Post-Quantum

Cryptography Conference

Cryptographic Discovery and Inventory: The Hidden Foundation for Enterprise Security

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KEYFACTOR CRYPTO4A SSL.com ENTRUST HID

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PKI Consortium

Data-Warehouse GmbH
Cybersecurity

PKIC PQC Conference

Cryptographic discovery, inventory, risk assessment, Cybersecurity Challenges, Compliance, Software Supply Chain Control and need for crypto agility

Data Warehouse GmbH

Data-Warehouse GmbH Cybersecurity

Our portfolio	Our products Made in Germany	Our customers
Software development •Cybersecurity •Individual & SME multiple branch and production solutions •Networking implementation and Communication solutions •Low Code Universal Software development platform (EBUS –J) •Consulting, Support, GDPR Consulting (GDPR) •Project management		DER PARITÄTISCHE BAYERN, Bärenmarke, Audi, SIEMENS, handicap international, KINDER SCHUTZ MÜNCHEN
+ Information management •Enterprise Solutions, Data Center solutions •Central information mangement systems, Logistics optimisation, PLM/PDM, Supply chain optimisation •Distributed database systems •Social collaboration, messaging (tixxle) •Master data management & logistics (IQIMS) •(High) secure software development •Mobile, Cloud and web solutions		Deutsche Post, Bundeswehr, AIRBUS DEFENCE & SPACE, Eurofighter Typhoon, O2, DEUTSCHE BÖRSE GROUP, BUNDESHEER, ESG, EnBW, DB BAHN
+ (IT & ID) Security •Implementation strategy of complex products •I(T-)Security concepts for high secure areas •Cyber security strategies, security research •Development of national standards •Online trainings, awareness, pentesting •Implementation of (national) CA and PKI •Identity Management und Privileged Identities •P-Cert		BMW, Eurofighter Typhoon, BNotK BUNDESNOTARKAMMER, secunet, TMS, AIRBUS DEFENCE & SPACE, EVG, HUK-COBURG

ISO 9001 | ISO 27001 | Aero Excellence Certified

Governance /Compliance

- US approach
  - Inventorisation of all cryptographic items until 2030
  - NIST: Post Quantum Migration projects
  - CISA: „“Post-quantum cryptography is about proactively developing and building capabilities to secure critical information and systems from being compromised through the use of quantum computers,” said **Rob Joyce, Director of NSA Cybersecurity**.“
    - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/cisa-nsa-and-nist-publish-new-resource-migrating-post-quantum-cryptography
- German approach
  - BSI TR-02102 Cryptographic Mechanisms
  - BSI, together with European partner authorities, has concretized the goal of completing the migration to quantum-safe mechanisms to protect against the “Store Now, Decrypt Later”-scenario for highly sensitive applications by the end of 2030 at the latest. 2026 starting date…
    - https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/TechGuidelines/TG02102/BSI-TR-02102-1.pdf
- NCSC, ETSI, and many more

How much time is left?

To estimate when the migration to quantum-safe cryptography is necessary, the following consideration by theoretical physicist M. Mosca from [Mos15] is very illustrative.

Let

- *x* be the number of years that the data to be protected must remain secured,
- *y* be the number of years needed to convert the corresponding system to quantum computer-resistant cryptography, and
- *z* be the number of years it will take for quantum computers to exist that threaten the cryptography currently in use.

Then, if x+y > z, you have a problem!



Figure: Illustration of "Mosca's Theorem"

https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Brochure/quantum-safe-cryptography.pdf

Timelines in average

- 2026 – start preparations
  - Build teams, assign budget
  - Identify priorities /risks (e.g. cryptographic inventory, risk assessments)
  - Plan the migration

- 2030 – begin migration
  - Migrate, test, roll out

- 2035 – Quantum readyness

- Uncertainities: Attack to Lattice algorithms with Grover (Yes, not Shore)
  - Published first 2020 retracted due to a bug
    - Mid 2025 Publishing the bug was solved.
  - Argument for cryptographic agility (maybe redo all the work again) as acontinuous process

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Do you have a solution for your environment?



