#### **Post-Quantum**

#### **Cryptography Conference**

#### A Framework for Cryptographic Agility



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KEŸFACTOR

**CRYPTO4A** 







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# A Framework For Cryptographic Agility

#### **Navaneeth Rameshan**

Senior Research Developer

## The Typical Crypto Call

```
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes

# Generate ECDSA private key
private_key = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())

# Sign some data
data = b"data"
signature = private_key.sign(data, ec.ECDSA(hashes.SHA256()))

# Verify signature
public_key = private_key.public_key()
public_key.verify(signature, data, ec.ECDSA(hashes.SHA256()))
```

 $\mathbf{z}$ 

IBM Research Security

### 11/28/2025

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Every call bakes in algorithm specifics

If any one of these inputs change, the application code changes too

IIM 3


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
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
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## **Input Abstraction**



IIM

# Input Abstraction




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## Input Abstraction

Named-Identifier

Parameters


Key Bytes



Hide key and parameters under a "named-identifier"

## What If Signing Looked Like This?

```
1 # Old API: many knobs & dials
2 # New API: just "operation" + "named key identifier"
3 ciphertext = crypto_service.sign("my-key-id", b"data")
```



#### Under the hood


my-key-id → resolves to a key with certain set of parameters

Decouples app from Crypto Specifics

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Crypto as a Service (CaaS)



#### Under the hood

my-key-id → resolves to a key with certain set of parameters

Decouples app from Crypto Specifics



## **Key Lifecycle Management**

Lifecycle Management ("my-key-id")

Key Creation

Key Destruction

Key Storage

Key Rotation

Deprecation


If keys are abstract, their lifecycle must be managed



## **Key Lifecycle Management**

Lifecycle Management ("my-key-id")

If keys are abstract, their lifecycle must be managed




Key Versioning

Action	Key Bytes	Parameters
Rotation	Changes	Retained
Transformation	Can-Change	Can-Change



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## What Have We Achieved So Far?







## **How To Create The Key?**

```
# Old API: many knobs & dials

# Create key with a template that captures relevant parameters crypto_service.create_key("my-key-id", "ECDSA_P256_SHA256")

# New API: just "operation" + "named key identifier"

ciphertext = crypto_service.sign("my-key-id", b"data")
```

Use a key template that captures all the relevant parameters

We still need to know the key type!!





## Replace "Template" with "Scope"

```
# Create key with a template that captures relevant parameters
crypto_service.create_key("my-key-id", "ECDSA_P256_SHA256")

# New API: just "operation" + "named key identifier"
ciphertext = crypto_service.sign("my-key-id", b"data")
```

```
# Old API: many knobs & dials

# Create key with a scope for intended use

crypto_service.create_key("my-key-id", "signature")

# New API: just "operation" + "named key identifier"

ciphertext = crypto_service.sign("my-key-id", b"data")
```

Scope: Intended purpose of use

- Authenticated data encryption
- Block Cipher
- Signature
- MAC/HMAC ...





## **Policy Auto-Selects Algorithm**



Scope	Preferred Algorithm	Fallback Algorithm
Authenticated Data Encryption	AES-GCM-96	ChaCha20-Poly1305
Signature	ECDSA-P256-SHA256	Ed25519

#### <u>Under the hood</u>

Policies determine which *algorithms* are allowed for each *scope* 

Changing policies swaps algorithms without touching app code



## What Have We Achieved So Far?

Crypto-Object Abstraction

Algorithm Agility



Application developers should not be able to set policies








## Who Sets the Policies and Rules?

Application developers should not be able to set policies

Identity and Access Management for separation of responsibilities


- CISO/Crypto Admin → Sets Policies
- App Developer  $\rightarrow$  Uses crypto via key IDs



Governance & Control

Can enable CBOM (SBOM / OBOM )

Crypto-Object Abstraction




Can enable CBOM (SBOM / OBOM )

Processing Agility

Governance & Control

Crypto-Object Abstraction



Abstract AP

Agility

## **Crypto-Processing Agility**

Where is Cryptography executed?



## **Crypto-Processing Agility**

Where is Cryptography executed?

Golang Crypto

A software-based cryptographic solution written in Go.

HSMs

Hardware Security Modules for secure key storage and operations.

Many more ...

OpenSSL Crypto

A widely used open-source cryptographic library.

IBM Cloud HPCS


IBM's cloud-based Hardware Security Module service.

Many more ...

Backend = Crypto Libraries, HSM, Cloud KMS ...

Abstract API and policy lets us switch cryptographic implementations at will





- CISO officer creates a crypto policy which allows both ECDSA and ML-DSA algorithms and keys
- 2. Signer client creates an ECDSA Key called ("signing-key")
- 3. Signer client signs with key "signing-key", and gets back a signature
- 4. Verifier client verifies the signature with key "signing-key"
- 5. The CISO officer now transforms the key signing-key to ML-DSA or updates policy to use ML-DSA
- 6. The signer client signs a new transaction with key "signing-key". Under the hood, without any application-level code changes, this automatically is signed with ML-DSA
- 7. The verifier client verifies the new signature with key "signing-key" and gets a successful validation, again without any code changes



ryptographic Backend



Authorization



Identity



**Policies** 




Key Management



Key

- 1. Replace direct crypto calls with abstract API
- 2. Centralize key lifecycle management
- 3. Introduce scope-based policies
- 4. Add strict identity & access control
- 5. Enable crypto-backend flexibility
- 6. ...



Increasing Agility

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Framework

Audit etc...

Cryptographic Backend

Authorization

Identity

**Policies** 

Key

## **Putting It All Together**

Thank You

Questions?

Algorithm Agility Federated Algorithm

Agility

**Srypto-Workflow** 

Audit, Provenance etc... Swap cryptographic backends Who can use/update keys and policies Allowed algorithms, backend, scope etc. Rotation, Transformation, Versioning Expiry, retirement Decouples app from crypto specifics