Healthcare for the Quantum Era: A PQC Readiness Roundt able\n\nMedical devices approved and deployed today will remain in clinical use for a decade or more\, and patient records carry confidentiality oblig ations measured in decades. Both timelines run past the point at which toda y's public-key cryptography is expected to fail\, yet healthcare has some o f the longest certification cycles and the least room for disruptive change of any sector.\n\nThis roundtable brings healthcare providers\, device man ufacturers\, life sciences organizations\, and their suppliers together for a working discussion rather than a series of presentations. After a short introduction from the moderator\, participants will examine what post-quant um readiness looks like in environments where equipment cannot simply be pa tched\, where regulatory approval governs every change\, and where availabi lity is a patient safety matter.\n\nThe discussion will focus on a small nu mber of practical questions: how post-quantum migration fits into device ce rtification and product lifecycles\; what healthcare organizations can reas onably demand from their suppliers and on what timeline\; and how to protec t long-lived patient data against harvest-now-decrypt-later exposure.\n\nTh e main conclusions will feed into a brief recap during the conference's clo sing session.\n\nSpeakers: Scott Rea *\, Konstantinos Dimitriou * LOCATION:Room F (6&7) CATEGORIES:Room F (6&7) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-4fb174dc-84fb-4e38-b015-6810576942fb@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261201T143000Z DTEND:20261201T151000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Adventures with LMS: Lessons from Implementing Stateful Hash-Based Signatures for Post-Quantum Trust DESCRIPTION:LMS is a proven post-quantum signature scheme\, but its statefu l nature creates deployment challenges that are easy to underestimate. This session shares practical lessons from implementing LMS in real-world post- quantum trust scenarios\, with a focus on one-time signature key management \, constrained environments\, firmware-style workflows\, verification perfo rmance\, and operational failure modes. Attendees will learn where LMS fits \, where it does not\, and what engineering decisions are needed to deploy stateful hash-based signatures safely as part of a quantum-resistant archit ecture.\n\n\nSpeakers: Dave Butcher LOCATION:Blue hall CATEGORIES:Blue hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-888edcd7-3006-413d-89a9-6a969affb3b5@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261201T143000Z DTEND:20261201T151000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Insights into a Post-Quantum Safety Transformation Journey DESCRIPTION:The quantum threat is no longer theoretical. Yet moving a large organization from awareness to structured action\, systematically and with out paralysis\, remains genuinely difficult. This talk shares practical ins ights from two years inside a live post-quantum security transformation\, b uilt around four pillars.\n\nPlanning despite uncertainty: how hypothesis-b ased planning keeps long-term strategy adaptable\, and how transparency and accountability turn ambiguity into a manageable condition rather than a bl ocker. Making risk tangible: abstract threats don't move budgets\, so we pr esent our framework for prioritizing across a complex IT landscape\, includ ing a method for quantifying quantum exposure and translating it into a con crete sense of urgency for decision-makers.\n\nBuilding awareness that stic ks: transformation stalls without broad understanding\, so we share what ha s worked for propagating post-quantum safety awareness internally across al l organizational levels\, and externally through collaboration with partner s and suppliers. Governing what you measure: a real insight into our operat ive governance model\, the KPIs we track\, the maturity framework we develo ped\, early results\, and an honest outlook on the road ahead.\n\nWe offer no definitive answers\; quantum readiness is still a work in progress for u s\, as it is for most. What we can offer is a transparent view into a compl ex\, ongoing transformation and the frameworks that have helped us navigate it.\n\n\nSpeakers: Cristof Kaufmann\, Thomas Maes LOCATION:Red hall CATEGORIES:Red hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-1fec1ffa-3dd6-4a9a-93b8-91f234d7db30@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261201T151500Z DTEND:20261201T155500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Gaming the Speed-vs-Memory Tradeoff for ML-DSA and ML-KEM DESCRIPTION:FIPS is only a suggestion\, sortof. Specifically\, FIPS only re quires "mathematical equivalence" to the listed algorithms\, and that gives a surprisingly wide latitude for implementations to play algorithmic games in search of either fast or small implementations.\n\nThis talk will explo re speed-vs-memory tradeoff techniques applicable to the ML-DSA and ML-KEM algorithms and the results that they obtain within the Bouncy Castle Rust l ibrary. We start with a close look at the "default" implementation\, then a t what you can do to move around the High Speed <--> Low Memory spectrum. I n one direction\, you can pre-expand intermediate values at key-load time f or faster sign\, verify\, encaps and decaps operations which gives performa nce increases in the 40% - 60% range (especially valuable if doing multiple operations against the same key). In the other direction\, your in-memory private key representation can consist of only intermediate seed values and you can re-derive the active lattice values one entry at a time as they ar e needed\; you pay a penalty for deriving the same intermediate values mult iple times for a dramatic reduction in memory footprint. This technique has a particularly pronounced effect on ML-DSA where ML-DSA-87.sign() can be p erformed in under 30 kb of peak memory usage\, which represents roughly a 7 .5x decrease in memory usage in exchange for a 6x increase in runtime\; whi ch is a win on heavily-loaded servers where parallelism is gated by RAM not by CPU.\n\n\nSpeakers: Mike Ounsworth LOCATION:Blue hall CATEGORIES:Blue hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-fa1d506e-6698-4563-bcba-f6cc0676179e@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261201T151500Z DTEND:20261201T155500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:The Board Factor: What Makes PQC Programs Succeed or Stall DESCRIPTION:Cryptographic resilience requires multi-year enterprise transfo rmation\, not a technical remediation exercise. Yet many organizations stil l treat it as one. That is a mistake.\n \nDigital trust depends on a crypto graphic estate that is everywhere\, used by everyone\, yet owned by no one. Its closest organizational parallel is not in technology. It’s data. And that parallel is not reassuring. Data management and governance programs a re decades old and rife with failure. Meanwhile\, PQC has a hard three- to eight-year deadline.\n \nLike early data initiatives\, PQC programs meet ne arly every condition for failure: a long-time horizon\, lack of business ow nership\, deep technical complexity\, unmapped dependencies\, low enterpris e literacy\, and budget cycles that reward near-term value over invisible r isk reduction. Compounding these challenges\, uncertain impact timelines me an that those responsible for acting on PQC today may be the ones to suffer tomorrow’s consequences\, weakening urgency\, ownership\, and escalation .\n \nEnterprise transformation is ultimately a complex systems problem. As hby’s Law of Requisite Variety is clear: the system will defeat any contr oller that lacks the capacity to manage its complexity. That controller is your PQC program.\n \nDrawing on systems theory\, modern data governance pr inciples\, and more than 30 years of experience leading complex enterprise transformations\, this session demonstrates why inventories\, standards\, a nd vendor readiness are necessary but insufficient\, and why early board en gagement is a determining factor in PQC program success. Participants will leave with a concrete\, practice-tested framework for establishing cryptogr aphic governance and securing sustained board engagement.\n\n\nSpeakers: Lo uise Davey LOCATION:Red hall CATEGORIES:Red hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-6d6e21eb-01aa-4933-8122-2a39686333d0@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261201T160000Z DTEND:20261201T160500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Closing (Day 1) DESCRIPTION:Brief closing remarks for the blue hall audience and a preview of Day 2.\n\n\nSpeakers: Albert de Ruiter LOCATION:Blue hall CATEGORIES:Blue hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-7c947833-b9b6-4098-aef4-dd4937e940ab@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261201T160000Z DTEND:20261201T160500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Closing (Day 1) DESCRIPTION:Brief closing remarks for the red hall audience and a preview o f Day 2.\n\n\nSpeakers: Paul van Brouwershaven LOCATION:Red hall CATEGORIES:Red hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-ce59f659-a0e7-4de9-90bc-7fddab12c1c5@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261202T070000Z DTEND:20261202T080000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Registration DESCRIPTION: URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-42b3bb00-f27c-4336-ab97-f74232491f40@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261202T080000Z DTEND:20261202T080500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Welcome back — Day 2 DESCRIPTION:Parallel welcome and agenda highlights for the blue hall audien ce.\n\n\nSpeakers: Sven Rajala LOCATION:Blue hall CATEGORIES:Blue hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-5089ba17-6860-4798-812d-e076c674ac1e@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261202T080000Z DTEND:20261202T080500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Welcome back — Day 2 DESCRIPTION:Welcome and agenda highlights for the red hall audience: a quic k look at what is on today and how to get the most out of it.\n\n\nSpeakers : Albert de Ruiter LOCATION:Red hall CATEGORIES:Red hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-8b5fda3c-73ec-4336-b243-a976a0619074@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261028T163318Z DTSTART:20261202T080500Z DTEND:20261202T083500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Mobile user authentication: post quantum trade-offs DESCRIPTION:At itsme\, an eIDAS Level High recognised identity scheme\, we explored several post-quantum migration strategies for user authentication. Itsme consists of a mobile application installed on the user's phone and a secure backend. In this context\, user authentication means proving that t he app is running on the same device the user originally registered with\, combined with proof of knowledge and/or inherence (typically a PIN or biome trics) established by the user at registration.\n\nGiven the current uncert ainty around long-term post-quantum algorithm robustness and ecosystem matu rity\, we focused primarily on hybrid approaches — combining post-quantum cryptography with classical cryptography — to preserve today's security guarantees while building in resilience against future quantum threats.\n\n Beyond algorithm selection\, a key challenge is migrating our existing user base to the new cryptographic scheme without compromising security or disr upting the user experience.\n\nIn this talk\, we will present the different approaches we implemented\, give real numbers\, discuss the impact each ap proach has on the user\, and weigh the pros and cons of each.\n\nSpeakers: Roel Peeters LOCATION:Blue hall CATEGORIES:Blue hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-a7fc5205-c277-45bd-ac9e-6bfed0cac4cf@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261202T080500Z DTEND:20261202T091500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Your Suppliers Aren't Ready: PQC Supply Chain Readiness DESCRIPTION:You have mapped your internal cryptographic assets\, you have a migration plan\, and you know which algorithms you are moving to. Then you open a ticket with your HSM vendor\, your cloud key management provider\, your identity platform\, your network appliance manufacturer\, and the answ ers range from vague to contradictory to silent. Your suppliers are the gap between your migration plan and your migration reality.\n\nThe challenge i s not limited to hardware security modules. Every product and service that uses cryptography (software libraries\, CAs\, signing services\, authentica tion platforms\, enterprise SaaS\, embedded firmware) is a dependency in yo ur PQC migration. And most of them are somewhere between Level 0 (nothing i mplemented) and Level 2 (production-ready but no inventory\, no agility\, n o roadmap transparency). This session opens with a ten-minute introduction to how the PKI Consortium's PQC Maturity Model (PQCMM) works in practice\, then the panel takes over: what does it actually look like to mandate PQC s upplier requirements at a large institution\, what do assessors find when t hey start evaluating products against a structured framework\, and what wou ld accelerate adoption of a common standard across the supplier ecosystem.\ n\nAttendees leave with a practical starting point: how to introduce the PQ CMM into procurement for high-priority suppliers today\, what to put in con tracts\, and how to handle the inevitable exceptions.\n\n\nSpeakers: Paul v an Brouwershaven\, Fred Roos\, Lory Thorpe\, Manfred Rieck LOCATION:Red hall CATEGORIES:Red hall,Panel discussion URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-c67b6192-5c12-4782-b625-fa9a799702da@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261028T163318Z DTSTART:20261202T084000Z DTEND:20261202T091500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:PQC-ready is not PQC-verified: ML-DSA downgrade and interoperabilit y failures across two independent software verifiers DESCRIPTION:Standardization is not the end of assurance. An algorithm can b e standardized\, shipped\, and still have to be replaced or re-verified on short notice\, and a hybrid signature can pass its own unit tests and still fail the first independent implementation that receives it. We encountered the second problem while adding ML-DSA-65 to a public offline evidence for mat: a development signer and verifier using the same JavaScript library ag reed with each other\, while an independent Python FIPS 204 implementation rejected the signature. That failure changed both our dependency baseline a nd our working definition of "PQC-ready."\n\nThis deep dive presents the re sulting reproducible artifact: a signer that covers the same canonical byte s with RSA-4096 and ML-DSA-65\, an RFC 9881 SubjectPublicKeyInfo\, and inde pendent TypeScript and Python verification paths. The shared public corpus now contains thirteen conformance packages: five accepted packages and eigh t deliberate rejection controls. A separate six-package downgrade lab is re played under two relying-party policies by both implementations\, producing twenty-four verifier-policy observations with no verdict or first-failure- code mismatch.\n\nThe session concentrates on three implementation boundari es.\n\n1. Self-interoperability is not cross-implementation evidence. We sh ow the cross-implementation probe that exposed the dependency-version failu re and explain why a positive FIPS 204 vector belongs in continuous integra tion.\n2. ML-DSA key bytes are not yet a deployable certificate interface. We encode id-ml-dsa-65 according to RFC 9881\, require absent AlgorithmIden tifier parameters\, and retain the earlier raw-key convention only for read compatibility.\n3. Downgrade resistance has two layers. Removing the PQC e ntries from a hybrid package is rejected because a signed witness still nam es them. A legitimately created classical-only transition package\, however \, remains acceptable unless the relying party selects an explicit require- pqc policy. Before the result is shown\, attendees choose which layer they expect to reject each package.\n\nThe announced program addresses interoper ability at the level of cryptographic modules and hardware. This session wo rks one layer up\, where two independent software verifiers read the same b ytes and disagree about them\; nothing in the announced program yet puts tw o independent verifiers on one signature and reports where they part compan y.