NCCoE & ACID … nope … ACDI- CADI

Strategy for Migrating to Automated Post-Quantum Cryptography Discovery and Inventory Tools

https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/crypto-agility-considerations-migrating-post-quantum-cryptographic-algorithms h

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

Let‘s start with the inventory

- Several different approaches to achieve the inventory
  - Using existing information systems and databases
  - Tracing the network traffic to find active cryptographic assets
  - Active scanning of the assets
  - Interfacing with existing cybersecurity agents to enrich the inventory

Approach one: Using existing information systems and databases

- Interfacing between the systems
- Extract existing cryptographic informations
- Pro:
  - No inpact to existing infrastructure (esp.complex one‘s)
- Con:
  - Only partial informations available due to quality of DB‘s
  - Interfacing topics



Approach two: Tracing the network traffic to find active cryptographic assets

- Sniffing the network with agents / probes / appliances
- Extract actively used cryptographic informations
- Pro:
  - Actively used crypto assets are detected
  - No third party tool needed
- Con:
  - Impact to infrastructure (Security)
  - External view to devices and coms (public keys). Additional effords for correct location and private key material needed



Approach three: Deep scanning cryptographic assets

- Combining network ports scanning and local scanning of all assets
- Extract all cryptographic informations (certificates, keys)
- Pro:
  - All used and stored crypto assets are detected
  - Permanent monitoring of cryptoassets
  - Deep informations to every assets
- Con:
  - Impact to infrastructure (Agents)
  - Data amount and time for implementation



Approach four: Interfacing with existing cybersecurity agents to enrich the inventory

- Combining network ports scanning and local scanning of all assets
- Extract all cryptographic informations (certificates, keys)
- Pro:
  - All used and stored crypto assets are detected
  - Permanent monitoring of cryptoassets
  - Deep informations to every assets
- Con:
  - Impact to infrastructure (Agents)
  - Data amount and time for implementation




Development Pipeline
Operations System / Network
Discovery Target
Discovery Sensor
Discovery Monitor
External System
Source Code
Libraries
- Inhouse
- Opensource
- 3rd party
Files
- Configurations
- Cryptography
App
App Binaries
Inhouse Libraries
Open source Libraries
3rd party Libraries
Operating System
Container
Host (VM / HW)
Source Code Analysis Tool
Binary Analysis Tool
File Analysis Tool
App Profiling Tool
System Scanner
Active Network Monitor
Passive Network Monitor
Development Pipeline Monitor
System Monitor
Network Monitor
Log Management / Risk Scoring
CBOM
SBOM
DevDecOps Tools
VM Monitor
SIEM Tools
Web Browser
User
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Web Browser
Admin

Practical samles & talking about numbers

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Some numbers per device:

Linux	200	- 20,000 Certs
Windows	80,000 – 5xx,000 Certs	
Mac OS	40,000 – 2xx,000 Certs	



