#### **Cryptography Conference**

### The impact of ML-KEM and ML-DSA on mTLS connection Time-to-Last-Byte

Multiple studies have evaluated the impact of PQC algorithms in TLS 1.3. These studies have been focusing on server authentication with PQC signatures. To our knowledge, there has been no study focusing on mTLS authentication where the client sends a PQ certificate chain as well. Such connections could be used in Zero Trust Architectures where the client opens multiple connections to various destinations each of which uses mTLS authentication. These sessions will be double impacted by the size of the "authentication data" travelling both directions. This presentation will share experimental results of the Time-to-Last-Byte (TTLB) of mTLS connections using ML-KEM and ML-DSA and transferring small and larger amounts of data. We will evaluate different round-trips, network bandwidth and TCP initial congestion windows. We will discuss the effect of PQC on mTLS sessions and compare it to previous experiments on typical TLS connections. We will cover potential mTLS use-cases that will suffer more than others and ways to improve them.



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## The impact of ML-KEM and ML-DSA on mTLS connection Time-To-Last-Byte

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#### Content

Introduction

Why PQ mTLSv1.3?

- $\circ$  Why PQ?
  - The challenges?
- $\circ~$  Why mTLS?
- TLSv1.3 vs mTLSv1.3

**PQ PKI Migration** 

**Cost Estimation?** 

- TCP & mTLSv1.3
  - $\circ \quad \text{Communication Flow} \quad$
- Round Trip Time (RTT)
- Congestion Window
  - o TCP & TLS RTT impact
  - Application Data Impact

#### **PQ PKI Performance**

#### **Reality?**

- Performance Graphs
- Performance Analysis



# PQ mTLSv1.3

#### $\rightarrow$ Why PQ mTLSv1.3?



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### Why migrating to PQ ML-KEM and ML-DSA?

PQ mitigation of Security Network Protocols CNSA 2.0<sup>1</sup> Commercial National Security Algorithm suite Web Browsers/Servers NIST releases 2025 ... 2027 **Cloud Services** PQ Standards Os **FIPS 203** Ο FIPS 204, FIPS 205 Code Signing Ο **Networking Equipment** Code Signing Cryptographically 2016 ... 2024 Web Browsers/Servers Relevant 2030 ... 2033 **Cloud Services** Quantum Networking Equipment Computer (e.g., VPN, routers) OS Standards Preparation CNSA 2.0 as default and preferred 


<sup>1</sup>https://media.defense.gov/2022/Sep/07/2003071834/-1/-1/0/CSA\_CNSA\_2.0\_ALGORITHMS\_.PDF



### Why mTLS?

TLS	mTLS
<ul> <li>Secure Websites (HTTPS)</li> <li>Public APIs</li> <li></li> <li>Application where only the server authentication is required</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Microservices Communication</li> <li>Internal APIs</li> <li>e-banking</li> <li>Edge-to-Cloud Communication</li> <li>Zero Trust Architecture</li> <li></li> <li>Any application with mutual trust of</li> </ul>
	authentication needed
Many studies on the impact of ML-KEM and ML-DSA on TLS	No studies on the impact of ML-KEM and ML-DSA on mTLS






## PQ mTLSv1.3 Performance Estimation

How to estimate the PQ mTLSv1.3 latency overhead?



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#### How is a secure network connection established?



o Communication flow = mainly round trips

○ Each round trip – 2-way communication flow

Round trips are expensive (high latency)
 Round Trip Time (RTT)

Multiple messages are merged up to a given size ('bucket'), forming part of a single round trip




How PQ PKI affects the communication latency?
 Additional RTTs?



#### How is the *cost* of a secure network connection estimated? Round Trip Time Estimate


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  - Eakily fittedge meingle 'bucket'
    - o Bidgitional Roburid Trip
- PQ crypto primitives
  - (large keys and signatures)
  - They don't fit into a single 'bucket'
    - Introduce Additional Round
       Trip





### Congestion Window Estimate the Round Trip Time *accurately*

- Congestion WiNDow (cwnd) ('the bucket')
  - The amount of data that fits into a Single Round Trip (~15KB)
- PQ Certificates (~22KB) > cwnd (~15KB)
   Additional Round Trips
- $\circ~$  Increase Congestion Window
  - $\circ$  PQ Certificates (~22KB) < cwnd (~34KB)
    - $\circ~$  No Additional Round Trips
- Application Data Transfer would also benefit from large congestion window
   Improved Time-To-Last-Byte






## **PQ PKI Performance**

The actual results




#### mTLSv1.3 handshake - Classical Cryptography Classical (small) Certs with Small Congestion Window






#### mTLSv1.3 handshake - Post Quantum Cryptography Classical vs. PQ (large) Certs with Small Congestion Window






#### The actual mTLSv1.3 handshake performance Classical vs. PQ (large) Certs with LARGE cwnd (Client & Server)






#### The actual mTLSv1.3 handshake performance Classical vs. PQ (large) Certs with LARGE cwnd (Client & Server)






#### The actual mTLSv1.3 performance Transfer Data (50KB) - Large cwnd (Client & Server)



#### The actual mTLSv1.3 performance Transfer Data (150KB) - Large cwnd (Client & Server)






### Conclusions

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# Thank you!