\n\nAttendees leave with a concrete test matrix for their own hybrid form ats: positive cross-implementation verification\, one-bit signature control s\, key-encoding checks\, structural stripping tests\, and an explicit rule for when classical-only evidence must stop being accepted. The code\, prep ared packages\, expected results\, and continuous-integration workflow are public under Apache-2.0 at https://github.com/tyche-institute/eatf-verifier /releases/tag/v0.6.1 . This is an interoperability report and research refe rence implementation\, not a product or trust service.\n\nSpeakers: Anton S okolov LOCATION:Blue hall CATEGORIES:Blue hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-a42377cc-cfca-49d4-9b9d-9281334e558a@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261202T091500Z DTEND:20261202T094500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Break DESCRIPTION: URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-01b82aec-85de-4fd0-a1a7-d5a3d9c83020@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261202T094500Z DTEND:20261202T100000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Discovery Tells the Truth: What Real Crypto Inventories Reveal Abou t PQC Readiness DESCRIPTION:The post-quantum transition is widely called "complex\," but th at word hides what the complexity actually is. PQC migration is both a tech nical challenge and an organizational one\, and it is only when organizatio ns begin cryptographic discovery that the full scope of both becomes visibl e. Discovery consistently reveals more than teams expect\, and what it reve als is far more useful. Grounded in real data from discovery work across ma ny organizations\, including large-scale automated discovery\, this session shows what discovery actually uncovers: not just the sprawl of keys\, cert ificates\, and protocols in use\, but the organizational maturity behind th em. Consider a pattern we see repeatedly: organizations that worked hard to eliminate SHA-1 from their certificates\, while quietly continuing to rely on SHA-1 in SSH. The same weak algorithm\, retired where governance was wa tching and untouched where it was not.\n\nDiscovery turns out to be a remar kably honest signal. The state of an organization's crypto policy\, the cla rity of its roles and responsibilities\, and the strength of its day-to-day cryptography management tend to move together\, and discovery exposes all of it at once. Attendees will leave able to read their own discovery result s not just as a technical inventory\, but as an honest measure of how ready they really are. Because cryptographic maturity isn't what you fixed where everyone was looking. It's what you did where no one was.\n\nSpeakers: Ita n Barmes LOCATION:Room A (2) CATEGORIES:Room A (2) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-a3a5f11c-c50d-4638-a267-19ccd2da1b06@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261202T094500Z DTEND:20261202T101000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:PQC Starts at the Root of Trust: The Role of TPMs in Protecting Nex t-Generation Device Identities DESCRIPTION:As organizations prepare for the transition to post-quantum cry ptography\, much of the conversation focuses on algorithms\, certificates\, and PKI infrastructure. Yet the success of any migration ultimately depend s on where cryptographic keys are generated\, stored\, and protected. For b illions of enterprise and IoT devices\, that foundation is the Trusted Plat form Module (TPM).\n\nThis session explores the role of TPMs as the hardwar e root of trust enabling post-quantum migration for device identities and m achine credentials. From certificate enrollment and key attestation to secu re storage and cryptographic agility\, TPMs provide the security foundation that allows PKI ecosystems to evolve without compromising trust.\n\nWe wil l examine the practical challenges PKI teams face when introducing post-qua ntum algorithms into existing deployments (including the hardware refresh c ycle) and describe how TPM capabilities can support the transition while ma intaining compatibility with existing enterprise and IoT infrastructures.\n \nAttendees will gain a clearer understanding of how hardware-backed key pr otection intersects with PQC deployment\, why device identity should be par t of every migration roadmap\, and what steps organizations can take today to prepare for a quantum-resilient future.\n\n\nSpeakers: Antonio Javier Ca brera Gutierrez LOCATION:Red hall CATEGORIES:Red hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-d611729c-8076-44dd-9a80-bc875141194d@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:2 DTSTAMP:20261027T223848Z DTSTART:20261202T094500Z DTEND:20261202T113000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Roundtable: Government PQC Guidance and Regulation — Where We Are and Where We're Going DESCRIPTION:More than 30 national governments have now published guidance o n post-quantum cryptography\, ranging from two-page memos to migration hand books running to hundreds of pages. Sector regulators then translate that g uidance for the industries they oversee\, and their approaches vary widely: informal supervisory dialogue\, procurement requirements\, convening and c oordination\, funded research programs\, and formal mandates under financia l-sector legislation.\n\nThis roundtable brings together government agencie s\, sector regulators\, standards bodies\, and the organizations that must implement their guidance for a working discussion rather than a series of p resentations. After a short introduction from the moderator\, participants will compare approaches across the Americas\, Europe\, the Middle East and Africa\, and Asia-Pacific: what the advantages and disadvantages of each mo del are\, which approaches are working in practice\, and where the gaps in global guidance lie.\n\nThe discussion will give particular attention to wh at organizations operating across borders need from governments and regulat ors to keep their migrations aligned\, and to what good practice in PQC gui dance looks like.\n\nThe main conclusions will feed into a brief recap duri ng the conference's closing session.\n\nSpeakers: Zygmunt Lozinski LOCATION:Room F (6&7) CATEGORIES:Room F (6&7) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-e295a89f-ab1f-4792-90ac-d6fc6f3b8835@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261027T171537Z DTSTART:20261202T094500Z DTEND:20261202T104000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Operationalizing PQC: Proposing a Common Crypto API for Agile PKI a nd Machine Identity DESCRIPTION:NIST has finalized its first working set of post-quantum crypto graphy standards. The NIST CSWP-39 paper has shifted the enterprise convers ation from algorithm selection to cryptographic agility. For application de velopment\, PKI\, HSM\, and machine identity teams\, the more challenging i ssue is no longer which algorithm to choose. Instead\, it’s a structural problem: heterogeneous Certificate Authorities\, HSMs\, certificate lifecyc le platforms\, and application stacks each independently absorb migration c omplexity\, with no shared abstraction to coordinate the transition.\n\nThi s session proposes a Common Crypto API: a standardized abstraction layer th at separates responsibility across four tiers\, ensuring that no single tea m or vendor owns the entire migration.\n* Cryptographers and library mainta iners are responsible for the primitive layer\, developing\, patching\, and replacing algorithms and/or libraries without forcing downstream rewrites. \n* PKI\, HSM\, and machine identity teams operationalize transitions throu gh certificate profiles\, key protection models\, and lifecycle automation. \n* Governance boards define and enforce crypto policy centrally\, adapting to new threats and regulations without touching every application integrat ion.\n* Application developers consume organizations’ approved cryptograp hic capabilities through a stable interface\, insulated from algorithm or e ntire crypto library updates or changes.\n\nThe Common Crypto API will help separate the responsibilities of cryptographic migration and management wh ile simultaneously serving as an interoperability layer connecting all stak eholders to achieve crypto agility.\n\nAttendees will leave with a working model for de-siloing PQC migration responsibility and the opportunity to sh ape a cross-vendor interoperability blueprint by providing input to extendi ng existing crypto API standards or developing a new one.\n\nSpeakers: Gane sh Mallaya\, Tomas Gustavsson\, Vladimir Soukharev\, Murugiah Souppaya *\, Jaime Gómez García\, Bruno Couillard LOCATION:Blue hall CATEGORIES:Blue hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-0925c502-a445-46ab-b348-ed47eb707d4c@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261202T100000Z DTEND:20261202T101500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Tackling PQC and 47-Day Certificates in Parallel DESCRIPTION:In the next few years every enterprise will have to deal with t wo seismic shifts in digital trust that will redefine all security strategi es: the phased reduction of SSL/TLS certificate lifespans to just 47 days b y 2029\, and the need to adopt quantum-resistant cryptography by 2030. Eith er mandate on its own is a major challenge. Together they represent an unpr ecedented technology lift for IT and security teams.\n\nThe good news is th at the foundational work for each of these initiatives helps the other. Ach ieving crypto agility starts with certificate agility. Organizations must g ain complete visibility and control over their certificate landscape to ens ure widespread use of PQC algorithms for data in transit. The coming step-d own of maximum TLS server certificate lifespans to monthly renewals over th e next three years will necessitate exactly the same thing. Wise enterprise s will combine these two initiatives to eliminate redundant technology deve lopment and expense\, avoid collisions between projects\, and ensure overal l quality.\n\nThis presentation shares original research on enterprise read iness for these trends and describes the opportunity for enterprises to imp rove the outcomes of both initiatives by working on them together. Attendee s will learn how a unified\, automated approach to certificate automation a nd management can eliminate redundant efforts\, reduce risk\, and build agi lity for both mandates.\n\n\nSpeakers: Tim Callan LOCATION:Room A (2) CATEGORIES:Room A (2),Lightning talk URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-b8cdb856-ae0f-4bae-a5c9-98c5f6d47909@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261202T101500Z DTEND:20261202T104000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Leveraging PKI in the Quantum Sovereign Stack DESCRIPTION:The convergence of post-quantum cryptography\, sovereign techno logy strategies\, advanced AI\, and accelerating computing power is forcing companies and countries to rethink how trust infrastructure is built and g overned\, with an evolved PKI at the core. Encryption\, identity\, communic ations\, and computing are all being reinvented and PKI is as well.\n\nBy a rchitecting a Sovereign Quantum Stack that leverages PKI and vertically int egrates an architecture of trust that spans silicon\, enterprise systems\, global communications\, and space-based infrastructure we can define the se curity and stability of the next generation of quantum infrastructure\, whi le future proofing industries and economies.\n\nThis talk walks through a n ational plan to architect a sovereign quantum stack\, and highlights the in tersection of today's PKI and the requirements for tomorrows'\, by highligh ting four of the most critical architectural layers:\n\n1. Silicon Trust La yer\nEvery secure system begins with hardware\, from this anchor point\, hi gher-level security guarantees such as secure boot\, encrypted communicatio ns\, and firmware validation can be established. Hardware roots of trust ge nerate cryptographic keys\, store them securely\, and perform sensitive cry ptographic operations inside protected environments. Hardware can also esta blish secure device identity for devices\, firmware\, and components as the y move through global manufacturing ecosystems. \n\n2. Identity and Certif icate Layer\nAbove the silicon layer sits the infrastructure that transform s hardware trust into operational trust. This layer includes public key in frastructure (PKI)\, certificate authorities\, and identity frameworks. The se systems extend trust established in hardware across enterprise systems\, cloud platforms\, and global communications networks. In the quantum era\, this layer must support cryptographic and enterprise agility to transition between cryptographic algorithms at pace. \n\n3. Enterprise Infrastructur e Layer\nThe third layer of the Sovereign Quantum Stack is where trust beco mes operational inside real organizations\, as enterprises deploy encryptio n across applications\, cloud environments\, operational technology\, and c onnected devices. Linking the encryption that appears in operating systems\ , software libraries\, network protocols\, cloud services\, and connected d evices starts with certificates and keys often distributed across thousands of systems. Hybrid deployments combining classical and post-quantum crypt ography will likely persist for years\, making this adaptable enterprise la yer essential.\n\n4. Orbital Infrastructure Layer\nThe final layer of the S overeign Quantum Stack extends beyond the Earth’s surface\, as satellite systems are becoming a critical part of global infrastructure. They provide communications\, PNT\,\, and encryption and data services across oceans\, deserts\, and remote regions. Orbital infrastructure also provides resilien ce as terrestrial infrastructure can be disrupted through physical damage\, network interference\, or geopolitical pressure. As quantum technologies m ature\, space will become a critical platform for establishing and distribu ting cryptographic keys\, verifying identities\, and supporting the global architecture of quantum infrastructure.\n\nPKI evolution\, extension\, and integration will be critical to global success of the future of encryption at scale-- and sovereign quantum stacks are this future.\n\nSpeakers: Tom P atterson LOCATION:Red hall CATEGORIES:Red hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-e9c6e434-f0e6-4a55-a112-c28298bcd7bd@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261202T101500Z DTEND:20261202T103000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:How to Actually Start Your PQC Transition DESCRIPTION:In discussions around the PQC transition\, the technical migrat ion challenge often receives the most attention. In practice\, however\, or ganizations face significant barriers before any cryptographic transition c an begin: establishing governance\, securing funding\, aligning stakeholder s\, and setting up effective program management structures.\n\nThis talk bu ilds on a whitepaper currently being developed through hands-on experience from members of two Belgian communities\, Quantum Circle and the Belgian Cy bersecurity Coalition. It provides practical guidance for the early stages of PQC adoption\, focusing on why these initial steps are complex\, how org anizations can structure the necessary PQC migration engine\, and how to ju stify the scale and urgency of such a transformation. In addition\, the tal k challenges commonly repeated advice on initial migration preparation and prioritization\, offering a more pragmatic alternative approach.\n\n\nSpeak ers: Joachim Vererfven LOCATION:Room A (2) CATEGORIES:Room A (2),Lightning talk URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-e5f81c94-f24c-4126-8084-c837be449d5f@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261202T103000Z DTEND:20261202T104500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Stop Hiring PQC Experts !!! DESCRIPTION:It is time organisations stopped making the mistake of assuming they need to hire a PQC expert. The real challenge has nothing to do with solving cryptography or researching new algorithms. PQC is not a cryptograp hic research problem anymore. It is a PKI\, enterprise and operations probl em.\n\nLet's be blunt: hiring PQC experts without fixing PKI operations is like hiring quantum physicists to fix a broken plumbing system. The mathema tics is not the problem\, the infrastructure is. Most organisations still s truggle with the basics: expired certificates\, unknown trust relationships \, weak crypto visibility\, manual certificate processes and poor lifecycle governance.\n\nThis session challenges the growing narrative that organisa tions need dedicated PQC specialists before they can begin preparing for th e quantum era. Instead\, it argues that PQC migration is fundamentally a PK I operational challenge. Replacing cryptographic algorithms is only one par t of the problem\; the real challenge is operationalising cryptography at e nterprise scale across complex environments\, legacy systems\, hybrid infra structures\, certificate lifecycles\, trust chains and governance models.