Discovery and Visibility	Collection & Mitigation	Governance & Management

Cryptographic inventory example

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Level	Priority	Serial No.	Valid from	Valid until	Revocation date	Algorithm	PubKeyType	PubKeyBits	Subject
pliant	9	4bab0582eb2339866580ed9d3aa27b75ed5eea2	09/16/2020	09/14/2050		SHA256withECDSA	EC	256	ST=California, O=Apple Inc., CN=Apple Accessories Certification Authority - 00000003
cal	9	4bbbe0d8257cd9711a1b57e6bb9c660f	07/06/2012	07/19/2015		SHA1withRSA	RSA	2048	CN="Sun Microsystems, Inc.", OU=Sun Microsystems, OU=Digital ID Class 3 - Microsoft Software Va
ium	9	4bcd77d6899133832fc144f642c9607c501d3d61	01/01/2015	01/01/2035		SHA256withRSA	RSA	2048	CN=xpcshell signed apps test root
cal	9	4be1ae04	04/28/2010	05/02/2020		SHA1withRSA	RSA	1024	CN=OpenVPN Update Root
ium	9	4be92a902784951dc13ac6ce37d230fe	02/24/2021	05/31/2027		SHA256withRSA	RSA	2048	CN=United Trust, O=United SSL Deutschland GmbH, C=DE
pliant	9	4c034bac67184c7faf44084d8296c7b2	11/18/2015	01/19/2038		SHA384withRSA	RSA	4096	CN=Network Solutions RSA Certificate Authority, O=Network Solutions L.L.C., L=Jacksonville, ST=FL
cal	9	4c0e646d	07/28/2010	07/28/2020		SHA1withRSA	RSA	2048	CN=Entrust Class 1 Client CA, OU="(c) 2010 Entrust, Inc.", OU=www.entrust.net/CPS is incorporated
pliant	9	4c1b960191fcabedcda9301a6cd78c3	12/15/2022	12/15/2032		SHA256withRSA	RSA	4096	CN=DigiCert Secure Site OV G2 TLS CN RSA4096 SHA256 2022 CA1, O="DigiCert, Inc.", C=US
ium	9	4c2b439be6d07a60ac676e51c73bd588	01/15/2015	01/15/2025		SHA384withRSA	RSA	2048	CN=TrustSign BR Certification Authority (DV) 2, O=TrustSign Certificadora Dig. & Soluções Seguran
cal	9	4c3	02/03/2014	02/03/2019		SHA1withRSA	RSA	2048	E=KoehlerT@iabg.de, CN=Koehler Tom, O=IABG, ST=Bayern, C=DE
pliant	9	4c462af6dbfbf7804f84c17cfea972b6	10/16/2014	10/16/2032		SHA256withRSA	RSA	4096	CN=TeliaSonera Server CA v2, O=TeliaSonera, C=FI
cal	9	4c50f334ad4d9931	11/14/2024	12/26/2024		SHA256withRSA	RSA	2048	C=US, O=Apple Inc., CN=Timestamp Signer NWK2
ium	9	4c7256a2663e5578e85bd2b6bb70c82	11/02/2017	11/02/2027		SHA256withRSA	RSA	2048	CN=AlwaysOnSSL TLS RSA CA G1, OU=Domain Validated SSL, O=CertCenter AG, C=DE
pliant	9	4c79b59a289c763164f58944d09102de	10/18/2012	12/02/2037		SHA384withECDSA	EC	384	CN=Symantec Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G4, OU=Symantec Trust Network, O=
pliant	9	4c8a631da9638f05a2fb7614ff5ba2cd	02/19/2021	02/13/2045		SHA384withECDSA	EC	384	CN=HARICA Code Signing ECC Root CA 2021, O=Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions CA, C
pliant	9	4c8fc03a854eb98a09b02883c66a3c0	01/15/2021	01/15/2046		SHA384withRSA	RSA	4096	CN=DigiCert Client RSA4096 Root G5, O="DigiCert, Inc.", C=US
ium	9	4ca28f3bf96109b27d9a6197b7051bb	09/18/2024	10/19/2025		SHA256withRSA	RSA	2048	CN=*.statuspage.io
cal	9	4ca81f77d5e33f7	01/07/2016	02/07/2023		SHA256withRSA	RSA	2048	C=US, O=Apple Inc., CN=Apple Mac OS Application Signing
