

Post-Quantum

Cryptography Conference

## Update on end-to-end PKI and HSM integrations with ML-DSA

At last years PQC Conference we benchmarked Hardware Security Modules with Dilithium. Now that FIPS-204 is released, it is time to forget about Dilithium and do production level integrations using ML-DSA. This session shows PKI application integration for issuing certificates, with a number of HSMs that are ready for ML-DSA. We will highlight how easy, or hard, it is to integrate using PKCS#11 or REST APIs. Of course there will be benchmarks of certificate issuance comparing ML-DSA against classic algorithms. Let's see what else we are able to squeeze in until January.



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Chief PKI Officer at Keyfactor



KEYFACTOR



January 15 and 16, 2025 - Austin, TX (US) | Online

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End-to-end PQC and  
HSM integrations  
(with PKI)

# Tomas Gustavsson


Chief PKI Officer

Keyfactor




# Signing Speed – Recap


Network over cloud – high latency: +-10%



Local installed – low (no) latency



# Certificate Issuance - Recap



Dilithium

ML-DSA / FIPS 204

Quantum ready  
algorithms


SPHINCS+

SLH-DSA / FIPS 205

Kyber

ML-KEM / FIPS 203

# Putting it all together



# What about PKI and Signing?

PKI and Digital Signatures *always* use HSMs in production.


You will notice the difference between different tokens...

- Using SoftHSM is in-memory
- PCI HSMs are in-memory
- Network based HSMs pass the network stack and wire (latency)
- Cloud HSMs pass the Internet

There is a reason why hash-and-sign is efficient

There is also a reason why hash-and-sign is legacy

# REST vs PKCS#11





A close-up, shallow depth-of-field photograph of a person's hands typing on a laptop keyboard. The person is wearing a grey sweater. The background is blurred, showing a wooden desk, a coffee cup, and a laptop screen. A blue rounded rectangle is overlaid on the left side of the image, containing the text 'PQCC' and 'in Practice'.

# PQCC

in Practice

# Certificate Issuance HSM 1

REST remote Internet




# Certificate Issuance HSM 2

REST remote Internet




# Certificate Issuance HSM 3

PKCS#11 remote Internet



# Certificate Issuance HSM 4

PKCS#11 local container




# Certificate Issuance HSM 5

PKCS#11 – local SW



# Signing what? How much?



## Sizes vary

- Certificates are small
- CRLs are small to large
- Bank transactions are small
- Documents are small to medium
- Firmware is large to huge

There is a limit on the data we can stream to a network connected HSM and expect it to work.

Some popular options currently have 4KB limit of the signature payload.

The new algorithms ~~are~~ were all just-sign (not hash and sign)

# CRL size limits

## ML-DSA-44 / LMS





# Lessons. Learned.



# What about PKI and Signing?

## PKI

- draft-ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates stipulates ML-DSA and introduces ExternalMu-ML-DSA to cope with CRLs
- In theory, you could have different algorithms for certificates and CRLs
  - Not seen before
- Compare Ed25519 and phEd25519 (hint, it's not fun)

FIPS 204: ML-DSA + HashML-DSA

FIPS 205: SLH-DSA + HashSLH-DSA

## Signing

- CMS have always had a workaround – using signed attributes – signs a hash.
- Easy, always include some signed attributes – but debate is on-going.
- Other signature formats?

# FIPS 203, 204, 205

When can we start with ML-DSA and friends?

- Pre standard OIDs

1.3.6.1.4.1.2.267.7.4.4 – Dilithium2 / ML-DSA-IPD-44

1.3.6.1.4.1.2.267.7.6.5 - Dilithium3 / ML-DSA-IPD-65

1.3.6.1.4.1.2.267.7.8.7 - Dilithium5 / ML-DSA-IPD-87

Confused yet?