\n \nThis is where the real insight emerges. The people who can actually solve this are not those who understand the deepest mathematics of PQC\, but tho se who understand how trust is built\, managed\, and sustained across an en terprise. PKI experts (the teams already responsible for certificates\, key lifecycles\, and trust infrastructure) are the ones who must be empowered. \n\nPQC is not about inventing cryptography anymore. It is about surviving its transformation. The organisations that succeed in the PQC transition wi ll not be the ones with the most theoretical quantum knowledge. They will b e the ones with mature PKI foundations\, automated certificate management\, strong governance and operational discipline. Provocative by design\, this talk reframes PQC migration from a research problem into a real-world ente rprise execution challenge\, and explains why fixing PKI maturity today is the most important step toward becoming quantum ready tomorrow.\n\n\nSpeake rs: Kiruthiga Chandrasekaran LOCATION:Room A (2) CATEGORIES:Room A (2),Lightning talk URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-2a3a4472-1177-4bde-a026-b1f659c6d1f9@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261202T104500Z DTEND:20261202T113000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Lessons Learned from Deploying LMS at Scale DESCRIPTION:Stateful hash-based signatures such as LMS are standardised and well understood\, but translating them into deployable products involves c hallenges that are often absent from standards and academic literature.\n\n This talk discusses the practical realities of deploying a stateful hash-ba sed scheme in long-lived hardware-rooted systems. Drawing on experience sec uring firmware update mechanisms in commercial PCs and printers\, it explor es how standards guidance\, hardware lifecycles\, resilience requirements\, certification considerations and business constraints influenced key desig n decisions.\n\nIt covers lessons from adopting the LMS standard into secur ity features deployed at scale\, including the challenges of balancing secu rity\, resilience\, certification and operational requirements\, and reflec ts on how later developments in standards\, certification programmes and in dustry guidance reinforced\, challenged or reshaped those decisions\, and w hat this means for future quantum-resistant migrations.\n\n\nSpeakers: Thal ia Laing LOCATION:Blue hall CATEGORIES:Blue hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-4ef1821f-4364-4abd-b0bc-8016046bd6da@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261202T104500Z DTEND:20261202T113000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Comparing Cryptographic Inventory Requirements Across Industries DESCRIPTION:This panel explores the differences in the requirements on cryp tographic inventory\, and how they impact remediation efforts and migration priorities across industry verticals. Chaired by an expert in cryptographi c posture management\, the panel brings together representatives from finan ce\, telecoms\, energy\, healthcare and transportation to determine what ea ch sector actually needs.\n\nThe panel explores whether a universal invento ry model is realistic across such fundamentally different environments\, or whether sector-specific approaches to PQC discovery\, cryptography informa tion exchange and prioritisation will ultimately emerge. It covers the chal lenges of on-boarding external inventory tools\, mapping cryptographic depe ndencies\, and how to evaluate different tools against the individual needs of each industry.\n\nThe topic becomes particularly interesting cross-sect or because financial institutions may have mature PKI governance and strong visibility into certificates and identity infrastructure yet still struggl e to map cryptographic dependencies within internally developed application s and third-party SaaS ecosystems\; OT-heavy sectors such as energy\, manuf acturing\, and transportation may know their physical assets in extraordina ry detail while lacking visibility into embedded cryptography within indust rial control systems\, field devices\, firmware\, and operational protocols \; and telecoms providers face challenges associated with highly distribute d network infrastructure\, vendor equipment\, and complex trust relationshi ps across operational environments.\n\n\nSpeakers: Itan Barmes\, Sarah McCa rthy\, Lory Thorpe\, Rouven Floeter\, Sjors Kasbergen LOCATION:Red hall CATEGORIES:Red hall,Panel discussion URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-5b57a6c3-58f8-4de0-8c26-8cb3fcb793e8@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261202T104500Z DTEND:20261202T113000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Cryptography Without the Headache: From Assessment Framework to Agi le API DESCRIPTION:Every organization knows cryptography will need to change. New standards arrive\, old algorithms age out\, compliance requirements shift\, and vulnerabilities force urgent decisions. Most systems still make those changes painfully expensive by embedding cryptographic choices deep inside applications and infrastructure.\n\nThis talk argues that cryptographic agi lity is largely a systems design problem. We begin with a component-based a ssessment framework for evaluating how today’s cryptographic APIs support or hinder agility\, and use it to examine widely deployed systems such as OpenSSL\, JCA\, Tink\, AWS KMS\, and Vault Transit. The result is a clear d iagnosis of why migrations remain slow\, expensive\, and deeply tied to app lication code.\n\nWe then show what it takes to fix the problem: an abstrac t cryptographic API built around intent-based operations\, policy-driven al gorithm selection\, explicit key transformation\, identity-based governance \, and pluggable crypto backends. The payoff is a shift from cryptographic change as a distributed rewrite to cryptographic change as a managed contro l-plane decision.\n\nAttendees will leave with a practical way to assess th eir current cryptographic stack\, a clearer picture of the architectural ga ps blocking cryptographic upgrades\, and a concrete API model for building systems that can evolve without breaking applications.\n\nSpeakers: Navanee th Rameshan LOCATION:Room A (2) CATEGORIES:Room A (2) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-bef54c58-a92e-4ee5-8e36-4e636573fe8d@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261202T113000Z DTEND:20261202T130000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Lunch DESCRIPTION: URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-5bdb5397-e315-4285-b07d-f044af44fbb1@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261027T223848Z DTSTART:20261202T130000Z DTEND:20261202T132500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:The PQC Ready German ID Card DESCRIPTION:Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) adoption is mandated for critic al EU infrastructure by 2030\, yet integration into existing identity docum ent ecosystems presents significant cryptographic and performance constrain ts. National ID cards with 10-year validity require quantum-resistant prote ction from issuance\, necessitating a pragmatic transition strategy that ba lances algorithmic security guarantees with hardware resource limitations.\ n\nThis talk points out high-risk spots in the ID card ecosystem and the ke y requirements for its operation. Subsequently an approach for a step-by-st ep PQC migration is presented\, including possible scenarios for the underl ying Public Key Infrastructure. The solutions employ different NIST-standar dized PQC algorithms alongside traditional cryptography using hybrid scheme s.\n\nThe feasibility of this approach is demonstrated by the realization o f a functional demonstrator implementing hybrid cryptographic schemes on a resource-constrained\, ISO 7816-compliant smart card\, addressing the criti cal challenges of signature generation and verification time and memory foo tprint during authentication operations. Finally\, the results of the demon strator are presented along with the identified challenges ahead.\n\n\nSpea kers: Jan Klaußner\, Malte Kruse LOCATION:Blue hall CATEGORIES:Blue hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-87667257-5044-4a78-a5da-32e19a89d6a8@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261202T130000Z DTEND:20261202T132500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:HAPKIDO Handbook: Navigating the Transition to Quantum-Safe PKI DESCRIPTION:PKIs operate on the assumption that trusted credentials remain unforgeable over their lifetime. Advances in quantum computing challenge th is premise: credentials trusted today may become forgeable in the future\, introducing a "trust now\, forge later" risk that directly impacts the inte grity of digital identities and trust anchors.\n\nFor PKI-dependent ecosyst ems\, migration is not just a cryptographic upgrade problem. Long-lived cer tificates\, complex trust hierarchies\, and cross-sector dependencies mean that failures can propagate systemically\, affecting entire digital trust e cosystems. Yet progress toward quantum-safe PKI remains fragmented\, slowed by uncertainty around standards\, timelines\, and ownership. The HAPKIDO s ocietal impact assessment shows that compromised PKIs could trigger cascadi ng failures across sectors\, from disruption of public services to economic instability in banking systems.\n\nThis talk presents the HAPKIDO Handbook \, which provides a consolidated\, research-based framework to guide organi sations and policymakers through the transition to quantum-safe PKI. It com bines technical insights\, governance perspectives\, and societal risk anal ysis into a unified approach\, with two main goals: raising awareness and p roviding actionable insights to support decision-making.\n\nThe handbook pr esents two key contributions: a societal risk assessment method that transl ates abstract quantum threats into concrete organisational and societal ris ks\, enabling prioritisation of critical assets and services\; and a five-s tage growth model guiding organisations from awareness to full ecosystem ad aptation\, emphasising the need for coordinated action across organisationa l and sectoral levels. Together\, these frameworks position the transition not as a technical upgrade\, but as a multi-actor transformation requiring alignment across ecosystems.\n\nThe handbook highlights that early action i s possible and necessary\, including cryptographic inventory and adoption o f cryptographic agility practices\, as well as jointly testing hybrid solut ions. Success depends on coordinated efforts across organisations and polic ymakers acting within a specific sector to avoid fragmentation and ensure i nteroperability. Stakeholders should begin risk-based assessment\, invest i n early experimentation\, and actively participate in sector-specific colla boration and standardisation efforts.\n\n\nSpeakers: Dayana Spagnuelo\, Man on de Vries LOCATION:Room D (9) CATEGORIES:Room D (9) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-8fcb1466-0cce-4b6f-b426-4ec6de44a924@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261202T130000Z DTEND:20261202T132500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:The Agentic Control Plane: Measuring Post-Quantum Readiness in MCP and A2A DESCRIPTION:AI Agents are now more widely used in production deployments\, and they are no longer merely prototypes. Model Context Protocol (MCP) and Agent-to-Agent (A2A) are emerging as the default protocols for how agents c ommunicate with tools\, data\, and each other.\n​\nThis talk analyzes the state of post-quantum readiness in the emerging agent ecosystem and shows at which layers PQC actually matters. We scan a growing list of public MCP and A2A endpoints identified through open registries\, GitHub\, and well-kn own endpoint probes to measure internet exposure\, authentication signals\, TLS posture\, mTLS detection\, and post-quantum key exchange. For A2A agen ts\, we also analyze whether Agent Cards are signed\, which JWS algorithms are used\, and what that implies for future signature migration.\n​\nOur findings show that some endpoints have started to negotiate hybrid PQC key exchange\, while the certificate identity layer remains classical. Further\ , we attempt to distinguish the CDN edge termination from the origin postur e because edge-only numbers overstate the readiness. Legacy TLS versions st ill appear on deployment infrastructure. The key exchange layer matters now because of the harvest-now-decrypt-later risk\, while the signature layer matters for agent identity\, Agent Card provenance\, and long-lived signed metadata. For publicly trusted WebPKI TLS certificates\, certificate-layer PQC is not yet an option until the CA/B Forum finalizes PQC profiles and ro ot programs accept them\, but agents using Private PKI can begin piloting M L-DSA certificates.\n​\nBy the end of this presentation\, the participant s will have a practical checklist about how to assess post-quantum readines s of the agent infrastructure\, including what to inventory\, what to scan\ , which post-quantum signals are relevant today\, certificate-layer changes to prepare for in the future\, and finally how to address crypto-agility f or your agent infrastructure.\n\nSpeakers: Bhushan Lokhande LOCATION:Room E (10) CATEGORIES:Room E (10) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-a60e692f-1c86-4dd3-a888-e708524fbbef@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261202T130000Z DTEND:20261202T132500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Scaling of Memory and Bandwidth Requirements of Post-Quantum Signat ures with Message Size DESCRIPTION:In this work we analyse the qualitative memory and bandwidth ef ficiency properties of the currently standardised post-quantum signatures a s such\, and of their protocol integrations mainly in the X.509 context. Th e term qualitative in this respect refers to how memory and bandwidth requi rements scale with the size of the signed message.\n\nSpecifically\, we add ress the question of how far the algorithms support online computations\, a lso known as streaming\, with respect to the signed message in the signing and verification operations. Further\, we review the possibilities for the pre-computation of a short message representative outside the cryptographic module responsible for the signing or verification operation of the differ ent signature schemes. We also give a preview of the corresponding cryptogr aphic API of the PKCS#11 standard\, which introduces numerous PQC signature algorithms in the upcoming version 3.2.\n\nWe demonstrate that for specifi c realistic use cases\, the qualitative memory and bandwidth efficiency of the PQC signature schemes in protocol use varies widely and tends to be sub stantially degraded compared to the traditional signature schemes based on RSA and elliptic curves\, which always allow for the pre-computation of a s hort message representative in the form of a hash value. Our results are re levant to PQC migrations of existing applications using traditional RSA or elliptic curve schemes.\n\n\nSpeakers: Falko Strenzke LOCATION:Room B (5) CATEGORIES:Room B (5) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-b7e1ccbc-14b5-40bd-85bf-0c509ceb28b9@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261202T130000Z DTEND:20261202T132500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Trust Now\, Forge Later: A Live Exposure Demonstration DESCRIPTION:Current post-quantum planning is dominated by one clock\, harve st-now-decrypt-later (HNDL)\, but for signature infrastructure the binding exposure is trust-now-forge-later (TNFL). Once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer arrives\, long-validity signing anchors become forgeable\ , leading to loss of trust. Using the global passport and national identity infrastructure as an empirical model for TNFL exposure analysis and remedi ation prioritisation\, this session shows in a live demonstration exactly h ow trust could collapse if urgent\, globally coordinated action is not put in place.\n\nThe dataset is the ICAO Master List: the self-signed country s igning certificate authority (CSCA) roots that anchor verification of ICAO 9303 compliant machine-readable travel documents (MRTDs) worldwide\, publis hed as a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) structure and cross-checkable a gainst the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) list. Both are public and neither requires Public Key Directory (PKD) participation at the CSCA layer.