pliant	9	4caaf9cadb636fe01ff74ed85b03869d	01/19/2010	01/19/2038		SHA384withRSA	RSA	4096	CN=COMODO RSA Certification Authority, O=COMODO CA Limited, L=Salford, ST=Greater Manchest
cal	9	4caf150325af0001af00000	03/31/2015	03/31/2020		SHA1withRSA	RSA	1024	CN=iTunes.4CAF150325AF0001AF00000, OU=Apple FairPlay, O=Apple Inc., C=US
cal	9	4caf160303af0001af000002	03/04/2016	03/05/2021		SHA1withRSA	RSA	1024	CN=CoreLSKD.4CAF160303AF0001AF000002, OU=Apple FairPlay, O=Apple Inc., C=US
cal	9	4caf170210af0001af000001	02/10/2017	02/11/2022		SHA1withRSA	RSA	1024	CN=FPPineBoard.4CAF170210AF0001AF000001, OU=Apple FairPlay, O=Apple Inc., C=US
cal	9	4caf190222af0001af000001	02/23/2019	02/24/2024		SHA1withRSA	RSA	1024	CN=FPStubCoreMediaPEM.4CAF190222AF0001AF000001, OU=Apple FairPlay, O=Apple Inc., C=US
h	9	4caf200313af0001af000001	03/13/2020	03/14/2025		SHA1withRSA	RSA	1024	CN=MobileInstallation.4CAF200313AF0001AF000001, OU=Apple FairPlay, O=Apple Inc., C=US
h	9	4caf201221af0001af000001	01/05/2021	01/06/2026		SHA1withRSA	RSA	1024	CN=StoreAgentStub.4caf201221af0001af000001, OU=Apple FairPlay, O=Apple Inc., C=US
h	9	4caf210203af0001af000001	02/03/2021	02/04/2026		SHA1withRSA	RSA	1024	CN=iBooks.4CAF210203AF0001AF000001, OU=Apple FairPlay, O=Apple Inc., C=US
h	9	4caf220329af0001af000001	03/29/2022	03/30/2027		SHA1withRSA	RSA	1024	CN=iTunes.4CAF220329AF0001AF000001, OU=Apple FairPlay, O=Apple Inc., C=US
cal	9	4caf73421c8e7402	08/17/2006	08/14/2016		SHA1withRSA	RSA	4096	C=TR, O=EBG Bilişim Teknolojileri ve Hizmetleri A.Ş., CN=EBG Elektronik Sertifika Hizmet Sağlayıcıs
h	9	4cc7eaaa983e71d39310f83d3a899192	05/18/1998	08/02/2028		SHA1withRSA	RSA	1024	OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU="(c) 1998 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only", OU=Class 1 Pu
ium	9	4cd3f8568ae76c61bb0fe7160cca76d	10/01/2019	10/17/2030		SHA256withRSA	RSA	2048	CN=TIMESTAMP-SHA256-2019-10-15, O="DigiCert, Inc.", C=US
cal	9	4d1c00c5d7e6503b057dd1d5dba3555eac7	08/23/2024	11/21/2024		SHA256withRSA	RSA	2048	CN=cdn.live.ledger.com
pliant	9	4d2d3364d7e1c0da2a46046801adf36	03/24/2020	03/22/2028		SHA256withRSA	RSA	4096	CN=Ionian University TLS RSA SubCA R1, O=Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions CA, C=GR
cal	9	4d4edd7706ef6b3131d00b1c6791d0c1	11/05/2009	12/11/2010		SHA1withRSA	RSA	1024	CN=Adobe Systems Incorporated, OU=Information Systems, OU=Digital ID Class 3 - Microsoft Soft
cal	9	4d5d80c30ad9c700	07/21/2021	09/01/2021		SHA256withRSA	RSA	2048	C=US, O=Apple Inc., CN=Timestamp Signer MA2
cal	9	4d5f2c3408b24c20cd6d507e244dc9ec	02/08/2010	02/08/2020		SHA1withRSA	RSA	2048	CN=Thawte SSL CA, O="Thawte, Inc.", C=US
pliant	9	4d669cec0030600ed07b6fd36cd9900c56f82e09	03/30/2023	03/29/2053		SHA256withECDSA	EC	256	CN=GC01-TERM-CN-P
h	9	4d817ef4	03/17/2011	12/18/2065		SHA1withRSA	RSA	1024	CN=MobileGo, OU=MobileGo Studio, O=MobileGoStudio, L=Shenzhen, ST=Guangdong, C=CN
