What the ICANN SSAC Report Doesn’t Tell You
March 22, 2013 by
CA Security Council
CA/Browser Forum
CASC
ICANN
SSL/TLS
The CA Security Council, which comprises seven of the largest CAs, read with interest the article titled, “Internal-use SSL certificates pose security risk for upcoming domain extensions.” As a group in one of the best positions to understand the impact of the new gTLDs on organizational security infrastructure and the Internet as a whole, we felt it appropriate to comment on this and related stories which summarize the ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC) report sac 045 Invalid Top Level Domain Queries at the Root Level of the Domain Name System.
IETF 86 – Web PKI Working Group
March 21, 2013 by
Bruce Morton
(Entrust)
CRL
Google
IETF
OCSP
PKI
Policy
Revocation
SSL/TLS
Web PKI
At the IETF 86 meeting in Orlando last week, there was a working group meeting discussing the operations of the Web PKI. At the previous IETF 85 meeting a birds-of-a-feather was held to discuss the purpose of having such a group. The result of the meeting was an established group with the charter that states purposes such as:
- Working group will work to improve the consistency of Web security behavior
- Address problems as seen by the end-users, certificate holders and CAs
- Describe how the Web PKI actually works
- Prepare documented deliverables as discussed below
The meeting discussed the charter and the four following deliverables. More information is in the presentation slides; look under the Operations and Management Area, then under WPKOPS.
All You Need to Know About the RC4 Encryption Scheme
March 14, 2013 by
Rick Andrews
Attack
CASC
Encryption
RC4
RSA
SSL/TLS
Vulnerability
The latest published attacks target specific algorithms used within SSL/TLS. Those algorithms are used when a client connects to a server via SSL/TLS; they’re not used when a Certificate Authority signs a certificate. The attacks demonstrate potential weaknesses in the use of the algorithms.
While interesting, the attacks don’t represent an immediate practical threat to users of SSL/TLS (including online banking, e-commerce, social networking, etc.). Such attacks require an attacker to run malicious software on a user’s computer which would connect to a particular web site and send the same message over and over again many times. In fact, if the attacker’s software could send the same message over and over 10 times per second, it would still take more than 3 years for the attack to succeed.
The Importance of Revocation Checking Part 2: A Real World Example
March 11, 2013 by
Wayne Thayer
Attack
Code Signing
CRL
Encryption
Identity
Malware
OCSP
Revocation
SSL/TLS
Just last week, a new security incident related to certificate revocation checking made headlines. It was discovered that a legitimate website was hosting a malicious Java application that installed malware on the computers of people who visited the site. This comes after recent updates that introduced Security Level settings in Java, and then raised the default from Medium to High. At the high level, users are shown a warning before any unsigned Java code is executed. Unfortunately, this recent incident exposed a method that allows an attacker to bypass the warning.
The Importance of Checking for Certificate Revocation
March 9, 2013 by
Rick Andrews
Attack
CRL
Identity
Malware
MITM
OCSP
Revocation
SSL/TLS
Certificates are typically valid for one to three years, and during that time it’s possible that the web site owner or the CA realizes that end users should not trust the certificate. There are several cases in which this might happen, including these:
- The web site owner ceases doing business, no longer owns the domain name used in the certificate, has changed their organization name, or wishes to shut down the web server.
- The subscriber learns that an unauthorized party has gained access to the private key associated with the public key in the certificate.
- The CA learns that errors were made in authentication, the subscriber misrepresented some material info used in the authentication process, or the subscriber has violated the terms of its agreement with the CA.
When the subscriber or CA makes the decision to revoke a certificate, that decision must be conveyed to end users who encounter the certificate in use. There are two different methods for this:
RSA Recap – Securing Your Site
March 8, 2013 by
Ben Wilson
BEAST
CASC
Encryption
Firefox
Hash Function
HSTS
OpenSSL
Policy
RSA
SSL/TLS
TLS 1.1
TLS 1.2
Vulnerability
At RSA last week a few of us participated in panel discussions that focused on SSL/TLS. During the panel that I moderated on Friday, one theme we addressed was secure server configuration. One of CASC’s goals is to help harden existing SSL/TLS implementations against vulnerabilities—because most SSL/TLS exploits arise from suboptimal website configurations. These vulnerabilities and attacks can be mitigated or even eliminated with proper server configuration and good website design.
CASC Happenings at RSA
February 25, 2013 by
CA Security Council
Attack
CASC
Identity
PKI
RSA
SSL/TLS
We are excited to have members of the CASC attending and speaking at this year’s RSA Conference. The events and panels will cover various topics that revolve around the security of the Internet and CAs as a whole. You can follow the CASC on Twitter for more information and news at @CertCouncil, as well as see some of the presentations after the events on our SlideShare page. Please join us for the following CASC member events:
OCSP Stapling: Improved Performance and Security, a Win-Win
February 14, 2013 by
Jeremy Rowley
CASC
OCSP
Revocation
SSL/TLS
The launch of the CASC has given its members a unique platform through which we can educate users about online security and the best practices in utilizing SSL. That’s why we’ve decided to pair the group’s launch with a focused effort on OCSP stapling.
Why OCSP stapling? For one, stapling is already supported by IIS and the newest versions of Apache and nginx. Although server software does not enable OCSP by default, servers can be re-configured with a little education. OCSP stapling is a significant improvement on traditional CRLs and OCSP revocation mechanisms because it eliminates the communication between the browser and CA when establishing the SSL connection. This leads to an increase in browsing performance and eliminates an attacker’s ability to successfully block a CA’s ability to provide revocation information. Stapled OCSP responses are cached by the web administrator and sent back to the relying party during the communication, effectively reducing bandwidth requirements and speeding up the SSL connection.
Certificate Revocation and OCSP Stapling
February 14, 2013 by
CA Security Council
Attack
CASC
CRL
IETF
OCSP
Revocation
SSL/TLS
Revocation
As a body of global CAs, the CA Security Council is committed to educating server administrators, end-users and other interested parties about SSL enhancements and best practices that can better protect everyone. An important initiative that can make a practical difference right now is addressing easily implemented improvements to certificate status services that handle revocation of invalid or expired certificates, specifically the implementation of OCSP stapling.
World’s Leading Certificate Authorities Come Together to Advance Internet Security and the Trusted SSL Ecosystem
February 14, 2013 by
CA Security Council
CA/Browser Forum
CASC
CRL
OCSP
Revocation
SSL/TLS
San Francisco, CA. – February 14, 2013 – Leading global certificate authorities announced the creation of the Certificate Authority Security Council (CASC), an advocacy group, committed to the exploration and promotion of best practices that advance the security of websites and online transactions. Through public education, collaboration, and advocacy, the CASC strives to improve understanding of critical policies and their potential impact on the internet infrastructure. Members of the CASC include Comodo, DigiCert, Entrust, GlobalSign, Go Daddy, Symantec, and Trend Micro.