\n\nThe demonstration walks through the pipeline end to end \, using open tooling only so that anyone can reproduce it: hash and record provenance of the source file\; unwrap the CMS encapsulated content and sp lit the CscaMasterList into per-certificate DER with a standard-library wal ker\; extract algorithm\, key size and validity fields\; then derive three outputs: installed base by algorithm and key-strength band\, the share of a nchors whose notAfter extends past a set of CRQC scenario years\, and a fin gerprint-level reconciliation between the two source lists. Every figure re generates from the script\; none is asserted by hand. Findings are reported in aggregate\, without singling out individual issuers.\n\nThe reusable co rollary for your own cryptographic estate is to treat the certificate as th e asset-register entry\, treat its notAfter field as a stated useful life\, and then ask which anchors you are relying on past the point their signatu res can be forged. The confidentiality wave of quantum cryptographic exposu re\, which dominates current attention\, concentrates at scannable perimete rs. The integrity wave\, in contrast\, is distributed across every componen t carrying a verifiable signature\, so it surfaces only through inventory\, not perimeter scanning.\n\nAttendees leave with a runnable method and an u nderstanding of how to apply this to their own PKI estates.\n\n\nSpeakers: Tim D Williams LOCATION:Red hall CATEGORIES:Red hall,Demo URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-b935c129-e4b2-4e6f-9f26-a65b850e3399@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261202T130000Z DTEND:20261202T132500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Quantum-Safe Audit Log Relying on Attestation Procedures DESCRIPTION:Last year\, we examined how hardware security modules can provi de cryptographic attestation\, i.e.\, a signed snapshot of the state of an HSM and/or of its keys. Trust in cryptographic infrastructure\, however\, o ften requires more than a snapshot\; it requires proof of history. This pre sentation introduces cryptographically verifiable audit logs for hardware s ecurity modules\, a mechanism that produces a tamper-evident\, independentl y verifiable record of every operation performed on a cryptographic object over its lifetime. Where attestation tells you what a key looks like today\ , an audit log tells you everything that was done to it and when. Key cerem onies require a verifiable sequence of authorized operations that no snapsh ot can reconstruct\; key migration requires a temporary export\, so the des tination device's attestation cannot prove the process was correct\, but th e combined audit logs of both devices can. The cryptographic architecture b ehind this relies on event chaining and attested log state\, with tooling t hat runs entirely outside the HSM so that an auditor can verify the record without device access. For long-term validity\, all of this must rest on qu antum-safe roots of trust provisioned at manufacturing time.\n\n\nSpeakers: Olivier Couillard LOCATION:Room A (2) CATEGORIES:Room A (2) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-db90873b-45d3-4f95-ac85-d855548f096d@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261202T130000Z DTEND:20261202T132500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Measuring PQC Readiness for PKI: Introducing the PKI Maturity Model Extension Framework and Its First Extension DESCRIPTION:Most organisations approaching post-quantum migration share the same blind spot: they have a roadmap\, but no honest way to measure where their PKI actually stands. This session introduces two published outputs of the PKI Consortium's PKIMM Working Group: the PKI Maturity Model Extension Framework\, and the PQC Readiness Extension for PKI built on top of it.\n\ nThe PKI Maturity Model already helps organisations benchmark their PKI pro grammes against an industry reference structured around four modules and fi fteen capability categories. The Extension Framework defines a standardised way to overlay targeted\, fast-moving maturity criteria (PQC\, automation\ , cryptographic agility) onto the existing categories\, with consistent sco ring\, weighting\, and reporting rules. The PQC Readiness Extension\, autho red by Kennedy Nwup\, is the first published extension\, giving PKI owners a defensible answer to questions their CISOs\, regulators and auditors are starting to ask.\n\nIn this joint session\, Roman Cinkais (Chair\, PKIMM WG ) and Kennedy Nwup (Vice Chair\, PKIMM WG\, and author of the extension) wa lk through the design of the Extension Framework\, present the PQC Readines s Extension in detail\, show how it is intended to be used in practice\, an d reflect on turning a working group draft into a published\, community-end orsed specification.\n\nAttendees will leave with a published framework and a PQC Readiness Extension they can apply to their PKI programme straight a way.\n\n\nSpeakers: Roman Cinkais\, Kennedy Nwup LOCATION:Room C (8) CATEGORIES:Room C (8) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-12ccbcbb-1169-4f8e-9006-9f58bf8a2389@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261028T163318Z DTSTART:20261202T133000Z DTEND:20261202T140000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:An Evaluation of PQC Algorithms in DNSSEC Using Real-World Data DESCRIPTION:Over the last years\, we have conducted a series of experiments to establish which PQC algorithms would be best suitable for replacing RSA and ECDSA in DNSSEC\, the security extension of DNS. As a core internet pr otocol\, it is important that DNS remains working securely when powerful qu antum computers exist. DNS contains data that fits in a single small UDP pa cket\, which is fast and reliable\, or switches to a slower TCP connection for bigger packets\, which uses more resources on the server side. Small si gnatures and public keys are therefore preferred.\n\nWe present insights fr om our experiments after implementing PQC in the toolchain of DNSSEC\, and testing PQC algorithms using real-world data from a top-level-domain operat or and a large DNS resolver operator. Using real-world data allows us to me asure the real impact of PQC algorithms on both client and server performan ce.\n\n\nSpeakers: Elmer Lastdrager LOCATION:Blue hall CATEGORIES:Blue hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-35a8506b-414c-4bc1-ab4e-ecb8d84deec3@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261202T133000Z DTEND:20261202T140000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Bootstrapping PQC on Existing Hardware: A Three-Stage Migration Fra mework DESCRIPTION:The transition to post-quantum cryptography requires more than replacing algorithms. Public-key cryptography is deeply embedded in device identity\, secure boot\, code signing\, certificate issuance\, software del ivery\, and credential lifecycle management. For long-lived connected and i ndustrial devices\, immediate hardware replacement is often neither financi ally nor operationally practical.\n\nThis presentation presents a three-sta ge migration framework for introducing PQC into existing device platforms w hile preserving current hardware roots of trust. In the first stage\, symme tric cryptography and existing protected key storage are used to maintain s ecure boot and establish a trusted execution environment. In the second sta ge\, that environment is used to generate\, provision\, and protect PQC cre dentials on the device. In the third stage\, PQC credentials and the establ ished boot chain are used to authenticate and deploy quantum-safe applicati ons and software updates.\n\nThe session will examine how this staged appro ach applies to constrained embedded devices and large\, mixed-generation fl eets. It will also address the operational challenges that determine whethe r such a migration can scale\, including cryptographic agility\, key protec tion\, credential lifecycle management\, rollback\, code-signing evolution\ , and coexistence between classical and PQC-capable devices.\n\nThe framewo rk is based on practical experience designing PKI\, secure boot\, code-sign ing\, and device-identity infrastructures for large populations of connecte d devices. It is intended for organizations that must begin PQC adoption be fore PQC-optimized hardware is broadly deployed. Attendees will leave with a concrete migration model for using existing hardware security capabilitie s to bootstrap PQC\, introducing PQC credentials without replacing the enti re installed base\, and evolving PKI\, secure boot\, and software-signing i nfrastructures toward fully quantum-ready platforms.\n\n\nSpeakers: Xin Qiu LOCATION:Room A (2) CATEGORIES:Room A (2) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-7c9db2fc-7b16-4912-ab31-e75a5e08d16f@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261202T133000Z DTEND:20261202T140000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Estonian PQC Migration Roadmap DESCRIPTION:This presentation outlines Estonia's roadmap for transitioning the public sector to post-quantum cryptography (PQC)\, officially released in April 2026. Given the significant heterogeneity in cryptographic archite ctures\, technical capacity\, and operational criticality across public sec tor organisations\, a uniform migration approach is neither feasible nor op timal. Instead\, the roadmap introduces a risk-based categorisation framewo rk that divides public sector institutions into four priority categories (V ery High\, High\, Medium\, and Low)\, each associated with distinct migrati on timelines and tailored implementation guidelines. A particular focus is placed on low-priority organisations\, whose transition steps remain underd eveloped in most existing roadmaps.\n\nThe talk first presents the develope d organisation categorisation approach and the underlying risk-assessment c riteria. It then details the migration framework\, outlining preparation\, cryptographic inventory\, implementation\, and monitoring steps tailored in their specifics to each priority level. Finally\, in a landscape where mul tiple national and international PQC migration strategies are converging\, the session presents a comparison with some of the existing roadmaps\, alon g with lessons learned through the process of constructing Estonia's PQC mi gration roadmap.\n\n\nSpeakers: Jelizaveta Vakarjuk LOCATION:Red hall CATEGORIES:Red hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-98f51fb9-d947-41a3-9991-49519145a4fd@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261202T133000Z DTEND:20261202T140000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Email Reborn: Post-Quantum encryption over the mailbox you already have DESCRIPTION:End-to-end encrypted email has existed for thirty years and is barely used. PGP puts key management on the user\; S/MIME puts a CA and an enrolment process on the organisation and still stops at its border\; the m odern alternatives require both parties to move to the same provider. Subst ituting ML-KEM for RSA in any of those changes the algorithm and not the de ployment. At the same time\, mail is the workload where harvest-now-decrypt -later is least hypothetical: it is archived for years by both parties and by everything in between.\n\nThis talk covers the engineering of Eon Phoeni x Mail\, a client that encrypts over an existing mailbox — IMAP/SMTP\, in cluding hosted consumer and enterprise providers — with no new address an d no server-side change\, and what that constraint forced. It is free softw are under AGPL-3.0: clients\, message envelope and directory server are all in the open\, and the cryptographic claims in this talk can be read back i n the source.\n\nCryptographic construction. A hybrid envelope: ML-KEM-1024 with X25519 for key establishment\, ML-DSA-87 with Ed25519 verified under logical AND for authenticity\, AES-256-GCM for content. The KEK derives fro m HKDF-SHA256 over both shared secrets plus the KEM ciphertext and ephemera l public key\, with domain separation per use\; sign-then-encrypt\, one con tent key wrapped per recipient\, so multi-recipient and group conversations fall out of the same structure.\n\nImplementation decisions. Two independe nt implementations of the same wire format — one on OpenSSL 3.5\, one pur e-Go — with byte-identical key encodings and a cross-implementation inter op test\, because the FIPS story and the cgo-free mobile and Windows builds pull in opposite directions. FIPS 203/204 known-answer vectors run in CI. One build-tag collision with the Go standard library silently disabled AES hardware acceleration: 115 MB/s against 1976 MB/s\, with every test still g reen.\n\nDesign decisions worth arguing about. Protection is chosen per mes sage rather than per product\, across five levels from ordinary mail to a r ead requiring a second party's cooperation\, with self-erase and metadata s uppression as separate stackable switches from a single registry both user interfaces derive from. Recipients without the client get ordinary mail ins tead of a blocked send. Metadata is treated as its own axis\, with an expli cit list of what the design does not hide: the domain pair\, the gateways t hemselves\, and traffic volume.\n\nFailures\, in detail\, because they are the transferable part: SRV-based key discovery that resolved on every deskt op and never on mobile\; key rotation that destroyed previously received ma il\; an in-band key header large enough to push short messages into spam cl assification\; and a directory lookup that queried the sender's domain inst ead of the recipient's.\n\nAudience: implementers migrating a deployed prot ocol to post-quantum primitives\, where key distribution\, graceful degrada tion and metadata are harder than the KEM. Everything shown is running code under an open licence\, so any part of it can be taken and reused.\n\nSpea kers: Dimitri van Esch LOCATION:Room E (10) CATEGORIES:Room E (10) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-c536867c-642a-40db-9ae0-1a392fe8dd21@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261202T133000Z DTEND:20261202T140000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Bridging the Gap: A Hybrid TPM Strategy for Post-Quantum Virtual Sm art Cards DESCRIPTION:Though NIST finalized ML-KEM and ML-DSA some time ago\, the ind ustry is still facing a dilemma: how to secure hardware against future thre ats without waiting for silicon updates. While the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) released the TPM 2.0 Library Specification v185 in March 2026 with na tive PQC support\, the reality of enterprise deployment is that most existi ng hardware remains on pre-PQC TPMs.\n\nThis session moves beyond theoretic al migration paths to dissect a real-world\, production-grade implementatio n of a hybrid Virtual Smart Card architecture. We detail our transition fro m Microsoft's Virtual Smart Card ecosystem to a custom\, standard TPM-based solution. The core of the discussion focuses on a stop-gap but robust hybr id model: leveraging software-based post-quantum algorithms (ML-KEM and ML- DSA) for cryptographic operations while utilizing the existing TPM for the secure storage of PQC private keys.\n\nWe look at why hardware-based key pr otection is significantly more secure than software-based storage\, compari ng pure software key storage against TPM-sealed keys and the attack surface each presents (lateral movement\, memory scraping\, offline extraction)\, along with honest caveats about where the hybrid model still has gaps compa red to fully native TPM computation. We then turn to key lifecycle manageme nt across mixed algorithm sets: generation\, backup\, rotation\, and revoca tion\, and what worked smoothly versus where the hybrid model introduces ge nuine complexity.\n\nThe session concludes with a frank assessment of when to wait for native TCG v185 hardware\, what it actually brings to the table \, and what pitfalls to avoid during the transition. Attendees will leave w ith a concrete blueprint for implementing crypto-agility in constrained env ironments and criteria for deciding when to migrate from software-hybrid mo dels to native TPM 2.0 v185 hardware based on threat modeling and resource availability.\n\n\nSpeakers: Zsolt Makádi LOCATION:Room C (8) CATEGORIES:Room C (8) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-dfbb4070-4b4c-4ae2-a17d-901da29ca3bb@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261202T133000Z DTEND:20261202T140000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Leveraging Agentic AI for Automated CBOM Inventory and Crypto-Agili ty DESCRIPTION:Extracting Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOMs) from source code is a foundational pillar of the Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) transi tion. However\, traditional security scanning methods fall short.