What Are Subordinate CAs and Why Would You Want Your Own?
June 26, 2019 by
Doug Beattie
(GlobalSign)
CA/Browser Forum
Chrome
Code Signing
CRL
ECC
eIDAS
Encryption
EV
HSM
Identity
Microsoft
OCSP
PKI
Policy
Revocation
RSA
S/MIME
SSL/TLS
Digital certificate and PKI adoption has changed quite a bit in recent years. Gone are the days where certificates were only synonymous with SSL/TLS; compliance drivers like stronger authentication requirements and digital signature regulations (e.g. eIDAS) have greatly expanded the role of PKI within the enterprise.
As PKI usage has expanded, conversation has moved beyond just the number and type of certificates needed and onto deeper dialogue about custom PKI deployments.
What the Latest Firefox Update Means for SSL Certificates
June 14, 2019 by
Tim Callan
(Sectigo)
CASC
EV
Firefox
SSL/TLS
Vulnerability
Last month marked the release of Firefox 66, the newest iteration of the ever-popular web browser. The update adds a number of interesting new features, including improvements to content loading and extension storage, auto-play sound blocking, and support for the AV1 codec (on the Windows version at least). The search feature has also been improved, and, as is typical of browser updates, a number of known security vulnerabilities have been patched.
2019 – Looking Back, Moving Forward
January 3, 2019 by
Bruce Morton
(Entrust)
Attack
CA/Browser Forum
Certificate Expiry
Chrome
Code Signing
DV
ECC
EV
Forward Secrecy
Identity
Mis-issued
Phishing
PKI
Policy
Qualified
Revocation
RSA
SSL/TLS
TLS 1.0
TLS 1.3
Vulnerability
Looking Back at 2018 2018 was an active year for SSL/TLS. We saw the SSL/TLS certificate validity period drop to 825-days and the mass deployment of Certificate Transparency (CT). TLS 1.3 protocol was finally completed and published; and Chrome status bar security indicators changing to remove “secure” and to concentrate on “not secure.” The CA/Browser Forum has been reformed, the London Protocol was announced and the nearly full distrust of Symantec SSL completed.
CA Security Council (CASC) 2019 Predictions: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
December 6, 2018 by
Bruce Morton
(Entrust),
Chris Bailey
(Entrust),
Jay Schiavo
(Entrust)
Apple
Attack
CASC
Chrome
DV
Encryption
EV
Firefox
Google
Identity
IETF
Malware
Microsoft
Phishing
SSL/TLS
TLS 1.0
TLS 1.2
TLS 1.3
As the legendary coach of the NY Yankees Yogi Berra allegedly said, “It’s difficult to make predictions, especially about the future.” But we’re going to try.
Here are the CA Security Council (CASC) 2019 Predictions: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.
The Good Prediction: By the end of 2019, over 90% of the world’s http traffic will be secured over SSL/TLS
Encryption boosts user security and privacy, and the combined efforts of browsers and Certification Authorities (CAs) over the past few years have moved us rapidly to a world approaching 100% encryption.
CASC Announces Launch of London Protocol to Improve Identity Assurance and Minimize Phishing on Identity Websites
June 27, 2018 by
CA Security Council
Attack
CA/Browser Forum
CASC
DV
EV
Identity
OV
Phishing
SSL/TLS
LONDON – (June 27, 2018) – The Certificate Authority Security Council (CASC), an advocacy group committed to the advancement of the security of websites and online transactions, announced at the CA/Browser Forum event in London the launch of the London Protocol – an initiative to improve identity assurance and minimize the possibility of phishing activity on websites encrypted with organization validated (OV) and extended validation (EV) certificates, which contain organization identity information (Identity Certificates).
The London Protocol
June 27, 2018 by
CA Security Council
DV
EV
Identity
OV
Phishing
The objective of The London Protocol is to improve identity assurance and minimize the possibility of phishing activity on websites encrypted by OV (organization validated) and EV (extended validation) certificates (together referred to as “Identity Websites”). The London Protocol reinforces the distinction between Identity Websites making them even more secure for users than websites encrypted by DV (domain validated) certificates. That security feature can then be utilized by others for their own security purposes, including informing users as to the type of website they are visiting and use by antiphishing engines and browser filters in their security algorithms.
Fortify Allows Users to Generate X.509 Certificates in Their Browser
June 19, 2018 by
Tim Hollebeek
Chrome
Code Signing
Encryption
Firefox
Google
HSM
Microsoft
Mozilla
S/MIME
W3C
Fortify, an open source application sponsored by Certificate Authorities through the CA Security Council, is now available for Windows and Mac. The Fortify app, which is free for all users, connects a user’s web browsers to smart cards, security tokens, and certificates on a user’s local machine. This can allow users to generate X.509 certificates in their browser, replacing the need for the deprecated <keygen> functionality.
Certificate Generation In The Browser The Web Cryptography API, also known as Web Crypto, provides a set of cryptographic capabilities for web browsers through a set of JavaScript APIs.
Fortify Provides a More Secure Web Experience for Certificates and Smart Cards
June 19, 2018 by
CA Security Council
CASC
Code Signing
S/MIME
SSL/TLS
San Francisco – June 19, 2018 – The Certificate Authority Security Council (CASC), an advocacy group committed to the advancement of web security, today announced that Fortify, an open source application sponsored by the Council, is now available for Windows and Mac. Fortify, a free app, connects a user’s web browsers to smart cards, security tokens, and certificates on a user’s local machine. This allows users to generate X.509 certificates in their browser, replacing the loss of key generation functionality.
CA/Browser Forum Governance Reform
May 18, 2018 by
Dean Coclin
Apple
CA/Browser Forum
Code Signing
Policy
S/MIME
SSL/TLS
In March 2016, the CA/Browser Forum formed a working group to review potential ways to restructure the forum. The primary goal was to examine ideas so the Forum could work on other types of standards besides TLS. Ben Wilson and I chaired this group with excellent participation from a cross functional team of browser and certificate authority representatives as well as interested parties. After 2 years of efforts, the working group produced Ballot 206 which passed in April 2017.
TLS 1.3 Includes Improvements to Security and Performance
April 10, 2018 by
Tim Shirley
Forward Secrecy
IETF
SSL/TLS
TLS 1.2
TLS 1.3
Vulnerability
Last month saw the final adoption, after 4 years of work, of TLS version 1.3 by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). This latest iteration of the protocol for secure communications on the internet boasts several noteworthy improvements to both security and performance:
Security All cipher suites that do not provide forward secrecy have been eliminated from TLS 1.3. This is a very important security property, because without forward secrecy, if a server’s private key is compromised today, any previously-recorded conversations with that server dating back as long as the key was in use could be decrypted.
