

Post-Quantum

Cryptography Conference

Post-Quantum Firmware Signing in IoT: Practical PQC-FOTA Implementation



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Post-Quantum Firmware Signing in IoT:

Practical PQC-FOTA Implementation

A practical implementation of PQC-FOTA for secure, future-proof firmware in IoT devices against evolving quantum threats.



The top of the slide features a dark blue background with a faint world map. Overlaid on the map are several glowing yellow icons: a padlock, a shield with a person inside, a key, and a document with a checkmark. These icons are connected by a network of thin yellow lines.

Why do we need Firmware Signing in IoT?

Crypto-agility

With the emergence of **quantum threats**, traditional signing methods like RSA and ECDSA pose significant risks.

Agenda



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- ✓ **IoT Constraints**
 - ✓ **PQC Integration**
 - ✓ **Bootloader Verification**
 - ✓ **Hybrid Signing**
 - ✓ **PQC Migration Roadmap**
-

IoT Constraints

**Classical
Cryptographic
Algorithms**

FOTA Compatibility

**Resource &
Performance Limits**

PQC Integration

Firmware Signing [Python]



ESP32 Secure Boot Verification [C]



Bootloader Verification [C]

```
#include <oqs/oqs.h>

OQS_STATUS status = OQS_SIG_verify(
    "ML-DSA-65",
    firmware_data,
    firmware_len,
    signature,
    sig_len,
    public_key
);

if (status == OQS_SUCCESS) {
    printf("PQC verification passed\n");
} else {
    printf("Verification failed\n");
}
```

OQS C API:

OQS_SIG_verify()

Demo

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/esp-idf/tools]
$ # Generate with default (ML-DSA-44)
python3 sign_firmware_pqc.py gen

# Generate with ML-DSA-65
python3 sign_firmware_pqc.py gen ML-DSA-65

# Sign firmware.bin with ML-DSA-65
python3 sign_firmware_pqc.py sign ML-DSA-65 firmware.bin firmware.sig

# Verify signature
python3 sign_firmware_pqc.py verify ML-DSA-65 firmware.bin firmware.sig

[+] Generated ML-DSA-44 keypair
    Private key: secure_boot_signing_key_ML-DSA-44.pkl
    Public key : signature_verification_key_ML-DSA-44.pkl
[+] Generated ML-DSA-65 keypair
    Private key: secure_boot_signing_key_ML-DSA-65.pkl
    Public key : signature_verification_key_ML-DSA-65.pkl
[+] Signed firmware.bin with ML-DSA-65, signature written to firmware.sig
[+] Verification SUCCESS for firmware.bin using ML-DSA-65
```

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/esp-idf/tools]
$ echo "tampered" >> firmware.bin
python3 sign_firmware_pqc.py verify Falcon-512 firmware.bin firmware.sig

[-] Verification FAILED for firmware.bin using Falcon-512
```


Hybrid Signing (ECDSA + MLDSA)

Header layout example:



Verification Policy:

- 1. Verify both (strict mode)**
- 2. Accept either (compatibility mode)**

PQC Integration Roadmap

Hybrid Signing Transition

Start with ECDSA + PQC signatures for compatibility with existing systems.

PQC-Only Secure Boot & FOTA

Move fully to PQC signatures for firmware verification and updates.

Full PQC Adoption

Expand PQC to mutual authentication and TLS stack



Q&A