\n\nThe li mitations of SAST and vulnerability tools include limited support for legac y or proprietary languages where old cryptography often hides\; the high fr iction and overhead of deep Abstract Syntax Tree analysis\, which is comput ationally heavy and slows down CI/CD pipelines\; scaling bottlenecks from h eavy reliance on DevSecOps teams for onboarding and configuration\; and a s tatic\, reactive posture that identifies risks but does not facilitate acti ve crypto-agility.\n\nIntegrating agentic AI into CI/CD pipelines via the M odel Context Protocol introduces a scalable and code-agnostic approach to C BOM management. Beyond inventory\, agentic AI enables true crypto-agility i n pipelines\, verifying pull requests and even fixing obsolete cryptography .\n\n\nSpeakers: Iván Fernández Mora LOCATION:Room B (5) CATEGORIES:Room B (5) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-eaef7446-b29e-4fce-bf87-5e580256ec4e@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261202T133000Z DTEND:20261202T140000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:A Pragmatic Strategy Behind PQC: 7 Decisions Every Enterprise Must Make Before Migration DESCRIPTION:Organizations are rushing to inventory certificates\, evaluate tooling\, and launch discovery projects in preparation for post-quantum cry ptography (PQC). But these activities often begin before the organization h as answered the architectural and governance questions that determine what should actually change. The biggest obstacle to PQC readiness is no longer the cryptography\; it is making the right organizational decisions before t echnology choices lock in years of unnecessary cost and complexity.\n\nThis session presents a practical decision framework built around the seven str ategic choices every enterprise should make before investing in PQC tooling or migration efforts. Rather than another discussion of algorithms or migr ation mechanics\, attendees will learn how to establish a clear\, executabl e roadmap using existing PKI investments\, governance processes\, and techn ical teams. The result is a strategy that reduces unnecessary spending\, av oids premature implementation decisions\, and creates a foundation for true cryptographic agility.\n\nDrawing from real-world enterprise PKI moderniza tion engagements\, this session demonstrates how organizations can prioriti ze business risk\, define crypto agility objectives\, align policy and arch itecture\, and determine where inventories\, assessments\, and tooling actu ally fit within an overall PQC strategy. It covers why certificate inventor y does not equal PQC readiness and where most programs go wrong\, how to al ign business risk\, governance\, crypto agility\, and PKI architecture befo re selecting technologies\, and how to determine when tooling adds value an d when it simply creates additional cost and complexity.\n\nAttendees will leave with a vendor-neutral framework they can immediately apply to reduce unnecessary spending\, avoid premature implementation decisions\, and build a foundation for long-term cryptographic agility.\n\n\nSpeakers: Mark Coop er LOCATION:Room D (9) CATEGORIES:Room D (9) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-4a23de52-79e4-4ec8-8da5-68686a06ceb6@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261202T140000Z DTEND:20261202T143000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Break DESCRIPTION: URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-6c7592b2-d657-4c1d-bc8c-565c23f2c536@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261202T143000Z DTEND:20261202T151000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Making PQC Migration Verifiable: CBOM Profiles for the EU Roadmap a nd Beyond DESCRIPTION:The post-quantum transition has two problems: a deadline and a lack of proof. The EU Coordinated Implementation Roadmap sets clear milesto nes for moving to quantum-safe cryptography. Meeting them depends on someth ing most organizations still don’t have: verifiable evidence of what cryp tography runs in their own systems and in their suppliers’ products. With out it\, migration plans rest on assumptions\, and organizations can’t sh ow progress to boards\, customers or regulators.\n\nCryptographic Bills of Materials (CBOMs) give you visibility. CBOM profiles make that visibility v erifiable. A profile sets out what must be disclosed\, for what purpose and in how much detail. That makes cryptographic inventories consistent\, comp arable and auditable across the supply chain\, whether they are written in CycloneDX or SPDX.\n\nThis hybrid session pairs a tutorial with hands-on wo rk. We introduce two reference profiles developed in the PKI Consortium CBO M Profiles Working Group. One supports supply-chain PQC migration and is al igned with the EU Roadmap milestones. The other addresses procurement assur ance. Working through real product examples\, participants will apply the p rofiles to set supplier expectations\, prioritize high-risk systems\, measu re migration progress and evidence readiness.\n\nThe EU Roadmap is where we start\, not where we stop. We close with a discussion of how a common prof ile approach carries into other jurisdictions and sectors\, giving organiza tions one framework for proving quantum readiness wherever they operate.\n\ nSpeakers: Michael Osborne LOCATION:Red hall CATEGORIES:Red hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-7f7f465b-937b-4076-9977-d4e646d089d3@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261202T143000Z DTEND:20261202T151000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:CLM 2.0: What's Deployed\, What's Broken\, What's Next DESCRIPTION:A year ago at the PQC Conference in Kuala Lumpur\, this panel m apped the roadblocks on the path to post-quantum resilience. Twelve months on\, the questions have shifted. Certificate lifetimes are collapsing towar d 47 days. Post-quantum cryptography has moved from roadmap slide to operat ional planning under regulator and customer pressure. AI-driven workloads a re beginning to demand identity at a scale traditional certificate lifecycl e management was never built to support. Conversations inside CISO offices and architecture reviews have moved from strategy to deployment.\n\nThis se ssion reconvenes the original panel for an implementation-grounded follow-u p. The aim is to move past the vision and into the field: what is actually running in enterprise production today\, where the new operational load is causing real failures\, and what is getting torn out and rebuilt. Discussio n will surface specifics: observed automation maturity across enterprise es tates\, failure modes under accelerated renewal cadence\, and the trade-off s that emerge when crypto agility\, hybrid PQC\, and machine identity conve rge inside the same stack.\n\nMost sessions on CLM and PQC remain at the le vel of strategy\, principle\, or capability inventory. This panel stays ins ide the operational reality: what works at scale\, what fails first\, and w hat the next architecture looks like once we accept that CLM is no longer a n operations function but a control plane for trust. That reframe carries p ractical consequences: where policy lives\, who owns PQC migration\, how AI agent identities are issued and revoked at workload speed\, and what resil ience metrics should replace the older uptime-and-renewal dashboards.\n\nTh e conversation is structured around four working areas: the breaking point of current approaches in a 47-day world\; PQC and crypto agility as an oper ational discipline rather than a research topic\; the architecture of a tru st control plane\, including how AI and autonomous workloads fit\; and the business and risk reframe needed to fund and govern the shift. Attendees wi ll leave with a clearer sense of where peer organizations actually stand on automation\, PQC readiness\, and machine identity scale\, a working defini tion of what CLM 2.0 demands in practice\, and a sharper view of the most e xpensive blind spots hiding inside today's deployments.\n\n\nSpeakers: Chri s Bailey\, Chris Hickman\, Ganesh Mallaya\, George Parsons\, Roman Cinkais LOCATION:Blue hall CATEGORIES:Blue hall,Panel discussion URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-ac6c1af7-4878-4d10-b2cf-f86370ee5856@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261202T143000Z DTEND:20261202T155500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Roundtable: Securing the Financial Sector for the Quantum Era DESCRIPTION:The financial sector has moved further than most towards a coor dinated post-quantum migration. The Quantum Safe Financial Forum\, together with FS-ISAC and CFDIR\, has published a framework for prioritizing use ca ses and sequencing the transition in shared implementation waves. The quest ion facing institutions now is no longer what the framework says\, but what it means for their own portfolios\, their vendors\, and their supervisors. \n\n\n\nThis roundtable brings banks\, central banks and supervisors\, mark et infrastructures\, and their technology suppliers together for a working discussion rather than a series of presentations. After a short introductio n from the moderators\, participants will work through how the prioritizati on applies in practice: which use cases institutions are actually starting with\, where their sequencing differs and why\, and what the shared waves r equire from the providers on which the whole sector depends.\n\n\n\nThe dis cussion will give particular attention to the dependencies no single instit ution can resolve alone\, from payment and settlement infrastructure to the vendors and standards every participant relies on\, and to what institutio ns need from regulators to keep the transition aligned across markets.\n\n\ n\nThe main conclusions will feed into a brief recap during the conference' s closing session.\n\nSpeakers: Jaime Gómez García *\, Sarah McCarthy * LOCATION:Room F (6&7) CATEGORIES:Room F (6&7) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-c00ed301-3759-48b3-af41-840f825b1c8f@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261202T151500Z DTEND:20261202T155500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Adding PQ Capabilities to SSH Protocol: The Fedora Approach DESCRIPTION:OpenSSH and libssh are 2 mostly widespread implementations of S SH protocol. Real-world requirements for PQ crypto causes writing significa nt patches to OpenSSH because of difference of the upstream and downstream requirements. libssh upstream is more binded to Fedora maintainers and land s the changes upstream.\n\nThe talk covers key downstream changes in OpenSS H: using OpenSSL code\, providing extra algorithms support\, FIPS compatibi lity quirks\, in OpenSSH\, and corresponding changes in libssh.\n\n\nSpeake rs: Dmitry Belyavskiy LOCATION:Blue hall CATEGORIES:Blue hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-d6b73833-6f6b-4ace-a8d4-c47fa9e3b50b@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261202T151500Z DTEND:20261202T155500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Role of CBOM in a Telco's PQC Journey DESCRIPTION:This presentation on behalf of the GSMA PQTN task force will ex amine the role of a "Cryptographic Bill of Materials" in the telecommunicat ion sector. The session will explore CBOM and its relationship to the Softw are Bill of Materials (SBOM)\, review the current standards landscape\, ide ntify telecommunications-specific use cases\, and outline the regulatory dr ivers shaping adoption.\n\nThe need for industry alignment on CBOM use\, fo rmat\, and content as a means to simplify the management and communication of cryptography between parties will be highlighted. This "CBOM profile" wi ll provide telco operators with a structured way to express cryptographic r equirements\, plan the migration to post-quantum cryptography\, and manage cryptographic assets across their lifecycle\, while giving vendors the mech anisms to communicate the cryptographic assets and future roadmap commitmen ts associated with their products and services to operators and other stake holders. The session concludes with actionable recommendations for telco ne twork operators\, vendors\, and other relevant stakeholders engaged in the transition to post-quantum cryptography.\n\nThe presentation will be of int erest to network operators\, the entire telecommunications supply chain\, a nd government regulators. It complements other standardization and industry adoption efforts.\n\n\nSpeakers: Luke Ibbetson\, Lory Thorpe LOCATION:Room A (2) CATEGORIES:Room A (2) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-fde8a3e2-12c6-4298-8a82-7d4237c6bf2b@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261202T151500Z DTEND:20261202T155500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:120\,000 Tasks: The Cryptography Was the Easy Part DESCRIPTION:The integrated master schedule for one large enterprise's post- quantum migration grew past 120\,000 discrete tasks. It was not a count of devices\, certificates\, or applications to upgrade. If it were\, 120\,000 would be small. The direct remediation work\, the actual cutovers across ev ery device and application\, accounted for fewer than 30\,000 tasks (a mill ion-plus devices\, systems\, and apps grouped into upgrade batches).\n\nThe remaining 90\,000 or so tasks are the enablement system: inventory as a li ving capability\, governance and reporting cadence\, vendor lifecycle enfor cement\, testing and assurance\, workforce change\, ecosystem and partner a lignment\, and ongoing operations during the long hybrid period.\n\nDrawing on that 120\,000-task plan (illustrative of complexity\, not a universal c ount) and on three decades running high-stakes delivery programs such as na tional payments systems and federal health-records platforms\, the talk tur ns to what actually governs whether such a program finishes. It is rarely t he cryptography. It is the density of interdependencies: vendors waiting on internal teams\, shared infrastructure that must be ready before applicati on waves can move\, regulatory deadlines colliding with finite engineering capacity. It is ownership\, because cryptography is everyone's problem and therefore no one's\, so the program needs a single accountable lead with au thority across security\, IT\, engineering\, procurement\, and OT. It is wo rkforce capacity\, since the trained people a program needs at its peak in years four to eight cannot be conjured on demand. And it is funding that ha s to survive several budget cycles and more than one CISO. PKI realities si t inside this frame: certificate migration planned as waves rather than a s ingle flag day\, and PKI and HSM procurement and certification lead times t reated as hard scheduling constraints.\n\nAttendees leave able to right-siz e and sequence their own program\, separate a credible plan from a wishful timeline\, argue for a single accountable owner and the governance to back one\, build the board case for multi-year funding\, and prioritize by risk so the program delivers measurable security gains in years one to three whi le the longer effort runs on.\n\n\nSpeakers: Marin Ivezic LOCATION:Red hall CATEGORIES:Red hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-1056f301-6d1a-4a8d-8b87-7d1e84d8ccfb@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261202T160000Z DTEND:20261202T160500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Closing (Day 2) DESCRIPTION:Brief closing remarks for the red hall audience and a preview o f Day 3.\n\n\nSpeakers: Sven Rajala LOCATION:Red hall CATEGORIES:Red hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-97861661-4f87-48e3-85a0-9ff2ee5c2669@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261202T160000Z DTEND:20261202T160500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Closing (Day 2) DESCRIPTION:Brief closing remarks for the blue hall audience and a preview of Day 3.\n\n\nSpeakers: Paul van Brouwershaven LOCATION:Blue hall CATEGORIES:Blue hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-32f5c093-149a-4e9b-a2f4-cdfdc353d321@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261202T160500Z DTEND:20261202T173000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Networking & drinks DESCRIPTION: URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-5c2b6786-54bf-4630-930c-fead6ea92e14@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261203T070000Z DTEND:20261203T080000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Registration DESCRIPTION: URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-3714e2c7-e24e-4f53-9566-88a0e5807daa@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261203T080000Z DTEND:20261203T080500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Welcome back — Day 3 DESCRIPTION:Final day framing for the red hall audience: what is ahead\, an d how to make the most of the last day before heading back into the real wo rld.