cal	9	4d819b64	03/10/2011	03/14/2021		SHA1withRSA	RSA	1024	CN=OpenVPN Web CA 2011.03.17 05:25:56 UTC ip-10-203-81-10
pliant	9	4d8247384adf541f88340f4928553224b6c48fe2	06/22/2020	06/22/2030		SHA384withECDSA	EC	384	CN=Cybertrust Japan SureServer CA G8, O="Cybertrust Japan Co., Ltd.", C=JP
pliant	9	4d8a4a1dabf126dac726fc663fab72a9	12/03/2018	01/01/2031		SHA384withECDSA	EC	256	CN=Sectigo ECC Domain Validation Secure Server CA 2, O=Sectigo Limited, L=Salford, ST=Greater M
h	9	4d8ba7b4df9e1153e1c80dee3e6f409a	03/13/2015	12/31/2030		SHA256withRSA	RSA	2048	CN=SHECA Extended Validation SSL CA, O=UniTrust, C=CN
ium	9	4d942c10d43be09409c5812d3a2b064f	11/02/2018	01/01/2031		SHA384withRSA	RSA	2048	CN=Sectigo RSA Client Authentication and Secure Email CA, O=Sectigo Limited, L=Salford, ST=Grea
cal	9	4da54fc7	04/06/2011	04/10/2021		SHA1withRSA	RSA	2048	CN=OpenVPN Update Root 2011.04
cal	9	4da54fc8	04/06/2011	04/10/2021		SHA1withRSA	RSA	2048	CN=OpenVPN Script Root 2011.04
cal	9	4da56a9b	04/06/2011	04/10/2021		SHA1withRSA	RSA	1024	CN=JY Private Root
pliant	9	4dd1c6d49937935c7c662428d193cf6	07/30/2014	07/30/2029		SHA384withRSA	RSA	4096	CN=NCC Group Secure Server CA G4, O=NCC Group, C=US
pliant	9	4dd7ecd8bfe3555392fa387b478e566f	03/14/2019	03/12/2027		SHA256withRSA	RSA	4096	CN=Ecclesiastical Academy of Vella SSL RSA SubCA R2, O=University Ecclesiastical Academy of Vell
ium	9	4ddcbc4d8baa006b1f321b00894f42ee	04/29/2015	04/29/2025		SHA384withRSA	RSA	2048	CN=Western Digital Technologies Certification Authority, O=Western Digital Technologies, L=Irvin
pliant	9	4df7309184c7b632b600b5d4a045e959	04/20/2022	04/20/2032		SHA384withECDSA	EC	256	CN=TrustAsia ECC OV TLS CA G3, O="TrustAsia Technologies, Inc.", C=CN

Like numbers? Mac Osx Highscore: currently 256.000, MS Windows 10: 369.000 Certs&Keys on one device

Risk Assessment option example

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

Need for permanent process or onetime?

- Cryptographic inventory – CBOM++
  - Building a Cryptographic Bill of Material and consolidate it in enterprise context
- Software supply chain inventory – SBOM++
  - Building a Software Bill of Material and consolidate it in enterprise context
- Crypto agility
  - Changing from one cryptographic provider (CA) to another with maximum automation. Identify weaknesses and needs for exchanging cryptography
- Risk identification and monitoring
  - Identifying risk components or suppliers in the enterprise context
- Post Quantum Migration, Quantum Security
  - Identify Risks, setting priorities, select algorithmic, perform development, change cryptography, verify status, perform operation, maintain product, implement new technologies
- Investigate cryptographic security
  - Eg. Keystore security, key / cryptographic handling

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Full Stop.

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