PKI Consortium blog
Posts by author Bruce Morton
How a SWEET32 Birthday Attack is Deployed and How to Prevent It
September 7, 2016 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) 3DES Attack Encryption RC4 SSH SSL/TLS TLS 1.0
Details surrounding the SWEET32: Birthday attacks on 64-bit block ciphers in TLS and OpenVPN can be found in the paper released by Karthikeyan Bhargavan and Gaëtan Leurent from INRIA in France. The paper shows that cipher suites using 64-bit block length ciphers are vulnerable to plaintext recovery attacks. As such, Triple-DES (3DES) and Blowfish are vulnerable. Here’s an overview. Vulnerabilities to a SWEET32 Birthday Attack Certain scenarios are pre-disposed to a SWEET32 Birthday attack.
Trust Indication Change in Google Chrome
August 24, 2016 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) Chrome EV Google ISO SSL/TLS
Google is making security icon changes in the Chrome status bar. The changes are based on a research paper prepared by members of Google and University of California, Berkeley. The research evaluated forty icons, seven complementary strings and surveyed 1,329 people. The goal is to make it easier for browser users to determine how secure their connection to a site is and indicate if the site is dangerous or deceptive. In addition, the icons are to indicate to people that HTTP is less secure than HTTPS.
Minimum Requirements for Code Signing Certificates
July 20, 2016 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) CA/Browser Forum CASC Code Signing FIPS HSM Malware Microsoft Revocation TSA
It is time for an update on the Baseline Requirements for Code Signing. First the bad news, the new standard was not approved by the CA/Browser Forum due to philosophical differences among some forum members who felt code signing was not in scope with the Forum’s charter. The good news is the document was created in a multi-stakeholder environment and substantially improves the current management processes. As such, it was decided to bring the document outside of the forum and finalize it as part of the CA Security Council.
SSL 2.0 and DROWN
April 4, 2016 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) Attack IETF OpenSSL SSL 3.0 SSL/TLS Vulnerability
A team of researchers has announced a vulnerability with SSL 2.0 called Decrypting RSA with Obsolete and Weakened eNcryption; otherwise known as DROWN. SSL 2.0 is a version of the SSL/TLS security protocols. It was released in February 1995, but due to security flaws was superseded by SSL 3.0 in 1996. DROWN is a cross-protocol attack where the bugs in SSL 2.0 can be used to attack the security of connections that use TLS.
What Will Happen With SHA-1 and Browser Users on January 1st, 2016?
January 5, 2016 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) Android Apple Chrome Firefox Google Mozilla SSL/TLS Vulnerability
On January 1, 2016, the public trust certification authorities (CAs) will stop issuing SHA-1 signed SSL/TLS certificates. What will happen? Will all websites using SHA-1 fail? No. SHA-1 will be supported by browsers and operating systems through 2016. Microsoft and Mozilla have announced that Windows and Firefox will not support SHA-1 in 2017, but no change for 2016. We expect Apple to follow the same protocol. What about Chrome? Chrome will still provide warning indications in the browser status bar for SHA-1 signed certificates which expire in 2016 and in 2017 or later.
2016 – Looking Back, Moving Forward
December 14, 2015 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) Attack CA/Browser Forum CAA Chrome Code Signing DH Encryption Firefox Google Hash Function IETF Microsoft MITM OpenSSL Policy RC4 Revocation RSA SSL/TLS TLS 1.2 TLS 1.3 Vulnerability
Looking Back at 2015 A number of new tactics proved 2015 was no exception to an active year defending against ever increasing security issues. Vendors found new and creative ways to provide vulnerabilities including the now popular man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks. MitM as well as a host of other new vulnerabilities caused browsers to rethink their security requirements. This article gives a flashback of the exploits and industry changes from 2015 and looks ahead at the latest security requirements and how it impacts IT security teams.
OpenSSL High Severity Vulnerability
July 10, 2015 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) Attack DTLS Google MITM OpenSSL SSL/TLS Vulnerability
OpenSSL has announced a high severity vulnerability, CVE-2015-1793 which will require an upgrade to some OpenSSL installations. The vulnerability was discovered by Google personnel Adam Langley and David Benjamin on June 24, 2015. Google has been working on an alternative to OpenSSL called BoringSSL. This has allowed Google to reduce vulnerabilities in their installations, but is also a benefit to OpenSSL as issues have been reported. Note that BoringSSL is not impacted.
Server Name Indication and Fewer IP Addresses
June 2, 2015 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) Attack Chrome MITM SSL/TLS
You have a dilemma. You want to continue to deploy your web service but are running out of IPv4 addresses. You consider deploying multiple virtual servers that will use the same IP address. However, your thought is that you can only have one SSL certificate per IP address. How will you make your service secure? Server Name Indication (SNI) is an extension to the SSL/TLS protocol that allows the browser or client software to indicate which hostname it is attempting to connect.
Microsoft Deploys Certificate Reputation
April 9, 2015 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) EV Google Identity Microsoft Mis-issued SSL/TLS
As we have stated previously, website owners have a concern that an attacker can have a certificate issued for their domain name. We now have two systems which will help monitor certificates for domains: Certificate Transparency (CT) and Certificate Reputation. At the start of 2015, most certification authorities (CAs) support CT as requested by Google. CT works for extended validation (EV) SSL certificates and will allow all EV certificates to be monitored.
Is Your SSL Server Vulnerable to a FREAK Attack?
March 11, 2015 by Bruce Morton (Entrust) Android Attack Encryption Forward Secrecy Microsoft MITM RSA SSL/TLS Vulnerability
FREAK is a new man-in-the-middle (MITM) vulnerability discovered by a group of cryptographers at INRIA, Microsoft Research and IMDEA. FREAK stands for “Factoring RSA-EXPORT Keys.” The vulnerability dates back to the 1990s, when the US government banned selling crypto software overseas, unless it used export cipher suites which involved encryption keys no longer than 512-bits. The issue is there are still some clients who let crypto be degraded from “strong RSA” to “export grade RSA”.