\n\n\nSpeakers: Paul van Brouwershaven LOCATION:Red hall CATEGORIES:Red hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-c5f98aec-dc99-4e44-8ae0-3e319a495cb7@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261203T080000Z DTEND:20261203T080500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Welcome back — Day 3 DESCRIPTION:Parallel welcome and agenda highlights for the blue hall audien ce.\n\n\nSpeakers: Albert de Ruiter LOCATION:Blue hall CATEGORIES:Blue hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-2af5b3e2-a947-42d6-8d3b-35d3d6bf0f01@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261203T080500Z DTEND:20261203T083000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Merkle Tree Certificates for Private PKI: Size\, Scale\, and Transp arency in the Post-Quantum Era DESCRIPTION:Merkle Tree Certificates (MTCs) introduce a new approach to PKI that can help address several challenges associated with post-quantum cryp tography migration. This presentation reviews three key deployment properti es currently being explored within the IETF: reducing certificate size to m itigate the impact of larger PQC algorithms\, enabling efficient batch sign ing and issuance for large-scale deployments\, and leveraging transparency mechanisms to detect unauthorized certificate issuance and cryptographic do wngrade attacks.  The talk focuses on how these capabilities can be applie d within private PKI environments\, examining practical deployment consider ations\, operational trade-offs\, and opportunities to integrate MTCs along side existing X.509-based infrastructures.\n\nSpeakers: Ganesh Mallaya\, Jo hn Gray LOCATION:Blue hall CATEGORIES:Blue hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-d765f667-84e6-466b-b523-72d10921055d@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261027T223848Z DTSTART:20261203T080500Z DTEND:20261203T083000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:How Close Is the Threat\, and What Does a Board Owe Its Shareholder s Now? DESCRIPTION:Post-quantum migration deadlines are now fixed by regulation — the EU Coordinated Implementation Roadmap\, EO 14412 — but the pace o f quantum hardware remains the variable every budget rests on. This keynote gives an independent read on where quantum computing actually stands\, fro m the researcher who leads BCG's quantum program and has published more tha n 15 pieces on the field.\n\nThe session covers three things. First\, the v endor and hardware-modality landscape: where the leading players stand acro ss superconducting\, trapped-ion\, neutral-atom\, photonic and annealing ap proaches\, and how logical-qubit and error-correction milestones translate into credible timelines. Second\, the impact of AI on the field — as an a ccelerant for error correction\, algorithm design and system control\, and as a driver of the compute economics that will decide which platforms win. Third\, the risk picture: the current range of estimates for a cryptographi cally relevant quantum computer\, the harvest-now-decrypt-later exposure or ganizations already carry\, and how boards and regulators should think abou t investment and migration timing under that uncertainty.\n\nIt closes with the question boards cannot defer: if there is even a small probability tha t RSA-2048 fails by 2030\, what is the fiduciary obligation to act today\, and how should investment and migration be sequenced under that uncertainty ?\n\nAttendees will leave with a clear-eyed view of quantum progress and wh at it means for the urgency and pace of their own post-quantum transition.\ n\nSpeakers: Jean-François Bobier LOCATION:Red hall CATEGORIES:Red hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-3273544e-a079-4e79-a699-7d3123006113@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261203T083500Z DTEND:20261203T091500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:How AI Is Compressing the Cryptographic Threat Timeline DESCRIPTION:**Abstract**\n\nThis talk looks at three recent results that to gether change the outlook for cryptographic risk.\n\nIt starts with classic al factoring. Two RSA Challenge records fell within sixteen days in Septemb er 2026: first RSA-260 (862 bits)\, then RSA-896. Both were factored with t he general number field sieve\, a method that is decades old\, after AI cod ing agents ported it to large GPU clusters. The talk will explain why the m athematics stayed the same while AI-accelerated engineering on AI hardware still changed the economics of attacking legacy RSA-1024 keys.\n\nThe secon d part covers AI-driven cryptanalysis of post-quantum candidates. In July 2 026\, an AI research agent found a classical key-recovery attack on HAWK\, a third-round candidate in NIST's additional signatures process. The attack exploits a Galois symmetry that halves the dimension of the lattice proble m. It recovered HAWK-256 keys in hours on a single server\, and the designe rs withdrew the scheme the next day. The same week\, AI-driven analysis als o improved the best known attack on 7-round AES. The talk will consider wha t these results mean for how much confidence to place in new algorithms.\n\ nThe third part looks at AI improving quantum attacks themselves. [ECDSA.fa il](http://ECDSA.fail) was an open challenge where human researchers and AI agents competed to optimise the quantum circuit for elliptic-curve point a ddition\, the core step in Shor's attack on ECDSA. In eight weeks\, logical qubits fell by 58% and the Toffoli gate count by 67%\, compared with the p ublished Google baseline. The talk will show how this widens the gap betwee n ECC and RSA timelines\, with elliptic-curve systems reaching the quantum threshold sooner.\n\nThe talk closes with what this means in practice for m igration planners:\n\n- RSA-2048 holds today\, but RSA-1024 does not.\n- Al gorithm maturity and crypto-agility now matter more than any single scheme. \n- ECC-protected assets deserve priority.\n- Some parts of migration plans should change now.\n\nSpeakers: Michael Osborne LOCATION:Blue hall CATEGORIES:Blue hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-f2c0cfca-c1c1-4e4a-b9ae-0e886eb7acb8@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261027T115025Z DTSTART:20261203T083500Z DTEND:20261203T091500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Scaling Quantum Safe: How HSBC Transitions from Early Momentum to E nterprise Execution DESCRIPTION:Quantum Safe transformation is emerging as a critical strategic priority for financial institutions\, though most organisations are still in relatively early stages of structured execution. This session shares HSB C's experience in evolving its Quantum Safe journey from a collection of ea rly initiatives into a structured enterprise programme designed for long-te rm migration.\n\nAs a global financial institution operating across complex technology landscapes\, HSBC recognised that successful cryptographic tran sformation requires more than identifying vulnerable algorithms or testing new technologies. It requires alignment across business priorities\, techno logy domains\, governance structures\, third-party ecosystems\, operational processes\, and future investment decisions. The session explores how HSBC approached this transition by consolidating existing insights\, validating readiness\, strengthening alignment across stakeholders\, and creating the foundations for the next stage of execution: moving from awareness and exp erimentation into an enterprise transformation mindset\, strengthening boar d-level visibility\, and building the governance\, ownership\, and executio n model needed for a multi-year journey.\n\nRather than focusing only on te chnology change\, this session highlights the organisational and strategic lessons behind scaling Quantum Safe adoption in a large financial instituti on.\n\n\nSpeakers: Antti Ropponen\, Alejandro Montblanch LOCATION:Red hall CATEGORIES:Red hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-86d1de33-9375-4a73-9008-75a5da369d57@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261203T091500Z DTEND:20261203T094500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Break DESCRIPTION: URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-59fa9b4a-d7e3-4cc7-8340-7bc2a31faf8c@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261027T223848Z DTSTART:20261203T094500Z DTEND:20261203T104000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Merkle Tree Certificates: Ready for Browsers and Beyond? DESCRIPTION:The transition to post-quantum cryptography creates a practical challenge for certificate-based systems: post-quantum signatures are subst antially larger than the signatures used today\, potentially increasing cer tificate chains beyond what TLS and other constrained protocols can comfort ably carry. Merkle Tree Certificates (MTCs) offer a different model built a round append-only logs\, batched signatures\, and compact inclusion proofs. \n\nThis moderated panel will examine whether MTCs are ready for the browse r use case for which they were originally designed—and whether the same m odel can work across the many public key infrastructures that operate beyon d the Web PKI.\n\nPanelists will discuss the architecture and security prop erties of MTCs\, implementation and interoperability considerations\, certi ficate issuance and lifecycle management\, and the operational changes requ ired for relying parties\, certificate authorities\, browsers\, servers\, A CME clients\, and enterprise PKI operators. The discussion will also consid er how MTCs could apply to qualified trust services\, device identity\, tel ecommunications\, government credentials\, code and document signing\, IoT environments\, and other regulated or specialized trust infrastructures.\n\ nThe panel will explore both the potential and the limitations of the appro ach. Can MTCs materially reduce the bandwidth and performance impact of pos t-quantum certificate chains? What new dependencies and trust assumptions d o they introduce? How would existing PKI systems need to change\, and which use cases may not fit the browser-oriented model?\n\nBringing together imp lementation\, practitioner\, qualified-trust-service\, and non-Web-PKI pers pectives\, this session will give attendees a practical understanding of wh ere Merkle Tree Certificates stand today\, what work remains\, and whether they can become a broadly useful foundation for post-quantum certificate ec osystems.\n\nSpeakers: Alexander Truskovsky\, Shane Kelly\, Kim Nguyen\, Jo hn Gray * LOCATION:Blue hall CATEGORIES:Blue hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-d692553f-242f-41d9-a5dc-f648496db751@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:3 DTSTAMP:20261028T163318Z DTSTART:20261203T094500Z DTEND:20261203T113000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Roundtable: Securing Telecommunications for the Quantum Era DESCRIPTION:Telecommunications networks carry the traffic that every other sector's post-quantum migration depends on\, and they are among the hardest systems to change. Network equipment\, SIM and eSIM platforms\, and roamin g and interconnect agreements run on long lifecycles and span many operator s\, vendors\, and standards bodies. Industry guidance\, including the GSMA' s post-quantum telco work and ongoing 3GPP and IETF standardization\, now g ives operators a common starting point. The open question is how to turn th at guidance into concrete plans across shared infrastructure.\n\nThis round table brings together mobile and fixed operators\, network and SIM vendors\ , standards contributors\, and regulators for a working discussion rather t han a series of presentations. After a short introduction from the moderato r\, participants will work through where operators are starting in practice : cryptographic inventory across the network\, protection of signaling and management interfaces\, subscriber identity and SIM provisioning\, and the IoT estates that will outlive today's algorithms.\n\nThe discussion will gi ve particular attention to the dependencies no single operator can resolve alone\, from roaming and interconnect partners to equipment vendors and the timing of standards. It will also cover what operators need from regulator s to keep national and cross-border migration aligned.\n\nThe main conclusi ons will feed into a brief recap during the conference's closing session.\n \nSpeakers: Lory Thorpe *\, Luke Ibbetson * LOCATION:Room F (6&7) CATEGORIES:Room F (6&7) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-da50765b-b27f-4e76-a760-9c4eea88f67e@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261203T094500Z DTEND:20261203T104000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Beyond Discovery: Making Cryptographic Inventory Actionable DESCRIPTION:PQC roadmaps and guidance\, including the EU’s coordinated im plementation roadmap and guidance from CISA\, NSA\, NIST\, and the UK NCSC\ , emphasize discovery and inventory as foundations for migration. With seve ral years of guidance and growing practical experience\, what have organiza tions learned? Where is discovery enabling progress\, and where does it ris k becoming an exercise with no clear endpoint?\n\nThis panel examines how t hat guidance translates into practice and what cryptographic posture manage ment requires beyond collecting findings.\n\nThe first question is scope: w here does broad\, exhaustive scanning add value\, and where does it generat e noise that slows everyone down? How should organizations decide where to point discovery tools first\, when to expand coverage\, and how to account for what remains outside scope?\n\nThe second is context. Software is updat ed\, dependencies change\, keys and certificates rotate\, and cryptographic configurations evolve. An inventory can therefore become outdated quickly. How current does that view need to be\, what context matters\, and what do es it take to maintain it?\n\nThe third is ownership. Cryptographic assets rarely belong to a single team\, and their dependencies often extend into t he supply chain. How should responsibility be divided among security teams\ , application owners\, and suppliers\, particularly when the organization i dentifying a risk cannot directly address it?\n\nThe fourth is what happens after the scan. Discovery tools can generate large volumes of findings\, a nd a report nobody acts on is worth little. What determines which findings deserve attention\, who should act\, and whether the response has achieved its purpose?\n\nPanelists will discuss what has worked\, what has not\, and where experience suggests that tooling\, processes\, or guidance need to e volve.\n\nSpeakers: Chris Hickman *\, Alexander Loew\, Itan Barmes\, Paul v an Brouwershaven LOCATION:Red hall CATEGORIES:Red hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-26812f4a-791f-46fd-a1e6-8d5bd5db9651@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261203T104500Z DTEND:20261203T113000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:PQC PKI: The Good\, the Broken\, and the Hybrid DESCRIPTION:2025 was a year full of preparations for deploying PQC in pract ice. Standards\, software libraries\, HSMs\, a lot of everything was update d to support PQC algorithms.\n\nPQC 2026 started with a lot of PQC capable components and a statement like\, "It's OK to have not acted YET. 2026 will be the last time this can be said". At the end of 2025 and the beginning o f 2026 was also the time for great confusion. As organizations started to p onder on the next practical steps\, they had to make decisions on what algo rithms to use\, hybrid solutions or not\, and in the case of hybrids what t ype of hybrid PKI. Have companies deployed PQC in production by now? The an swer is yes\, production deployment have started. Decisions have been made and some earlier thoughts had to be dismissed. This presentation will highl ight PQC PKI choices and hierarchies based on some real world decisions.\n\ nArchitecture\, algorithms\, and combinations. What has been chosen and why . And maybe even more interesting\, what didn't work and why? The presenter s do not claim to have seen all PQC PKI deployments of 2026\, but we have s een a few\, and this is real world experience from those.\n\n\nSpeakers: To mas Gustavsson\, Sven Rajala LOCATION:Room A (2) CATEGORIES:Room A (2) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-31b9be54-2373-4d1b-89a6-2bd1fec41f9e@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261203T104500Z DTEND:20261203T113000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Prioritising Financial Sector Use-Cases for Migration DESCRIPTION:The intricate web of interbank communications\, transaction pro tocols\, and shared infrastructure means no single financial institution ca n effectively navigate a successful Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) migrati on alone. The Quantum Safe Financial Forum (QSFF) was launched by Europol i n 2024 and quickly established itself as the go-to authority for financial institutions grappling with the complexities of quantum-safe migration. The forum comprises experts from leading commercial banks\, central banks\, re gulators and other financial entities.