**Post-Quantum** 

**Cryptography Conference** 

#### **CRQC** and **Signatures** – no **Problem**?

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# **CRQC and Signatures** No Problem?

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#### **Moscas Theorem and eIDAS**

"A qualified electronic signature shall have the equivalent legal effect of a handwritten signature."

eIDAS Regulation, articel 25 para. 2

retired algorithms or keys do not matter



 $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$  2021 Quantum Threat Timeline Report, Mosca/Piani, 01/2022

• no obligation for archives, regular timestamping or re-signing



A Qualified electronic signature issued today is expected to be legally binding **forever**.



#### **Court case simulation**

Disability pension claim

... electronic signature with outdated key length

→ free consideration of evidence

TransiDoc survey 2006



 $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$  Image by rawpixel.com on Freepik

#### **PQC now!**



**New DSS** 

**A** 7

6

1

**±** 10


\* 7

**♦** 4

### The PQC Signature Zoo

Simple replacement... does it work?

Probably not:



**Standard** 

XMSS\*

LMS\*

Draft

▲ Dilithium

Sphincs+

▲ Falcon



### **The Quicksand of PQC**

#### • breakups

- see SIKE, Rainbow
- improvements
  - see switch RSA PKCS1.5 to PSS

#### • bugs

- see ROCA attack on RSA
- see ECDSA "Psychic Signatures"

#### • more PQC signatures

• NISTs new competition

#### New Quantum algorithms



### The Quicksand of PQC

#### • breakups

• see SIKE, Rainbow

#### improvements

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#### o **bugs**

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#### • more PQC signatures

• NISTs new competition

#### New Quantum algorithms

#### short term switching

of keys and algorithms


#### cover security gaps

due to weak keys or algorithms

Agility



#### The Quicksand of PQC and eIDAS



### d-trust.

### **Current Approach**


- Timestamps
- AdES digital signatures

o ERS

Timestamps are not for free Maybe two timestamps are required

Will hinder deployment of Digital Signatures

Better make simple signatures last longer!






### **Hybrid Scheme**

use two or more algorithms

 Combine traditional and/or PQ algorithms

bridges security gap if one fails





#### **Related Certificates**

Cryptographic linking of two certificates to same entity



- non-critical X.509v3 extension
- CA validates reference an signs


Standard	•	draft-ietf-lamps-cert-binding-for-multi-auth
No algorithm restriction	$\checkmark$	
Protocol independent	x	Only X.509 end entity certificates; handling of two PKIs needed
Security implication	x	Usage of related keys out of scope; only one way relation
Backward compatibility	$\checkmark$	Non-critical extensions are ignored if unknown
Forward compatibility	×	



#### **Isara Catalyst Extension**

Additional key and signature in certificate

- X.509v3 extension
- also for CSRs and CRLs




Standard	$\checkmark$	ITU-T X.509 (10/2019)   ISO/IEC 9594-8			
No algorithm restriction	×	Only one extension			
Protocol independent	×	Only X.509 signatures and certificates			
Security implication	× √	Non-critical extension has unclear security Critical extension provides complete security			
Backward compatibility	√ ×	Non-critical extension is ignored if unknown Critical extension is rejected			
Forward compatibility	×				



### **Chameleon Certificates**

Reconstruction of additional certificate from Base certificate

• Non-critical X.509v3 extension



Standard	×	draft-bonnell-lamps-chameleon-certs
No algorithm restriction	×	Only one extension
Protocol independent	•	Only X.509 signatures and certificates; handling of two PKIs needed
Security implication	×	Non-critical extension has unclear security
Backward compatibility	$\checkmark$	Non-critical extension is ignored if unknown
Forward compatibility	×	



### **Composite Signatures**

Algorithm composes Keys and signatures

- Two component algorithms
- Explicit specification of pairs
- Key pair and signature are
- Both must validate (AND construction)




Standard	×	draft-ounsworth-pq-composite-sigs
No algorithm restriction	•	Limited predefined pairs, additional definitions possible
Protocol independent	$\checkmark$	Transparent to other protocols (X.509, CMS,)
Security implication	$\checkmark$	
Backward compatibility	×	
Forward compatibility	×	



### **K-of-N Signatures**

Algorithm composes keys and signatures

- N component algorithms allowed
- All component signatures are created
- Only K need to validate
- Generic construction



Standard	×	draft-pala-klaussner-composite-kofn
No algorithm restriction	$\checkmark$	Generic construction allows algorithm combination up to user
Protocol independent	$\checkmark$	Transparent to other protocols (X.509, CMS,)
Security implication	$\checkmark$	
Backward compatibility	×	
Forward compatibility	$\checkmark$	Unknown components are ignored




#### **The Hybrid Schemes Zoo**

	Related Certificates	Isara Catalyst	Chameleon Certificates	Composite Signatures	K-of-N Signatures
Standard	•	$\checkmark$	×	×	×
No algorithm restriction	$\checkmark$	×	×	•	$\checkmark$
Protocol independent	×	×	×	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
Security implication	×	× √	×	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
Backward compatibility	$\checkmark$	√ ×	$\checkmark$	×	×
Forward compatibility	×	×	×	×	$\checkmark$



### **The Agile PKI**

Automated, flexible processes for PKIs to support switching of keys and algorithms without interruption of security and operation.





### **Crypto-Agility**

(1) the ability for machines to **select their security algorithms** in real time and based on their combined security functions;

(2) the ability to **add new cryptographic features or algorithms** to existing hardware or software, resulting in new, stronger security features;

and (3) the ability to gracefully **retire cryptographic systems** that have become either vulnerable or obsolete.

Source: McKay in Anne Frances Johnson and Lynette I. Millett (Eds.). 2017. Cryptographic Agility and Interoperability: Proceedings of a Workshop. The National Academies Press, Washington, DC. https://doi.org/10.17226/24636




#### **Root Key Update**

cross-certification of root certificates

forward compatibility:
 old clients trust new root

 automated migration: install new root





### **Key takeaway points**

- Todays digital signatures have legal effect beyond CRQC
- No drop in replacement of traditional algorithms
- Agile PKI needed
  - Hybrid Algorithms
  - Crypto agile system components
  - Root key update



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## Thank You.

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#### **Cryptography Conference**





### PQ SHIELD

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