- Must be changed to Standard OIDs (≠ML-DSA-IPD)

2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.17 ML-DSA-44

2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.18 ML-DSA-65

2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.19 ML-DSA-87

+ HashML-DSA...2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.32/33/34

# HSMs – PKCS#11 (v3.1) LMS

Same code tested with 2 HSMs so far.

```
final CKA ckaType = getAttribute(session, publicKeyRef, CKA.KEY_TYPE);
if (CKK.HSS == ckaType.getValueLong()) {
    CKA ckaValue = getAttribute(session, publicKeyRef, CKA.VALUE);
    final HSSPublicKeyParameters params = HSSPublicKeyParameters.getInstance(keyBytes);
    final BCLMSPublicKey pub = new BCLMSPublicKey(params);
}
```

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# HSMs – PKCS#11 (v3.2 - draft)

## ML-DSA

```
CKA ckaKeyType = getAttribute(session, publicKeyRef, CKA.KEY_TYPE);
if (ckaKeyType.getValueLong() = CKK.ML_DSA) {
    CKA ckaValue = getAttribute(session, publicKeyRef, CKA.VALUE);
    final byte[] keyBytes = ckaValue.getValue();
    final MLDSAPublicKeyParameters params;
    switch (keyBytes.length) {
        case 1312:
            params = new MLDSAPublicKeyParameters(MLDSAPParameters.ml_dsa_44, keyBytes);
            break;
        <snip>
        default:
            throw new InvalidKeySpecException("Invalid length of ML-DSA public key");
    }
    final BCMLDSAPublicKey pub = new BCMLDSAPublicKey(params);
}
```

# HSMs – REST

```
Object jsonObjType = jsonKey.get("obj_type");
if (jsonObjType != null && jsonObjType.equals("RSA")) {
    <snip>
} else if (jsonObjType != null && jsonObjType.equals("MLDSA")) {
    Object jsonPublicKey = jsonKey.get("pub_key");
    JSONObject mldsa = (JSONObject)jsonKey.get("mldsa");
    Object parameterString = mldsa.get("param_set");
    if (parameterString == null) {
        log.info("ML-DSA key does not have parameters:" + mldsa);
    } else {
        MldsaParamSet parameterSet = MldsaParamSet.valueOf((String) parameterString);
        return Optional.of(new AsymmetricKey((String) jsonName, (String) jsonKeyId,
            Base64.getDecoder().decode(((String) jsonPublicKey)),
            parameterSet));
    }
}
return Optional.empty();
```



# Issues Encountered

## LMS/HSS public key encoding

SubjectPublicKeyInfo vs  
SubjectPublicKeyInfo-like

ASN.1 OctetString vs BitString –  
Internet drafts changed

## LMS vs HSS key and signature

ACVP only have LMS signatures

## LMS results are inconsistent

Slow to very slow, multithreaded  
or not – not general use

# Issues Encountered

ML-DSA vs ML-DSA-IPD –  
things are not what they  
seem to be

Context was added in the last  
minute, when verification fails you  
know it 'ipd'

ML-DSA vs HashML-DSA –  
last minute decision

ExternalMu-ML-DSA

SLH-DSA, LMS, ...

Different algorithm for certificates  
and CRLs?

Signing large data

Careful testing needed – expect  
different limits on different HSMs

How to document this so that  
users understand?




# ENCRYPT

## Where are we now?

- ACVP testing is stable for FIPS standards
- BC 1.79 released with FIPS OIDs and 1.80 with interop fixes
- IETF interop going well – few releases yet
- Some HSMs with FIPS 204 IPD
- Few HSMs with FIPS 204
- Some HSMs with LMS - inconsistent
- Unwise with Production until RFCs
- Start testing early

Removed Dilithium completely – it is not ML-DSA



# LIKE IT'S 2030

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# This is the starting point on the PQC migration journey.

- New algorithms will come in the future.
- Maintaining crypto agility is a must.



Quantum-safe  
Cryptography,  
HSMs and  
Experiences

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