

Post-Quantum

Cryptography Conference

Overcoming Challenges in Post-Quantum Cryptography Adoption



Frank Michaud

Principal Engineer Tech Lead for Cisco Crypto Services at Cisco

KEYFACTOR

CRYPTO4A

SSL.com

ENTRUST

HID

October 28 - 30, 2025 - Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

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Overcoming Challenges in Post-Quantum Cryptography Adoption

Adoption Timelines and Product-Dependent Challenges



Post-Quantum Cryptography Conference – PKI Consortium

Kula Lumpur October 28 – 30, 2025

Frank Michaud, Principal Engineer


Quantum Threat & PQC Shift

- Quantum computing risk
 - RSA/ECC/DH vulnerable
- Shift in approach
 - No silver bullet, domain-specific solutions
- PQC standards in place
 - But not all standards are in place yet




Why worry today, when QC is not yet available?

Harvest Now– Decrypt Later (HNDL) vulnerability



NSA | Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0



CNSA FAQ [update](#)
December 2024
version 2.1:

Required-by date
accelerated to
January 2027.

Only PQC allowed
in NSS after
December 2031.

Source: National Security Agency, *Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0*

Adoption Timelines & Key Dependencies

- Dependency readiness
 - HSM, SDKs, TLS stacks, OS/toolchains
- Performance tuning
 - MTU, bandwidth, storage, latency budgets
- Protocol/profile work
 - Cert formats, hybrid modes, interop tests
- Compliance
 - FIPS, Common Criteria, CNSA 2.0, audits
- Risk controls
 - Rollback, hybrid, observability, SLOs
- Guidance
 - Multi-year embedded; weeks-months cloud hybrid



NIST Postquantum Algorithms

ML-KEM (FIPS 203)

- Based on CRYSTALS-Kyber
- Lattice-based
- Secures the exchange of keys over untrusted medium

ML-KEM Use Cases

- Securing web connections
- VPN session key establishment

ML-DSA (FIPS 204)

- Based on CRYSTALS-Dilithium
- Lattice-based
- Digital signature scheme for authenticity and integrity of data

ML-DSA Use Cases

- Signing software and updates
- Communication Authentication
- Authenticating digital docs

SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)

- Based on SPHINCS+
- Stateless hash-based
- Digital signature scheme for authenticity and integrity of data

SLH-DSA Use Cases

- Long-term code and firmware signing
- Validating certificates
- Authenticating archival documents

FN-DSA (FIPS 206) Draft

- Based on FALCON
- Lattice-based
- Very compact digital signature scheme for authenticity and integrity of data

FN-DSA Use Cases

- TLS handshakes
- Securing IoT/Embedded Devices
- Authenticate sessions for high performance systems (Ex., VPNS, Load Balancers)

HQC (Draft)

- Serves as a backup for ML-KEM to diversify outside lattices
- Code-based (decoding random linear codes problem)

HQC Use cases

- General Key Exchange (TLS, VPN, Messaging)
- Backup crypto-system

LMS/XMSS (NIST SP 208)

- Stateful hash-based signatures

LMS/XMSS Use Cases


- Firmware / software signing
- Bootloader / OS image signing
- Code updates
- Hardware root of trust

PQC Performance vs RSA/ECC

- Larger keys and signatures than RSA/ECC
 - Higher storage and transport costs
- Different computational profile
 - Impact on HSM throughput and latency
- Operational implications
 - Ecosystem/library maturity still evolving



Comparison of Public Key Sizes In Bytes



Comparison of Signature Sizes In Bytes



LMS Stateful PKI Backend Challenges

- No OTS reuse in LMS
 - Strict state tracking
- Concurrency control
 - Prevent state conflicts
- Durable state for offline signing
 - Support long workflows
- Disaster recovery
 - Restore without state duplication
- Audit processes
 - Track exhaustion, rollover, root hash integrity
- NIST SP 800-208



Path to post-quantum cryptography

NIST PQC Algorithms

LMS – [RFC8554](#) – approved

XMSS – [RFC8391](#) – approved

NIST [SP.800-208](#) – approved (implementation requirements for LMS & XMSS)

CRYSTALS Kyber: [FIPS 203](#) – ML-KEM - approved

- Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard

CRYSTALS Dilithium: [FIPS 204](#) – ML-DSA - approved

- Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard

SPHINCS+: [FIPS 205](#) – SLH-DSA - approved

- Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard

Final standards for FIPS 206 TBD

Falcon DSA (FIPS 206) – stated expectation date passed

HQC – draft pending – expected 2027

Protocol standards (the most urgent set)

IKEv2:

[RFC 9370](#) – Multiple Key Exchanges in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) – approved

[RFC 9242](#) – Intermediate Exchange in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) – approved

[Post-quantum Hybrid Key Exchange with ML-KEM in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 \(IKEv2\)](#) – draft

TLS:

[Hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3](#) – draft

SSH:

[Post-quantum Hybrid Key Exchange in SSH](#) – draft

PKI:

[Composite Signatures For Use In Internet PKI](#) – draft

[Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Algorithm Identifiers for ML-DSA](#) – draft

[Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure – Algorithm Identifiers for Kyber](#) – draft

PQC Strategy: Key Takeaways & Actions

- Planning
 - Decade long transition – need to survive throughout all hurdles
 - Dependency list can be longer than expected
 - Think of the lifetime of your products/services to evaluate the risk
- PQC algorithm
 - No silver bullet found, yet ...
 - New algos might have an impact on your design and operations
- Standards
 - You can start already
 - TLS and IKE are on the way



Thank you