\n\nA dedicated Working Group within QSFF is actively developing an aligned roadmap: precisely defining the scop e of each "use-case" for PQC implementation\, establishing criteria for eva luating and prioritizing those use-cases\, linking business contexts to the CIA triad\, identifying concrete milestones\, and balancing dependencies t o ensure a synchronized rollout.\n\nThis talk provides an overview of the W orking Group's structure\, its deliverables to date\, planned next steps\, and practical ways in which the audience can contribute to this vital initi ative.\n\n\nSpeakers: Sarah McCarthy\, Sudha Iyer LOCATION:Red hall CATEGORIES:Red hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-f0873d61-9761-4454-951a-1e29c2ff1d8d@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261203T104500Z DTEND:20261203T113000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Collaborative Efforts to support migration to PQC DESCRIPTION:A panel discussion that shares examples of how over 55 differen t organizations have worked collaborated within the NCCoE Migration to PQC project to demonstrate in either the use cryptographic visibility to suppor t risk management management decisions for migration actions or how perform ing demonstrations using PQC for interoperability and benchmarking informs PKI system owners to start using PQC algorithms. Bill Newhouse\, the NCCoE Migration to PQC lead\, will moderate a panel with 3 (or maybe 4) collabor ators who have been working on implementing PQC algorithms in PKI systems ( such as US Gov't PIV card)\n\nSpeakers: Murugiah Souppaya *\, Evgeny Gervis \, Bruno Couillard\, Ted Shorter LOCATION:Blue hall CATEGORIES:Blue hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-f09f307a-bcd9-473a-b949-123f04f153d1@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261203T113000Z DTEND:20261203T130000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Lunch DESCRIPTION: URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-89842635-4362-469f-9288-0082ce7cbee1@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261203T130000Z DTEND:20261203T132500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Quantum-Ready for BFSI in the ASEAN Region DESCRIPTION:This session shares real experience working with MODA and FSC i n Taiwan\, and DICT and BSP in the Philippines\, to understand their guidel ines and roadmaps for supporting the Taiwanese and Philippine BFSI sectors in migrating to PQC\, starting from helping them become quantum-ready.\n\nI t shares real use cases covering how large national banks plan to build a g olden inventory\, what should be considered when preparing them to start PQ C inventory and assessment\, and which approach and methodology they adopt to start the assessment and the journey of PQC migration. For example\, mos t of the banks would only adopt an agentless tool for cryptographic asset s canning\; the session looks at which areas they usually start with and how they manage the data afterwards\, as well as the role of the national cyber security authority and the central bank in driving this.\n\n\nSpeakers: Viv ian Ma LOCATION:Room B (5) CATEGORIES:Room B (5) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-9062ed6b-3fd7-443b-b418-afb435f0cc23@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261203T130000Z DTEND:20261203T132500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Trust Me\, I'm Random: Zero Trust Entropy for PQC DESCRIPTION:Every key your cloud HSM or KMS generates relies on one assumpt ion nobody in your SOC can verify: that the RNG feeding it is actually rand om. That assumption has failed before\, in certified hardware\, silently\, for years. Taiwan's national ID smartcards were FIPS 140-2 Level 2 and Comm on Criteria certified and still shipped factorable RSA keys\, found by outs ide researchers factoring the public keys\, not by the devices and not by t he auditors. Debian's OpenSSL entropy bug ran undetected for nearly two yea rs. Someone edited a constant in Juniper's ScreenOS ‘Dual_EC’ parameter s and nothing alerted. Post-quantum migration sharpens this: an ML-KEM or M L-DSA private key is exactly as strong as the seed behind it\, and we are r e-keying the internet on top of black-box entropy right now.\n\nStatistical testing cannot save you. A generator whose output an adversary chose in ad vance passes every SP 800-90B health test and every Dieharder suite\, by co nstruction. Certification is a point-in-time snapshot of a device that then runs unobserved in someone else's datacenter for five years. You have no t elemetry\, no detection\, and no forensic trail on the most foundational co mponent in your cryptographic stack.\n\nWe have solved this shape of proble m before\, just never here. Reproducible builds and SLSA replaced ‘trust the build server’ with evidence. Certificate Transparency accepted that m isissuance cannot be prevented and made it publicly detectable and replayab le instead. Remote attestation did it for workloads. Each was the same move : stop asking operators to be trustworthy\, start requiring them to emit ar tifacts anyone can check. Entropy is the last link in the chain still runni ng on trust-by-assumption\, and it is the link everything else is built on. \n\nThis talk is about what that move looks like for randomness. I present FQR-CSS\, from my peer-reviewed paper in Discover Computing (DOI: 10.1007/s 10791-026-09994-y)\, staying strictly on the part implementable today. The generator is made to prove its own health. Each QRNG node precommits to a s eed before the session\, then publishes a post-quantum zk-STARK over its cl assical measurement log asserting that the log satisfies a stated physical predicate: a CHSH score above threshold\, a photon-number distribution pass ing chi-square\, measurement bases derived from the pre-committed seed. The raw log never leaves the device. An aggregation layer verifies every proof and runs BFT consensus\, so only attested contributions reach the mixer. T he client receives randomness plus a Merkle-rooted integrity token it verif ies itself and an auditor can replay months later against a transparency lo g.\n\nNo new quantum hardware is required: the proofs are over classical lo gs that commercial QRNGs already emit\, using standard post-quantum ZKPs. I walk through reproducible zk-STARK benchmarks and a full latency budget: r oughly 396 ms end-to-end for a conservative CHSH attestation over WAN with HotStuff consensus\, of which client verification is sub-millisecond. That fits inside high-assurance key generation and disappears behind a pre-verif ied randomness buffer. The scope is deliberate and I will state it plainly: this is a cryptographic architecture with benchmarked primitives\, not a h ardware product. It attests entropy provenance at generation time\, not tha t a key was never exfiltrated afterwards.\n\nKey Takeaways:\n1. Why RNG com promise is undetectable in today's cloud HSM/KMS deployments\, and why outp ut-side statistical testing structurally cannot catch a chosen-output gener ator.\n2. Why the random number generator is the last implicitly trusted co mponent in a stack where zero trust has already been applied to networks\, identities\, workloads and machines\, and what ``verify explicitly\, assume breach'' means when the subject is a physical entropy source rather than a user or a workload.\n3. What to do before any of this ships: entropy prove nance in key metadata\, multi-source mixing so no single vendor dominates\, transparency-logged precommits\, and fail-closed attestation policy for CA and HSM key generation.\n\nSpeakers: Menyhért Pálinkó LOCATION:Room D (9) CATEGORIES:Room D (9) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-aef09c14-ad62-40a2-acca-a9f82236f52b@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261203T130000Z DTEND:20261203T132500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Project Hail Merkle: Rethinking Qualified Trust Services with Merkl e Tree Certificates DESCRIPTION:Digital trust is entering a new phase. For decades\, certificat es have been the invisible backbone of secure digital interactions: reliabl e\, proven\, and essential. But the environment around them is changing fas t. Trust ecosystems are becoming larger\, more connected\, more automated\, and more demanding. The question is no longer only how we protect trust. I t is how we scale it\, prove it\, and govern it in a world of growing compl exity.\n\nThis talk explores the emerging concept of Merkle Tree Certificat es and asks a fundamental question: could this be the next major step in th e evolution of digital trust\, especially for qualified trust services? Mer kle-tree-based approaches promise a new way of thinking about certificates. By embedding certificate-related information into cryptographically protec ted structures\, they can enable more efficient proofs\, greater transparen cy\, and new models for validation at scale. What sounds like a technical r efinement may in fact signal something much bigger: a shift from isolated c ertificate objects to more dynamic\, auditable\, and internet-scale trust a rchitectures.\n\nFor the world of qualified trust services\, this is especi ally significant. Here\, trust is never just a technical matter. It is also legal certainty\, regulatory compliance\, operational reliability\, and pu blic confidence. That is why the real opportunity\, and the real challenge\ , lies not only in the cryptography itself\, but in the question of how suc h new models could fit into highly regulated trust environments. Can innova tion deliver more transparency and scalability without weakening assurance\ , accountability\, or supervision?\n\nThe talk connects these developments to the future of qualified electronic signatures\, seals\, website authenti cation\, and emerging wallet-based ecosystems. It highlights both the promi se and the unresolved questions: interoperability\, standardization\, liabi lity\, governance\, and the broader impact on trust frameworks that were bu ilt for a different era.\n\nUltimately\, this session is not just about a n ew certificate concept. It is about the future architecture of trust. As di gital infrastructures evolve\, trust services must evolve with them. Merkle Tree Certificates may be one of the technologies that help define that nex t chapter\, where trust becomes not only secure\, but also scalable\, trans parent\, and ready for the demands of the next digital decade.\n\n\nSpeaker s: Kim Nguyen LOCATION:Blue hall CATEGORIES:Blue hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-c209e627-cb58-41b3-86bb-43c91166f76d@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261203T130000Z DTEND:20261203T140000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:PQC Regulation and Guidance Globally DESCRIPTION:PQC guidance varies by country and by industry. Some countries publish short policy papers\, others provide detailed cryptographic recomme ndations\, and even PQC migration handbooks. We are also seeing the develop ment of sovereign PQC algorithms and standards. This tutorial gives an over view of the PQC and cryptographic guidance that is currently available\, hi ghlights common themes\, and identifies significant differences.\n\nDesigne d for managers and technical architects planning for PQC migration\, especi ally those working in multinational organizations. It is also suitable for policy makers and regulators to help them understand the changing global la ndscape\, and developers of cryptographic products and services will also b enefit.\n\n\nSpeakers: Zygmunt Lozinski LOCATION:Room A (2) CATEGORIES:Room A (2),Tutorial URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-d5f83a73-a391-4b7d-aea5-54d5b326be7d@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261203T130000Z DTEND:20261203T132500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:PQC Migration for European Public Institutions DESCRIPTION:Cryptanalytically Relevant Quantum Computing (CRQC) is approach ing increasingly fast\, as the latest developments in hardware\, software\, and the application of decrypting algorithms show. But where would adversa ries with a CRQC find their first targets? The public sector\, involving ma ny different institutions with huge amounts of confidential information (fr om monetary and financial\, through organizational and strategic\, to healt h and security data) is home to high-value targets with data retention peri ods that make harvest-now-decrypt-later worth the effort.\n\nThe complexity of IT systems\, already heterogeneous between the different institutions a nd even more so between European countries\, and the need for reliability a nd trustworthiness of this backbone of our societies\, make migration a hig hly difficult undertaking. This is a challenge Q-PrEP is here to help tackl e\, in and with its community of cybersecurity agencies\, public sector org anizations\, their private sector providers\, and cybersecurity researchers on PQC and related aspects. A clear strategy\, not unguided disruption of safety and secrecy\, is needed and advanced by and within Q-PrEP.\n\nTo giv e the audience an impression of the project and its community\, the present ation by the Q-PrEP project team covers an introduction to the approach and measures taken by Q-PrEP\; the Q-PrEP Community as the centerpiece of the project\; integration of Q-PrEP into the European PQC ecosystem\; key aspec ts of the PQC migration in European public organizations and services and h ow their representatives engage in Q-PrEP\; and the direction of Q-PrEP's P QC roadmap for the public sector\, Europe-wide.\n\n\nSpeakers: Mathias Schu macher\, Adrian Neal LOCATION:Room C (8) CATEGORIES:Room C (8) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-ebe4bac6-cd1d-4382-a533-cd5a4210d57b@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261027T223848Z DTSTART:20261203T130000Z DTEND:20261203T140000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Post-Quantum HSMs: Shipped\, Validated\, or Roadmap? DESCRIPTION:Post-quantum cryptography has moved from standardization to pro curement and deployment\, with HSM providers central to what customers can implement. This panel brings providers together to distinguish what is avai lable and validated today from what remains on a roadmap\, and to explain w hat customers should require now.\n\nThe timing is no longer abstract. In t he United States\, Executive Order 14412 directs the FAR Council to propose post-quantum FIPS requirements for covered contractors by December 31\, 20 30\, while federal high-value assets and high-impact systems must transitio n key establishment by that date and digital signatures by 2031. In the Eur opean Union\, the Coordinated Implementation Roadmap expects national strat egies and cryptographic inventories to be underway\, and transition plannin g and pilots to have begun\, by December 31\, 2026\, with high-risk use cas es transitioned by the end of 2030. The Cyber Resilience Act adds product-s ecurity and vulnerability-handling obligations that will influence HSM proc urement. Buyers therefore face an immediate question: how can they procure platforms today without creating lock-in\, revalidation costs\, or another hardware migration later?\n\nPanelists will address FIPS 140-3 validation a nd EUCC/Common Criteria certification\, including EAL4 and applicable augme nted assurance components\, for HSMs supporting ML-KEM\, ML-DSA\, and SLH-D SA\; firmware versions and approved operating modes\; standards-based crypt o-agile interfaces\; hybrid key and certificate handling\; partition and ke y portability\; and audit evidence. They will also discuss why migrations s tall at cryptographic discovery and what customers should expect from vendo rs on hardware provenance\, supply-chain dependencies\, and delivery timeli nes.\n\nAttendees will leave with practical criteria for separating deploya ble capability from roadmap claims\, writing stronger procurement requireme nts\, and identifying choices that could create lock-in or require later re validation.\n\nSpeakers: Marcel Dasen\, Zsolt Rózsahegyi\, Bruno Couillard \, John Buselli *\, Giuseppe Damiano LOCATION:Red hall CATEGORIES:Red hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-6d2fe663-affb-4943-9e1f-04337b9d4afb@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261203T133000Z DTEND:20261203T140000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Securing the Internet of Things for the Quantum Era DESCRIPTION:The rapid growth of the IoT has transformed critical sectors su ch as healthcare\, transportation\, manufacturing\, energy\, and smart citi es. However\, IoT security is deeply dependent on public key infrastructure s (PKI) for device identity\, authentication\, certificate management\, sec ure onboarding\, key establishment\, and firmware validation. The emergence of quantum computing threatens many of the public-key algorithms underpinn ing today's PKI\, creating a long-term security risk for IoT deployments wi th constrained resources and long operational lifetimes.\n\nThis talk focus es on the transition of IoT PKI towards PQC. It examines the implications o f PQC for certificates\, certificate chains\, device provisioning\, authent ication protocols\, secure updates\, and lifecycle management at scale. Par ticular attention is given to the practical challenges of deploying larger post-quantum keys and signatures on constrained IoT devices and bandwidth-l imited networks. The talk also covers hybrid certificates\, crypto-agile PK I architectures\, migration strategies\, and interoperability with existing IoT security standards.\n\n\nSpeakers: Shahid Raza LOCATION:Room B (5) CATEGORIES:Room B (5) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-72a44527-93c1-45e3-bb66-23daed245038@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261203T133000Z DTEND:20261203T140000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:The Layer Nobody Monitors: Entropy Failures in PKI\, from Factorabl e Keys to Silent Hardware Faults DESCRIPTION:The randomness PKI assumes is there fails silently — certific ates look valid\, keys look fine\, and nothing alerts until someone goes lo oking.\nThis session walks four real entropy failures and the thread connec ting them. The 2012 shared-factor research (Heninger et al.\; Lenstra et al .) found a meaningful fraction of live TLS and SSH keys factorable by simpl e GCD\, because devices generated keys at first boot before the entropy poo l filled. The Debian OpenSSL collapse reduced a keyspace to a few thousand possibilities. Taiwan's national smartcards produced factorable keys despit e FIPS and Common Criteria certification. And AMD's 2025 Zen 5 RDSEED fault (CVE-2025-62626) returned zeros while signaling success — a hardware sou rce failing silently on current CPUs.\nThe lesson isn't hardware versus sof tware. It's runtime health-testing\, validation that exercises the noise so urce\, and no single point of dependence — as PQC and short cert lifetime s multiply randomness demand.\n\nSpeakers: Douglass Hill LOCATION:Room E (10) CATEGORIES:Room E (10) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-b5362695-1cab-49ba-a786-aad728425c95@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261203T133000Z DTEND:20261203T140000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Practical Implementation of Hardware-Separated Composite Signatures for Large-Scale PKI During the PQC Migration Period DESCRIPTION:The transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) presents a si gnificant challenge for organizations operating large-scale Public Key Infr astructures (PKIs). While PQC standards are becoming available\, replacing vast numbers of deployed hardware tokens such as smart cards remains operat ionally expensive and time-consuming.\n\nIn this session\, we present our i mplementation experience with the IETF LAMPS draft "Composite ML-DSA for Us e in X.509 Public Key Infrastructure" in a hardware-separated environment f or large-scale PKI migration. The approach combines existing smart cards ho lding traditional signature keys (e.g.\, RSA) with server-side Hardware Sec urity Modules (HSMs) providing PQC signature capabilities (e.g.\, ML-DSA)\, enabling organizations to begin introducing PQC without requiring immediat e replacement of end-user hardware. We discuss three representative risks o bserved during implementation and evaluation: cross-protocol signature comp osition\, unintended reuse of composite-signature keys for single-algorithm signatures\, and device impersonation across separated trust domains\, and present a device-binding architecture that addresses them while maintainin g compatibility with the IETF LAMPS composite signature framework.\n\nWe al so evaluate the potential operational impact of this approach using a large -scale PKI migration model involving tens of millions of certificates\, and share architectural considerations\, implementation experiences\, and vali dation results from a prototype built using cloud-based HSM services and co mmercially available PKI smart cards.\n\n\nSpeakers: Akane Suzuki\, Hiroki Uchiyama LOCATION:Blue hall CATEGORIES:Blue hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-bd510a5f-d32d-421e-8c88-f3708eb0d978@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261203T133000Z DTEND:20261203T140000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:ETSI/EU PQC update DESCRIPTION:While the EU set up its roadmap for a PQC transition and now is ready for another standardization project regarding PQC involving industry uptakes (development\, interoperability\, digital services\, …)\, ETSI i s preparing for the changes that need to be made.\nAdded to the current QSC WG on TC CYBER\, ETSI has created a new TC called QT (Quantum Technologies ) to deal with all quantum stuff. While this is really a boost on the matte r\, it does not solve the specific problems faced at TC ESI regarding certi ficates and signatures. Therefore\, ETSI ESI has created a new WG called PQ C which deals with all these aspects. \nThis new WG will focus on producing at least 4 TRs (Technical Reports) to evaluate the impact of PQC on ESI st andards. These TRs will cover the areas within the ESI framework\, which ar e:\n- Signature creation and validation\n- Cryptographic suites (this is co vered under the STF 705 and will work together)\n- Trust Services Providers supporting digital signatures and related services\n- Trust Application Se rvice Providers\n- Trust services status lists providers\nEach of these TRs will be split into multi-part documents\, covering: policy and security re quirements\, technical specifications and conformity assessments.\nIn this session you will learn what´s going on in the EU but mainly the ETSI ESI ’s plans for PQC\, the status PQC in the standards-making process\, and e xpectations for when PQC-enabled eIDAS certificates will be available.\n\nS peakers: Iñigo Barreira LOCATION:Room C (8) CATEGORIES:Room C (8) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-c21e3059-9bbb-4dbe-ac43-12875ca9f0c2@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:1 DTSTAMP:20261025T183315Z DTSTART:20261203T133000Z DTEND:20261203T140000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Crypto-Agility in Practice: What Breaks When Introducing Post-Quant um Algorithms DESCRIPTION:Post-quantum cryptography is often discussed in terms of algori thm design and standardization\, but integrating new cryptographic primitiv es into existing software systems exposes a different class of engineering challenges. Many production systems assume fixed algorithm identities\, com pact key and signature sizes\, and stable serialization formats. These assu mptions are often implicit and only become visible when new algorithms are introduced.\n\nThis talk examines practical issues encountered when introdu cing post-quantum algorithms into identity and access management systems. T he discussion is based on implementation experience in both a newly designe d platform and an existing legacy system\, where crypto-agility had to be i ntroduced incrementally without breaking existing functionality. The sessio n identifies common failure points\, including limitations in cryptographic libraries\, constraints imposed by protocol message sizes\, incompatibilit ies in token validation logic\, and operational issues that arise when mult iple algorithms must be supported simultaneously.\n\nBeyond identifying pro blems\, the talk focuses on the engineering responses used to address them. These include abstraction approaches for algorithm handling\, strategies f or managing backward compatibility\, and techniques for validating mixed-al gorithm environments during transition periods. The goal is to highlight th e often-overlooked system-level implications of cryptographic change.\n\nAt tendees will gain a grounded understanding of how post-quantum migration af fects real systems and what design considerations are necessary to reduce d isruption during cryptographic evolution.\n\nSpeakers: Udara Pathum LOCATION:Room D (9) CATEGORIES:Room D (9) URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-18c00459-28b8-4619-9bdc-a3a8cdd89381@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261203T140000Z DTEND:20261203T143000Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Break DESCRIPTION: URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-8f322cea-216e-4ca1-8fac-f43ecbdab7dc@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261203T143000Z DTEND:20261203T151500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Making ML-DSA Work for Machine-to-Machine mTLS: Field Notes from an End-to-End Post-Quantum PKI DESCRIPTION:Most post-quantum migration programs have done the easy part - hybrid key exchange - and then hit a wall at authentication. Getting ML-DSA certificates working for real machine-to-machine identity\, with a PKI tha t can issue\, renew\, and revoke them\, is where timelines slip: the certif icates are large\, lifecycle tooling is immature\, and almost no one has ru n mutual TLS where both sides authenticate with post-quantum credentials.\n \nThis is a practitioner field report from an organization that has built a nd now operates exactly that - an end-to-end post-quantum machine-identity stack: an ML-DSA-65 CA hierarchy\, post-quantum-only mutual TLS enforced at the edge\, automated enrollment and short-lived issuance\, and OCSP/CRL re vocation that takes effect in real time. We share what it actually took\, s o teams planning the authentication phase of their own migration know what they are walking into.\n\nAttendees leave with: a realistic picture of the authentication half of PQC migration - what is production-ready today and w hat is still blocked on standards (IETF LAMPS composite certificates\, post -quantum identity tokens)\; where ML-DSA certificate and signature sizes ac tually cause problems - handshake payloads\, buffers\, issuance throughput - measured against classical TLS 1.3\; how to tell a genuinely post-quantum -only deployment from a post-quantum key exchange sitting in front of class ical certificates\, and how to verify it\; a certificate-lifecycle model fo r machine identity - constrained enrollment\, automated issuance\, real-tim e revocation - and the operational decisions that matter\; and a practical set of questions to put to your CAs\, HSM vendors\, and platform teams befo re committing to an approach.\n\nThe session is for PKI\, platform\, and se curity teams responsible for the machine-identity and mTLS portion of their post-quantum migration. It assumes working knowledge of TLS 1.3 and certif icate PKI\; no prior post-quantum background is required.\n\n\nSpeakers: Ru men Doynov\, Alexander Shestakov LOCATION:Blue hall CATEGORIES:Blue hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-e630cd18-62a3-4467-add8-c14739bdd83b@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261203T143000Z DTEND:20261203T151500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Where the World Stands: A Government Leaders’ Panel on the PQC Tr ansition DESCRIPTION:A digital economy runs on trust\, and that trust runs on crypto graphy. The signatures\, certificates\, and encrypted channels that underpi n banking\, identity\, commerce\, and communication are invisible until the y fail — and the quantum threat puts all of them in question at once. The exposure is often discussed in geopolitical terms\, but the consequences a re economic and societal: markets\, supply chains\, public services\, and t he everyday transactions that modern life depends on. This is not a problem governments can solve alone. And it is not one organizations can afford to defer.\n\nThis panel brings together senior representatives from national cybersecurity agencies and government PQC programmes to share where their p rogrammes stand\, what they are seeing in the market\, and what they expect ahead. Are migration timelines holding — or are they moving? That is the question every leadership team will be asking\, and this panel offers a un ique opportunity to hear how governments are thinking about it.\n\nThere wi ll be plenty of room for questions and interaction with the panellists.\n\n Speakers: Paul van Brouwershaven *\, Pieter Schneider\, Stephan Ehlen\, Fab iana Da Pieve\, Megat Zuhairy Megat Tajuddin LOCATION:Red hall CATEGORIES:Red hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-50871b14-e284-47bf-9041-010e9ac6fd3c@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:2 DTSTAMP:20261027T224749Z DTSTART:20261203T152000Z DTEND:20261203T155500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:The European Roadmap on Post-Quantum Cryptography: Looking Back and Moving Forward DESCRIPTION:In April 2024\, the European Commission issued a Recommendation on Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC)\, calling on Member States to adopt a c oordinated and harmonized approach to the transition towards quantum-resist ant cryptographic systems. This led to the establishment of a dedicated PQC workstream within the NIS Cooperation Group\, co-chaired by France\, Germa ny\, and the Netherlands. Bringing together representatives from nearly all EU Member States\, the workstream developed the European roadmap for the c oordinated migration to PQC\, published in June 2025.\n\nThe workstream con tinues to support Member States by fostering collaboration\, exchanging exp eriences\, and addressing common challenges related to the transition to PQ C. In this talk\, we will review the progress made since the publication of the roadmap\, discuss key developments and lessons learned\, and provide a n outlook on the remaining priorities and future activities of the workstre am.\n\n\nSpeakers: Stephan Ehlen\, Anita Wehmann LOCATION:Red hall CATEGORIES:Red hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-b2484544-c529-477b-9a6d-e04280803c12@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261203T152000Z DTEND:20261203T155500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Beware of Downgrade Attacks during the Migration to Quantum Resista nce DESCRIPTION:During the quantum-resistant migration’s transitionary phase there is a need for backwards compatibility and manageability. This means t hat old and new cryptography may be in use at the same time\, creating a re al risk of downgrade attacks.\nThis talk sets out the problem of limiting d owngrade risk during migration\, focused on the use-case of end-to-end auth enticated commands from an authority to a device\, which is a critical use- case for managing infrastructure and devices. We pose several strategies fo r migration and provide practical ways to mitigate and manage the downgrade risk and minimise the exposure time window. In this use-case the problem i s compounded when commands are sent one-way and do not receive a response\, and when it takes time to upgrade authorities and devices. Furthermore\, w ith new quantum-resistant standards emerging and best-practice for selectin g algorithms and parameter sets likely to evolve\, this transition will lik ely not be the last. Planning today’s migration with cryptographic agilit y in mind to reduce the downgrade risk during future changes is therefore i mportant.\nGreater recognition of the real challenges of the downgrade risk and how to address it will equip vendors and IT managers with strategies t o reduce their exposure and manage risks during their quantum-resistant mig ration and future cryptographic transitions. By setting out the problem we also hope to establish a foundation for further research in this area that many will depend on.\n\nSpeakers: Thalia Laing LOCATION:Blue hall CATEGORIES:Blue hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:agenda-5ecc81ba-733b-444b-9fb8-efe9880c999b@ics.pkic.org SEQUENCE:0 DTSTAMP:20261023T000842Z DTSTART:20261203T160000Z DTEND:20261203T160500Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Conference closing DESCRIPTION:The chairs bring the conference to a close with key takeaways\, a call to action\, and what comes next for the PKI Consortium's PQC work.\ n\n\nSpeakers: Paul van Brouwershaven\, Albert de Ruiter\, Sven Rajala LOCATION:Red hall CATEGORIES:Red hall URL:https://pkic.org/events/2026/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/agenda/ END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR